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Abstract
How should we best analyse the meaning of proper names, indexicals,
demonstratives, both simple and complex, and definite descriptions? In what relation
do such expressions stand to the objects they designate? In what relation do they stand
to mental representations of those objects? Do these expressions form a semantic
class, or must we distinguish between those that arc referential and those that are
quantificational? Such questions have constituted one of the core research areas in the
philosophy of language for much of the last century, yet consensus remains elusive:
the field is still divided, for instance, between those who hold that all such expressions
are semantically descriptive and those who would analyse most as the natural
language counterparts of logical individual constants.
The aim of this thesis is to cast new light on such questions by approaching them from
within the cognitive framework of Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theory.
Relevance Theory offers not just an articulated pragmatics but also a broad
conception of the functioning of natural language which differs radically from that
presupposed within (most of) the philosophy of language. The function of linguistic
expressions, on this conception, is not to determine propositional content, but rather to
provide inferential premises which, in parallel with context and general pragmatic
principles, will enable a bearer to reach the speaker's intended interpretation.
Working within this framework, I shall argue that the semantics of the expressions
discussed should best be analysed not in terms of their relation to those objects which,
on occasions of use, they may designate, but rather in terms of the indications they
offer a hearer concerning the mental representation which constitutes the content of a
speaker's informative intention. Such an analysis can, I shall claim, capture certain
key data on reference which have proved notoriously problematic, while respecting a
broad range of apparently conflicting intuitions.
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chapter one
Introduction
1.0
Around I5OAD Claudius Ptolemy published a book that was to define astronomy for
the next 1400 years, a book that has come to be known as the Almagest. In the
Abnagest, Ptolemy set out to provide a mathematical model of the motion of the Sun,
the Moonand the five known planets, taking as his starting point two ofthe keytenets
of Aristotelian cosmology that the Earth was at the centre of the universe and that the
motion of the heavenly bodies was perlbctly circular, i.e. that heavenly bothes moved
in a circular orbit at a constant rate around the centre of that orbit. Hampered from the
start by these premises, Ptolemy devised, in his attempt to represent the observed
motion of the planets, a model of spectacular sophistication but also of spectacular
complexity. In the system of the Almagest, the planets are taken to move in circular
orbits, with the centre of their orbits themselves orbiting around points which are
slightly removed from the position of the Earth. The centres
of the planetary orbits do not, however, move at a constant
rate around the centre of their orbits, but around a point,
known as an equwu, which is at the same distance from the
centre of their orbit as the Earth on a line passing through
the Earth and the centre of their orbit (a typical Ptolemaic
planetary orbit is illustrated by the diagram on the left)'.
This model represents the motion of the planets with reasonable accuracy: it has,
however, certain problems on its own terms: although close to the centres of the orbits
of the centres of their orbits, the Earth is not itself taken to be at the centre of the
planets' orbits, thus violating one of the key Aristotelian tenets Furthermore, planets
are not taken to move constantly around the centre of the centre of their orbits, thus
violating the other key Aristotelian tenet. Despite its enormous complexity and its
failure to respect, at least to the letter, its own foundational pniticiples, it would not be
until 1543, with the publication of Copernicus' L)e revolutionibus orbium coelestium,
'If you find this e,qosaliou c(Ptoleaaic conc4cgy l thai aitirely clear, httv /www hioiv ns
floiyJMathematcian/Pto anyhftnl offars a lucid peaaitabou o(the key elems o(tI
A1mgest.
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that any serious challenge would be mounted to the Ptolemaic system and the
assumptions on which it is buik. Copernicus' key insight was that it s possible to
do away with Ptolemy's complex theoretical machinery, his eccentrics, epicyles and
equants, by the shnple step of abandoning one of his fbundational principles, the
principle of geocentricity. If one places the Sun, rather than the Earth, Ht the centre of
one's cosmology, one no longer needs to postulate planets moving constantly around
points which are not only not the centre of their orbits, but not even the centre of the
orbit of the centre of their orbits.
In 1892 Gottlob Frege published Uber Slim und Bedeutung, a paper that has
been one of the foundation stones of the philosophy of language for the last century.
In the paper, Frege mounts an argument that looks something like this: it seems clear
that expressions such as proper names refer to things; why not, then, assume that all
linguistic expressions refer? If that is the case, however, then whole sentences must
refer; but what sort of thing might they refer to? We can asswne that hatever serves
as the reference of a sentence must be determined by the references ofithat sentences'
constituent parts. Now this offers us a strategy for finding out what sentences refer to:
it should be the case, if the reference of a sentence is determined by the references of
its parts, that, if we take one expression hi a sentence and swap it kr another with the
same reference, the reference of the sentence as a whole should remain unchanged.
But what remains unchanged in such circumstances? Nothing but the sentence's truth
value. Therefore, sentences must refer to their truth values. This argument, and later
more sophisticated versions of it, have had a profound and lasting effect on the
philosophy of language: they have located truth fairly and squarely at the centre of
theories of linguistic meaning.
This thesis will be concerned with many of the questions that have been at the
heart of the philosophy of language, and, in particular, the philosophy of reference,
since Frege placed truth at the centre of meaning: what do singular expressions,
expressions such as proper names, pronouns and definite descriptions, mean? What do
they contribute to the truth conditions of sentences in which they appear? How do
they make this contribution? Must we distmguish between those singular expressions
which denote and those which refer? If we answer 'yes' to this question, naist we
make a parallel cognitive distinction between ways of thinking of entities? 1f on the
other hand, we answer 'no', how can we account fbr intuitive differences 1ween, fbr
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instance proper names and definite descriptions? I shall also explore the issues which
provide a background to these questions: how might we want to individuate
propositional content? What sorts of evidence should we rely on in the search fur a
theory of meaning? What role should be assigned to speaker intuition?
My aim will be to address these questions from within a particular theoretical
framework, the conmiunication-based framework offered by Sperber and Wilson's
Relevance Theory (see, fur instance, Sperber and Wilson (1986/95)). Sperber and
Wilson offer not just an articulated pragmatics, but a conception of meaning which is
fundamentally different from that presupposed within much of the truth-conditional
literature on this conception, the role of language is not to encode (or determine)
propositional content, but rather to provide clues as to the content of a speaker's
informative intention. Thus the hearer of an utterance will retrieve that utterance's
propositional content not merely by decoding the sentence uttered, but by a
combination of decoding and pragmatic inference. By approaching the meaning
properties of singular expressions from within this framework, I hope to suggest that
Uber Sinn und Bedeutung has had a similar effect on twentieth century philosophy of
language as the Almagest had on mediaeval cosmok)gy putting truth at the centre of
theories of linguistic meaning has led to the construction of a great number of
semantic eccentrics, epicycles and equants. This is not to say that truth has no place in
theories of meaning and, in particular, in theories of the meaning of singular
expressions. It is clearly the case that utterances have truth conditions, and that tokens
of singular expressions contribute to the truth conditions of utterances in which they
appear. But this fact no more shows that truth must be at the centre of theories of
meaning than the fact that the Earth has a place in any satisfactory model of the solar
system shows that we should return to Aristotelian geocentricity. One of the key
claims of this thesis, then, will be that we should oust truth from the central place it
has held in those theories of meaning that have held sway fur the last century. But
what should we replace it with? The theory which I shall outline over the following
chapters suggests that we thoukl, in essence replace truth with mind. My claim will
be that the eccentrics of twentieth century semantics are the product of a failure to
appreciate the nature of the mediatory role that mind plays between language and the
world.
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1.1 Reference—a brief history
It should already be clear that an examination of the notion of reence will be
central to this thesis. But what are we talking about when we talk about relërence?
The fundamental intuition is that certain types of ressions, expressions such as
proper names, demonstratives, definite descriptions and so on, pick out particular
individual entities in order that we may talk about them. There is an intuitive contrast
between these sorts of expression and those which seem to be meaningful not by dint
of picking out individuals. So, if we consider sentence (1):
1) Bertishappy
it looks like 'Bert' and 'happy' are doing fundamentally different kinds of thing:
'Bert' picks out a particular individual, whereas 'happy' picks out a property.
This then is the starting point for discussions of reference: an intuitive
distinction between the kind of work done by different types of expression. Over the
course of the last century in particular, this distinction has been subject to extensive
refinement. To set the scene fur what Ibilows, and to give a sense of what is at stake
in debates on the nature of reibrence, I want to examine the most significant of those
refinements. This examination will, however, be briefi my aim is not primarily to
present the refinements themselves, since they are flimiliar, but rather to draw out
their underlying concerns and to focus on those concerns that are coninon to all; we
shaH also have occasion to return to some of the most influential accounts of reference
in later chapters.
Although Frege established the terms in which the modern discussion of
reference is conducted, the origin of that discussion can be traced back beyond Frege,
at least to Mill (1843). The intuitive distinction between those expressions which
serve to pick out individuals and those which do not finds a corollary in Mill's work
in the distinction between Individual names and general names:
A general name is ... a name which is capable of being truly affirmed,
lithe same sense, of each of an indefinite nwnber of things. An
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indivklual or singular name is a name which is only capable of being
truly affirmed, in the same sense, of one thing.
Mill(1843,p. 131)
Mill draws another distinction, within the class of individual names, that has been
pivotal to the nxxlern philosophy of language. For MIII, proper names are distinct
from other individual names, such as definite descriptions, hi that their meaning
properties are exhausted by thew referents, Le. by that which they name. Put in Mill's
own terms, all individual names other than proper names have both connotation and
denotation, i.e. both descriptive meaning and referent, whereas proper names have
only denotation. Given what we shall have to say about later accounts of reference, it
is perhaps unfortunate that Mill talks of the referent of a proper name as its
denotation; its referent, however, is what he is talking about. This distinction between
connotative and non-connotative names prepares the ground fbr much that Ibilows:
the question of how one takes the distinction can be seen as one of the key areas of
disagreement between opposing camps in the debate on reference.
As the discussion above may already have made clear, the intuitive distinction
between those expressions which refer and those which do not is somewhat blurred in
Frege's semantic system. For Frege all meaningful expressions may refer, not just
those which we would normally think of as doing so. This does not mean, however,
that the intuitive distinction outlined above is entirely lost for Frege. In his semantic
system it corresponds not to a division between those expressions which refer and
those which do not, but rather to a division between those expressions which have
saturated meanings and those which have unsaturated meanings2. Without going into
detail on this distinction, I corresponds closely to the klea that some expressions
serve to pick out individuals, while others serve to pick out properties which may be
true or ise of those individuals. The intuitive distinction we started off with
survives, then, albeit in alered form, in Frege's framework. Given the underlying
principles which inform Frege's semantic system, however, Mill's distinction
between connotative and non-connotative individual names is bat. For Frege, one of
the key cts about meaning is that linguistic expressions present what they refer to in
a particular way. This idea tics in with the fbtmdational epistemological notion that
2 For a p esontion of this distinction, , instance, Frege (1891)
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we cannot think of an individual other than as the satisfier of certain properties: I
cannot entertain a bare thought about the desk I am working at, for instance; I must
instead think of it as that which is presented to me in such-and-such a way. Given this
epistemological slant there can be, for Freg; no non-connotative names: if a name
were non-connotative, it would seem that to grasp the meaning of that name would be
simply to think of its referent, without thinking of that referent in any particular way.
All singular expression must therefore have descriptive meaning, Le. sense 3. Not only
does this view tie in with the fimdamental tenets of Frege's epistemology, it also
offers a way out of a puzzle that has dominated the philosophy of reference for a
century, a puzzle that has come to be known as F,vge 'a puzzle. We shall have much to
say about Frege's puzzle in the coming chapters, particularly when we come on to
discuss the semantics of specific types of singular expression. In its simplest form it
looks 1&e this: if Mill is right, then proper names lack any meaning beyond their
referent. But ifthat is so, then there can be no difference in meaning between, for
instance, (2) and (3):
2) Batman is Bruce Wayne
3) Bruce Wayne is Bruce Wayne
Afler all, (2) and (3) difler only in the substitution of one name for another name with
the same reference. On the assumption that names have no meaning other than
reference, (2) and (3) must therefore have the same meaning. Yet this is clearly
wrong, according to Frege: (2) and (3) must have difierent meaning properties for the
simple reason that (2) is potentially informative, i.e. is cognitively significant,
whereas (3) is not. This puzzle has been largely responsible for setting the parameters
within which discussion of reference has been conducted; in particular it has placed
the relation between meaning and cognitive significance centre stage. Frege's
assumption is that a plausible semantic theory must be answerable to fracts concerning
cognitive significance. Whether this is so, or whether, as some recent contributors to
3 In identifying Fregean sane with descrq*ive meaning I beIiec th I an not only being faithfi3l to
Frege's intgsition, Indian also aligning myself with the majority intapretatiosi of Frege's work. My
intapretalion is, however, M odds with th of Evans (see, in particular, Evans 1982) who sees the
possibility in Frege's work c(non-desoriptive san
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the debate would have it4, semantic acts and cognitive facts are mdepeadent, will be
a theme that we will return to on more than one occasion.
A system such as Frege's, on which to be rneaningfiul is to have descriptive
meaning, conforms closely with hguition in its analysis of expressions such as
definite descriptions and complen demonstratives. But then, as far as these
expressions are concerned, Frege's semantics have much in common with Mill's: on
both accounts, the meaning of these types of expression must be analysed along two
dimensions, for Mill, connotation and denotation, for Frege, sense and eeference. The
interesting case is clearly going to be the analysis of proper names. The Miffian
intuition, that names lack descriptive meaning, seems robust: on the 6cc of it, there
seems to be no descriptive condition which an individual must satisfj, in order to be
the referent of 'Condoleezza Rice', she simply has to be Condoleezza Rice. Yet this
intuition is beyond the grasp of a semantic system such as Frege's meaningful as they
are, expressions such as 'Condoleezza Rice', must indeed have a sense, maybe the
same sense as the description 'George W. Bush's National Security Advisor'. I don't
want to go any further into this issue here; we shall pick it up again when we come to
discuss the semantics of proper names in chapter 3. The point I want to stress, since
we are examining the intuitive basis for the debate on reference, is that ii this respect,
Frege's semantic system seems, at least, counterintuitive. Once we do) return to this
question in chapter 3, however, it will turn out that there is a way of looking at
Frege's account on which I seems less counterintuitive.
Mill's distinction between connotative and non-connotative individual names
resurfuces in Russell's account of reference, based, as it is, on an epistemology which
differs from Frege's in fundamental respects. I shall have a great deal to say about
Russell's theory of descriptions when I come onto look at the semantics of definite
descriptions in chapter 5. Here I shall restrict mysel1 therefore, l the briefest
discussion. Underlying Russell's semantics is a distinction betweeii two ways in
which we can think about indivkkjals we can think of an individual either in an
essentially Fregean way as the satistler of some property or set of properties, or in a
much more immediate way which Russell terms knowledge by acquaintance. This
distinction tallies with some robust intuitions: there seems to be a fimdamental
4 See, R instanon, Wdtstein (1986).
3 For Russell's setnsnlic and tamlogic views on rcferan see, us particula Russell (1905) and
Russell (1911).
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difference between the way you can think, for instance, about your next door
neighbour and the way you can think about the okiest woman in the worki (whoever
she may be); while you can entertain thoughts about both, that, lbr instance, your next
door neighbour left his rubbish on your doorstep again and that the oldest woman in
the world can't be looking forward to the future much, your thoughts about your next
doorneighbourseem,onanhitukivelevel,tobelinkedtothefrobjectinawaythat
your thoughts about the okiest woman in the world are not. For Russell, this cognitive
distinction has a linguistic corollary some expressions, which Russell terma logically
proper names, are anchored to their referents in the same way as acquaintance-based
thoughts they do not present their reirents as the satisflers of any set of propeities
but rather simply label those referents. Given their lack of any mode of presentation,
Russell's logically proper names can be identified with Mifi's non-connotative
individual names. We can thus see the re-emergence of a distinction that has since
become Ilindameilal to the philosophy of language between, on the one hand, certain
classes of singular expression which refer directly to their designata, and, on the other,
classes of singular expression which operate on something like a Fregean model. As I
shall discuss at some length in the chapters that follow, the assumption embodied by
Russell's account, that truth-conditional distinctions between types of cognitive entity
must early over to types of linguistic entity, has become part of the bedrock of
modern truth-conditional semantics.
While Russell drew a hard and fast distinction between logically proper
names, on the one hand, and definite descriptions on the other, applying this
distinction to the semantics of natural language proved problematic. As we shall see
when we come on to look at the semantics of proper names in chapter 3, the
assumptions upon which his epistemology was based forced Russell to some
notoriously unpalatable conclusions, conclusions that undermine the intuitive basis for
his distinction between logically proper names and descriptions. Despite the
unpalatability of these conclusions, the fundamental distinction drawn by Russell
between those singular expressions which serve as no more than labels for their
designata and those which designate via the satisfaction of a property, between, ii
other words, those expressions which refer and those which denote, has become one
of the main plails of the currently dominant school of thought on reference. As we
saw above, a Fregean model of reference seema to work fine (speaking roughly) for
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expressions such as definite descriptions and complex demonstratives. It seems to
work less well, or, at least, is less in tune with pre-theoreticaf intuition, when it comes
to an analysis of expressions such as proper names which seem, on the face of it, to
lack descriptive meaning. As Kripkc has shown (Kripke 1972 etc), this is far from
being the only problem we face if we apply a Fregean model to proper names. A
Fregean story on names depends on the claim that, when we successfully refer by use
of a proper name, this must be because our use of the name corresponds to a mode of
presentation, a sense, which uniquely picks out that to which we have referred. Yet, as
Kripke shows, we may refer to a particular individual using a proper name even if
every piece of information we associate with the name is false of that individual, or,
indeed, where we have no uniquely identiIing information concerning that individual
at alL
Such observations have heralded a return to the Milhian model over the last
thirty years or so. The key tenets of the new version of Millianism, espoused by
Kripke, Kaplan, Perry et aL, are that we must distinguish between those expressions
which refer by virtue of their linguistic meaning and those which denote by virtue of
their linguistic meaning, and that those expressions which are referential contribute
nothing to truth-conditional content but their referents. Even in the neo-Millian
analysis of referring expressions, however, we can still make out the reflection of a
Fregean two-tier semantics. For Kaplan (in particular 1989a), the key distinction
between referring and denoting expressions does not lie in whether or not their
linguistic meaning is descriptive; both, on his semantic system, may have descriptive
linguistic meaning. Rather it depends on what role that descriptive meaning plays
with regard to propositional content. What distinguishes referring expressions, a. a
class, from denoting expressions, as a class, is that whatever descriptive meaning the
lbrmer have drops out of the picture prior to the level of propositional content, serving
only to constrain reference. The latter by contrast contribute their descriptive meaning
to propositional content Given this analysis, Kaplan distinguishes between the
linguistic meaning of a referring expression, its character in his terms, and is content,
i.e. that which I contributes to propositional content which, on his account, is nothing
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but its referent (or, more accumtely but less perspicuously, a constant function from
cicumstances of evaluation to its referent)6.
Neo-Millianism can be viewed as an attempt to develop the Russellian
distinction between logically proper names and denoting expressions into a semantic
theory for natural language. Any such attempt will, of course, have to confront those
data around which the Fregean model was designed, and in particular Frege's puzzle
itself After all, if Mill's original story fell foul of Frege's puzzle, what reason might
there be to suppose that a new version will not also come to grief on 1? Mucb ink has
been spilled in answering just this question, and many variants of the basic Milan
picture have been developed as a result.
1.2 Language, mind and reference
Regardless of the differences between different flavours of neo-Millianism, more or
kss all accept the fundamental Russeffian assumption that there is a direct correlation
between type of expression linguistically indivkluated and type of propositional
contribution truth-conditionally individuated. Put another way, it is assumed that one
type of expression must always give rise to the same type of propositional
contnl,ution. It is this assumption, above all, that has led, I shall cJlaim, to the
eccentrics, epicycles and equants of modern semantic theory. Why should this be so?
There is, I shall argue, extensive evidence that all types of singular expression can be
used either referentially or descriptively they can, that is, give rise to either singular
or general truth condition& It; however, one works on the assumption that expression
types must always give rise to the same type of propositional constituent, truth-
conditionally bdividuated, then some sophisticated theoretical machinery is going to
be called for to explain this apparent data. You have two choices: either you claim
that all uses of your chosen singular expression give rise to singular prcpositions, or
you claim that they all give rise to descriptive propositions. Either way, you need
some way of explaining how it is that there are apparent examples in which your
singular expression gives rise to the wrong kind of proposition. Much use has been
made of the Gricean notion of hnplicature in this cause, particularly in an analysis of
'The ideatificstion of thact with Iiniistic meaning is dearest in Kaplan (1989a).
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what Donnellan7 terms the refe,niia1 use of definite descriptions, of which we will
see much more in chapter 5.
Why, rather than employ this theoretical machinery, shouki we not simply
accept, in fight of the strong evidence available, that singular expressions can make
different types of propositional contribution in different contexts? There are two key
answers that are either explicit or implicit in the literature: firstly, any account on
which singular expressions can be either referential or descriptive is thereby an
ambiguity account, and we should, on theoretical grounds, prefer accounts that can do
without positing ambiguities. I shall argue hi the final chapter of the thesis that to
view the account I favour as an ambiguity account would be to misunderstand why
avoiding ambiguity is a goal worth pursuing Ibr the semantic theorist. The second
reason why the one-expression-one-propositional contnl,ution assumption has
remained so pervasive is this: if we abandon it, then we abandon the hope that we
might be able to explicate the linguistic meaning of singular expressions hi terms of
the notion of truth, and, since Frege placed truth at the centre of meaning, it has
largely been taken on faith that truth offers our best hope of a satisfactory theory of
meaning. I shall argue that, at least as far as singular expressions are concerned, we
must bite the bullet, accept that truth cannot lie at the heart of theories of linguistic
meaning, and thus excise the Ptolemaic machinery which has become a familiar
feature of the modern philosophy of language.
1.3 Structure
I propose to structure the thesis as follows: in chapter 2! shall layout the theoretical
machinery which I intend to nse in building my theory of the semantics of singular
expressions. This machineiy will come in three flavours: cognitive pragmatic and
semantic. Once I've laid out the theoretical machinery, I shall then, ii chapters 3 to 6,
examine the semantics and pragmatics of different types of singular expression,
outlining the account of each that I favour and comparing I with the mali accounts
currently on the philosophical markel Finally in chapter 71 shall address how the
accounts I will by then have developed fit m with broader semantic concerns.
See in pw1ii1ar, Donndlan (1966).
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Chapter 2
The theoretical background
2.0
In this chapter I want to undertake some preliminary groundwork, groun&work upon
which the account of the semantics and pragmatics of singular expressions which I
shall developin chapters3to 6wlllbuild.Attheheartofmythesis isareassessmeit
of the relations between semantic, pragmatic and cognitive facts in an account of
singular expressions. It will thus be necessary to provide both background and
technical machinery for each of these dimensions of the account. I shall net, however,
address them in this order the view of semantics which Ishall be werking with
depends upon a proper understanding of the role played by pragmatic inference in the
determination of propositional content while the nature of our pragmatic macliineiy
depends on prior facts about human cognition. I shall thus start with some cognitive
scene-setting, and, once that is hi place, move on to look at the pragmatic and
semantic issues that underlie the claims I shall be making in the rest of the thesis.
2.1 A general view of mind and cognition
As discussed hi chapter 1, the account of the semantics and pragmatics of singular
expressions which I aim to defrnd will make extensive use of the relevance-theoretic
framework developed by Sperber and Wilson (e.g. 1986/95). Given this I am
committed from the outset to certain claims on the nature of mind which arc
embodied in that framework; in particular the account I shall develop presupposes a
representationalist view of mind. That is to say, I shall take the Lontents of
propositional attitudes to be representations in something like a language of thought.
As Fodor (see hi particular Fodor (1975)) has convincingly argued, all vaguely
plausible views on the operation of mind presuppose computation, and computation
presupposes something like a machine code. It thus seems that all plausible views on
the mind presuppose some lbrm of language of thought.
Placing my account within a relevance-theoretic framework also commits me
to certain claims about human mental architecture; in particular I am committed to the
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view that mind is modular in something like the sense of Fodor (I 983). The details of
what such a claim must amount to have been the subject of much recent discussion,
within the relevance-theoretic framework and elsewhere. It is beyond the scope of this
thesis to argue lbr any one particular take on the notion of mental modularity. I want,
however, to lay out those features of the modular view which will be significant for
the kind of account of singular expressions which I wish to develop.
Fodor (1983) presents a view on which the architecture of the mind is divkled
between input modules and central systems. Among the hallmarks of modular
processes is that they are domain specific, mandatoiy and lIst; central processes, by
comparison, are domain general, optional and relatively slow. Given these typical
feature sets, language processing seems, for Fodor, to be a good candidate lbr
modularity. This view, that the mind contains a language processing input module
which takes as its input linguistic stimuli and, having processed those stimuli, passes
its output on to other mental components, dovetails elegantly with the relevance-
theoretic view of language and communication. I don't want to say much more about
this here, since I will return to the interrelations between relevance and modularity
when I lay out the semantic and pragmatic background to my account later in this
chapter. In brief; however, relevance theorists take the distinction between those
interpretive processes which are conducted within the language module and those
which are conducted at a higher cognitive level to correspond to a distinction between
linguistic decoding and pragmatic inference. As I shall discuss below, the view that
the encoded content of linguistic stimuli goes no further than whatever the output of a
dumb language processing module may be has profound implications for the
semantics-pragniatics interfi,ce.
In addition to these general claims about the nature of mind and mental
architecture, the relevance-theoretic analysis of communication rests on a specific
claim about human cognition: that it is guided by the search for relevance. For
Sperber and Wilson (Sperbez and Wilson (1986195), Wilson and Sperber (2002) etc.),
relevance is taken to be a property of inputs to cognitive processes, be those inputs
external (enviromnental stimuh) or internal (e.g. thoughts, memories etc.). As far as
the determination of relevance is concerned, such inputs have two key features: on the
'it might patzape, be bett to say that lam coimnitted to the view that mind i conpitatkinally
modnl& in the saise of Segal (l996.
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one hand they may offer an agent positive cognitive effects - they may combine with
other available information to provide new information, they may remlbrce pie-
existing hifonnation or they may contradict and eliminate pie-existing beliefs - while
on the other they will cost the agent eflbrt to process: accessing the available positive
cognitive effects will place a lesser of greater demand on the agent's cognitive
resources. It is the balance between these two factors that, for Sperber and Wilson,
determines the relevance of an input:
Relevance of an input to an individual
a. Other things being equal, the greater the positive cognitive effects achieved by
processing an input, the greater the relevance of the input to the individual at
that time.
b. Other things being equal, the greater the processing effort expended, the lower
the relevance of the input to the individual at that time.
Wilson and Sperber (2002, p. 252)
Sperber and Wilson's claim is that hwnan cognition is geared towards optimising the
balance between positive cognitive effects and processing effoit This claim is
formalised in their cognitive principle of relevance:
Cognitive principle of relevance
Hwnan cognition tends to be geared to the maximisation of relevance.
Wilson and Sperber (2002, p. 254)
The significance of this principle to our curreit concerns will not become clear until
we examine the relevance-theoretic account of utterance interpretation later hi this
chapter. As we shall see then, however, utterance interpretation, on the relevance-
theoretic view, depends on the exploitation of the cognitive principle ofrelevance.
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2.2 Thoughts of individual particulars
2.2.1 Individual concepts - an outline
While I shall presuppose, in this thesis, the sort of picture of mind and cognition
outlined above, my main focus, as far as cognition is concerned, will be on mental
representations of individuals. I shall, throughout, refer to such representations as
individual concepts. This term seems to me to have the advantage of offering an
intuitive way to talk about conceptual representations of individuals. There is,
however, a caveat that needs to be raised: I am not using the term in line with the
semantic tradition on which an individual concept is taken to be a function from
indices to individuals, i.e. the intension of a singular expression. The sense in which I
use the term should become clear as this section progresses. I want to underline here,
however, that I take individual concepts to be subjective cognitive entities to be, in
other words, whatever representation a cognitive agent entertains when she thinks of a
particular individual.
I want to start out, then, with the following idea: that, on a representationalist
view of the mind, what it is to have a thought about an individual is to entertain a
propositional mental representation one of the components of which is a
representation of the individual in question, i.e. one of the components of which is an
individual concept of that individual But what do such concepts look like? What, in
other words, makes a concept an individual concept? The answer I want to suggest is
broadly familiar within the philosophical literature2. I want to identiI' individual
concepts with dossiers containing infonnation all of which is taken by the holder of
the concept to be satisfied by the same individual Thus, for instance, you may have a
concept of Humphrey Bogart which contains the information that he was a film star
(which I shall henceforth represent as x was a film star), that x led in The Big Sleep,
that x was married to Lauren BacaIl and so on. On the kind of story I am proposing,
to say that you have placed these pieces of inlbrmation in the same dossier, i.e. in the
same individual concept, is just to say that you take them all to apply to a single
individuaL Looking at the same point from a diflërent angle individual concepts are
2 Sce, fw histic Once (1969), Reati (1993), Lson d Segal (1995).
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taken by their holders to license particular inference schemas: a cognitive agent who
has placed the information that x is F and that x Lc G into the same individual concept
takesthi$tolicensetheinfeTenceto3x(Fx&Gx).
Although this is only, as yet, the barest outline of an anatomy for individual
concepts, there might already seem to be an objection: while it is clearly the case that
we do have individual concepts of actual individuals, we also seem capable of
entertaining individual concepts of non-actual individuals. I can ceitahily entertain a
concept of Hwnphrey Bogart, but I can also entertain a concept of Philp Marlowe, a
concept that may contain information such as x Lc the pivtagonist of The Big Sleep,
Farewell my Love'y etc., x was created by Raymond Chandler, x Lc a detective in Los
Angeles and so on. But, so the objection might go, on the story I have told so far, my
concept of Philip Marlowe cannot be viewed as an individual concept: II take none of
the information in my Philip Marlowe concept to be satisfied by a particular
individual, since Philip Marlowe is fictional. I cannot therefore afomon, take all the
information in my Philip Marlowe concept to be satisfied by the same individual. I
don't want to say a great deal on this question here; I will return to the issues raised
by non-denoting individual concepts at some length hi the next chapter. What I will
suggest there is, in essence, that the apparent pmblents posed by empty individual
concepts are not best addressed by altering our story on the anatomy of individual
concepts, but should rather be addressed via a distinct theory of flctionl contexts (or,
more broadly, of non-actual contexts).
2.22 Two types of individual concept
What I have claimed so far, then, is that when we think of individuals we do so by
entertaining individual concepts which comprise dossiers of Information taken to be
true of a single individuaL This, however, leaves open a key question: what makes an
individual concept a concept of a particular mdividual? In answering this question we
will need to distinguish between two types of individual concept, a InctIon that
harksbucktotheworkofRussell(e.g. 1905,1911).
The theory of meaning developed by Russell depends, as was 1*iefly discussed
hi the last chapter, on some t1ndamental epistemological clams. thderlyhig the
distinction, central to Russell's semantics, between logically pmper names and
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denoting expressions, as the parallel distinction between knowledge by acquaintance
and by description. Russell (1911) sketches the distinction thus: 'I say that I am
acquainted with an object when I have a direct cognitive relation to that object, i.e.
when I am directly aware of the object itself(p. 108); 'I shall say that an object is
Imown by description" when we know that it is "the so-and-so," Ic. when we know
that there is one object, and no more, having a certain property'(p. 113). As
mentioned in chapter 1, such a distinction seems to have a robust intuitive basis: it
seems, lbr instance, that my thoughts about my next door neighbour, call him 'Bob',
are of a fundamentally different kind from my thoughts about the oldest woman in the
world (whoever she may be). As is well known, however, Russell came up against
some formidable problems in applying these distinctions, between logically proper
names and denoting expressions and between knowledge by acquaintance and
knowledge by description, to an analysis of natural language. A brief examination of
these problems will, I believe, be instructive.
Russell's account approaches meaning from a strictly realist stance. As Neale
(1990, p. 15) puts it, 'every meaningful item of language stands for something reaL
The meaning of an expression is simply that entity for which I stands' This semantic
view has a necessary epistemic cocollaiy if the meaning of an expression is just that
entity for which it stands, then to grasp the meaning of an expression must just be to
grasp the entity I stands fbr. One inplication of this is that, should an expression fail
in fact to stand for any entity, then there should be nothing which would count as
understanding that expressiolt The mental objects which constitute our understanding
of referential expressions must therefore be such that they cannot exist ii the absence
of something for them to stand for. Put another way, Russell requires mental modes of
presentation that would simply not be available if that for which they stand did not
exist. Acquaintance is, fur Russell, the relation in which a cognitive agent must stand
toanentity,inordertobeabletothinkofitinthisobject-dependentway.The
difficulty is that such mental modes of presentation, such concepts, are very hard to
come by. We could be mistaken about the existence of more or less any entity which
we believe ourselves to have thoughts about Thus, I currently believe that I am
having a thought about a particular mug to the effect that it is empty but would be
better fulL it is entirely possible, however; that I am merely hallucinating, that there is
in fact no mug. Given this, Russel must conclude that my thought about the mug,
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although seemingly as direct as any thought could be, is in fact descriptive; I am
thinking of the mug not by acquaintance, that is, but by description. The difficulty of
finding any concepts which are truly immune to error, and thus of finding linguistic
expressions which might express such concepts, led Russell down some dark alleys.
The best known of these alleys is to be found in his account of the semantics of proper
names, an account which wiH receive more detailed attention in the next chapter. For
the time being Ijust want to point to Russell's central thesis on names. Aswe have
seen, to understand an expression is to grasp that which it stands for. It seema
intuitively clear, moreover, that I can understand the sentence:
I) Santa Claus is coming to town
despite the failure of 'Santa Claus' to pick out any actual individual3. If Russell
accepts that I can understand the name 'Santa Claus', as he must, he is forced to the
following conclusion that proper names do not, in fact, stand for individuals. And this
is, of course, just the view that Russell held: that proper names are semantically
equivalent not to his logically proper names but rather to definite descriptions; that
they stand, in other words, not for individuals but for complex quantified structures.
The requirement, imposed on him by his realist framework, that the semantic
value of a concept, and thus of any expression which expresses that concept, can only
be identified with an individual if the concept is immune to error, robs Russell's
epistemology of its intuitive support. Consider once more the intuition we originally
used to motivate a distinction between different ways of thinking of things, the
intuition that my thoughts about my neighbour Bob are of a different kind from my
thoughts about the oldest woman in the world. On Russell's picture this isn't so: my
thoughts about both must be descriptive, since I certainly have no concept of Bob
which is entirely immune to error. If we want to capture this intuition, then, we need
to look for an alternative to Russell's notion of acquaintance. This is not to say that
Russdllian acquaintance will have no role to play: as I shall come on to discuss
shortly, there do seem to be certain concepts which are hinnune to error, and which
may or may not correspond to particular linguistic expressions However, if we are
'assuming th the nso 'Santa Clam' as we use It slxmld not be takat to ref to Saint Nitholas, a
4th caituly bishop from Asia Minor. Evas if we do so take it, howevu, the swim point om be made,
sin thore scans to be some cvidai thot Saint Nidiolas did not, in sot, oci.
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interested in capturing the intuitions that support Russellian acquaintance, Russellian
acquaintance itself will be too inflexil,Ie a theoretical notion. My aim in what follows
is to outline an alternative to Russell's distinction which I believe will do the work we
want of it. I shall not here have much to say ii defrnce of this outline; it must stand or
fall according to how well it allows us to account for the semantic behaviour of
singular expressions, and we will not come on to discuss that question until I present
my account of singular expressions starting in the next chapter.
The lesson we should learn from the problems facing a Russellian
epistemology is that infallil,IIity is a dead end when it comes to capturing the intuitive
distinction between these different ways of thinking of individuals. An alternative
basis for the distinction has been advocated, in one form or another, by a number of
recent philosophers of language (see, for instance, Recanati (1993), Bach (1987)). On
this approach, the distinction between, for instance, the way I can think of my
neighbour Bob and the way I can think of the oldest woman in the world comes down
to a difference between the sort of facts that make each of these ways of thinking a
way of thinking of a particular individuaL It seems reasonably clear that my concept
of the oldest woman in the world attaches to its designatum satisfactionally, this is
just to say that it is a concept of whoever satisfies its descriptive content, i.e. of
whoever is the oldest woman in the work!. It is equally clear, however, that my
concept of Bob does not attach to its designatum satisfactionally making use of the
sort of intuitions which Kripke (e.& 1972) marshals as evidence for the rigidity of
proper names, it seems that my concept of Bob may contain information which is
false of Bob or may fail to contain information which Bob uniquely satisfies without
thereby ceasing to be a concept of Bob. I then, my concept of Bob is not of Bob
because Bob satisfies some or all of is descriptive content, what is it that makes my
concept of Bob of Bob? The answer which is now familiar within the philosophy of
language and mind is that my concept of Bob is of Bob because of certain causal
relations in which Bob and my concept stand; because Bob is, in some appropriate
sense, the causal origin of my Bob concept. I don't propose to spend time discussing
just which causal relations are appropriate for this corollaiy of Russellian
acquaintance: interesting though this question is, there are many brands of answer
currently available on the market which I am sure are along more or less the right
lines, and a proper discussion of the question would require an extensive digression
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from our central concerns. The point I wish to focus on is that a distinction between
those concepts which pick Out their designatum satisfactionally and those which pick
out their designatum relatkrnally may well offer us an appropriate alternative to
Russell's distinction between acquaintance and description.
How will this hlea look when recast in the language of individual concepts?
What I would suggest is this: we should distinguish between two dimensions of
individual concepts, what I shall call their internal and external dimensions. All
individual concepts have structurally similar internal dimensions along the lines
suggested above; their internal dimensions will essentially be repositories of open
sentences structured in such a way that they support particular inferences. it is thus in
terms of facts concerning their internal dimensions that the class of individual
concepts as a whole is to be individuated. It is only when we come to look at their
external dimensions that we start to see distinctions within the class of individual
concepts. For those concepts which pick out their designatum satisfactionally,
henceforth, following standard usage dexnpllve individual concepts, the relation
between internal and external dimensions is intimate: essentially one or more
elements of the internal dimension are co-opted to do work as the external dimension.
In the limiting case, the internal dimension of a descriptive individual concept may
comprise a single piece of information; I may, for instance, know nothing at all about
the oldest woman in the world. On the view I want to propose, my concept of the
oldest woman in the world would thus have identical internal and external
dimensions. Given that this concept, as it stands, licenses no inferences, why should I
want to say that the unique piece of information that x is the oldest woman in the
world enters the internal dimension at all? Why should I not rather say that this
individual concept has an external dimension which anchors it to whoever is the
oldest woman in the world, but has an empty internal dimension? The answer to this
concerns the inferences I will be disposed to draw once new information is added.
Say, for instance, that I learn that the oldest woman in the world lives in Asia. On the
picture painted above, this should lead me to add the information x lives in Asia to the
internal dimension of my oldest-woman-in-the-world concept. If this were the only
piece of information within the internal dimension, I should still not be in a position to
draw inferences from the concept. But clearly I am in a position to do so; I will, for
instance be disposed to lifer that 3x(Oldest-woman-in-the-world x & Lives-in-China
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x). Since this is an instantiation of just the inference schema which internal
dhnensions of individual concepts characteristically support, there seems to be good
reason to suppose that we should place a copy of the condition which comprises the
external dimension of such a concept in its internal dimension.
What of the more complex case, in which the internal dimension of a
descriptive individual concept comprises more than one piece of information? What I
wail to suggest is that any uniquely identil5ring condition (or conjunction of
conditions) within the internal dimension can serve as external dimension4. Thus,
consider a concept the internal dimension of which contains the information that x u
the oldest woman In the world and that x Lr the oldest woman In China. Either of these
conditions can serve as external dimension; the bearer of the concept can, in other
words, entertain the thought that, for instance, the oldest woman in the world is U,
from which she should be inclined to infer that the oldest woman in China is G, as
well as the thought that the oldest woman hi China isU from which she should be
inclined to in1r that the oldest woman in the world is G. It seems to me to come
down to little more than preference whether we are inclined to say that we have here
two distinct individual concepts or one individual concept with distinct external
dimensions on distinct occasions of use. Given what I shall come on to say about
relational Individual concepts, I am inclined to view the two concepts as distinct
although, given that they share an internal dimension, Intimately linked.
What I have suggested, then, is that there is a close link between the internal
and external dimensions of descriptive individual concepts. One upshot of this is that
a cognitive agent may not rationally revise all the information within the internal
dimension of a descriptive individual concept without also revising its external
dimension; she cannot, for instance, jettison the information that x is the oldest
woman in the world from the internal dimension of a descriptive concept while
retaining this condition as the concept's external dimension at pam of entertaining the
contradictory belief that the oldest woman in the world is not the oldest woman in the
worki. This shows up one of the key distinctions between descriptive concepts and
those individual concepts which pick out thei designata relationally, henceforth
(again following coimnon usage) de , individual concepts. As suggested by the claim
i shall have more to say on the requiranad th the condition saving as the extanul dimension
should be uniquely denoting below.
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that such concepts pick out their designata relationally, the satisfaction of none of the
conditions which comprise is internal dimension is criterial to determining the
reference of a de concept5. On the view I want to suggest, the descriptive
conditions within the internal dimension of a de re concept are overridden, as far as
the external dimension is concerned, by a causal relation hi which the concept stands
to a particular mdivklual Thus my concept of my neighbour Bob may contain the
informationx,sateacher,x scalled 'Bob,xis male.Ican, nevertheless, come to
revise all of these pieces of information without rendering my concept contradiotory
that is to say that, for any condition x L G which appears within the internal
dimension of by Bob concept, I can rationally come to believe that Bob is not G.
I have so far laid out a reasonably simple ontology for individual concepts: on
the one hand there are descriptive individual concept which pick out their designata
satislhctionally and thus contribute a complex condition to the truth conditions of
thoughts in which they occur, while on the other there are de re individual concepts
which pick out their designata relationally and thus contribute nothing but their
designata to truth-conditions. On this picture, all individual concepts are of a kind as
far as their internal dimensions are concerned, the difference between the two distinct
types arising only at the external leveL As it turns out, however, things are not quite
as straightforward as this. Firstly, although the causal link that determines the
reference of a de re concept is a matter of that concept's external dimension, the fact
of the link must be internally represented. Recanati (1993) gives an analysis of the
semantics of what he takes be directly referential expressions on which these
expressions encode, as part of their linguistic meaning, a feature which Recanati terms
REF. This REF feature serves to mark an expression as directly referential i.e. limits
the truth-conditional contribution of the expression in question to its referent. To give
a flavour of what is to come, I shall argue throughout this thesis that singular
expressions are not marked by dint of their linguistic meaning as either referential or
descriptive. They may, however, given appropriate context, give rise to referential or
descriptive readings. Individual concepts, by contrast, are marked as either referential
or descriptive: that is to say, we have intuitions concerning whether particular
concepts are linked to ther reference in the intimate way which Russell identified
with knowledge by acquaintance, or the indirect way identified with knowledge by
The killowing es nith to the t-cimçcnaIt pdure defaided by Recanati (1993).
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description. It thus seems a natural move to transfer Recanati's REF feature from the
encoded meaning of particular linguistic expressions to the internal dimension of
particular individual concepts, specifically those Individual concepts which are de re.
Why should we want REF to be a constituent of the internal dhnensiafl of de re
concepts? Firstly to account for our intuitions concerning the truth conditions of
certain thoughts. But secondly, this move allows us to capture the intuitions
underlying Russell's distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and by
description without the problems inherent in Russell's epistemology. Recall the
intuition with which we originally motivated some such distinction, the iiltuition that
my thoughts about my next door neighbour are of a fundamentally different kind from
my thoughts about the oldest woman in the world. Now we cannot rely on actual
causal chains to capture this distinction for just the reasons that so constrained
Russell's account: my next-door-neighbour concept seems contentfiul, whether or not
there is a neighbour for it to be a concept of: In the terms just developed, however,
what distinguishes my next-door-neighbour concept, whether or not it is hi fact
causally linked to any individual, from my oldest-woman-in-the-world coaept is the
presence of REF within its internal dimension. What distinguishes the two concepts,
in other words, is that I believe one but not the other to be causally linked to an
individual in the way appropriate for de re-ness. I am not, of course, intending to
suggest that this will be the only difference standardly to be found between the two
types of concept: de re concepts will, fbi instance, standardly be weighted towards
perceptual inlbrmation in a way that descriptivc concepts will not. It is on the
presence or absence of the REF feature, however, that, so I want to claim, the intuitive
distinction between these different types of concept is based.
There is a further refinement I wish to make to the conceptual ontology so-far
sketched. As things stand there are two truth-conditional possibilities for Individual
concepts: either the external dimension of an individual concept is satisThetional and
that concept gives rise to general truth conditions, or the external dimension is
relational and the concept gives rise to singular truth conditions. There is, however, a
third truth-conditional possibility that the external dimension is descriptive but the
truth conditions are singular. What does this possibility amount to? It essentially
equates to placing the descriptive condition which constitutes the external dimension
of a descriptive individual concept within the scope of a rigldi1yin,g operator
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something like Kaplan's dthat operatt (see for instance, Kaplan (1978)). The result
of this move is to anchor a concept truth-conditionally to whatever actually satisfies
its external dimension. The significance of this third possilility, which I shall label
stipulative de re-ness, will become apparent in the next chapter.
Finally in this section, I just want to point towards a distinction drawn by
Recanati (1993), among others, between two types of de , individual concept. Recall
that we started this section with a discussion of the difficulties Russell faced in
applying his distinction between knowledge by acquaintance and knowledge by
description to an analysis of natural language. The difficulties, as we saw then, rested
on Russell's requirement that acquaintance-based thoughts should be hnmune to error
is that they simply could not exist lithe absence of that which they are thoughts
about The types of individual concept which we have k)oked at so far are certainly
not immune to error: I may have just the same thoughts (viewed from an internal
perspective) that I have now about, for instance, my neighbour Bob even if Bob does
not exist —if! have, say, been the victim of an elaborate hoax. There do seem to be
some kinds of thought, however, which are immune to error in just the way required
by Russell's epistemology. The clearest and most discussed case is that of first-person
thoughts, Le. thoughts about oneself It seems intuitively clear that the thought that
you might express with the sentence'! am F' simply could not fail to be about you
and therefore could not exist if you did not exist. The same seems to go for the
thoughts expressed by 'now is U' and 'here is H': your now-is-U thought simply must
be about the time of its own tokening, and your here-is-H thought must be about the
place of its tokening. As Recanati points out, the concepts underlying these thoughts
are of a very diflrent kind from other de re concepts: they so not standardly comprise
tile sort of beiefa which we have seen so far, but rather comprise predominantly
perception-based information. Again, I don't wish to defend any particular view of the
nature of such concepts, which, following Recanati, I shall call egocentric; I am sure
the analysis Recanati proposes is along veiy much the right lines. I merely want to
flag up this distinction, which will become significant when I come on to discuss
certain indexical expressions in chapter four.
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2.3 Relevance-theoretie pragmatics
Now that Ihave put ii place the co e machinerywhich Ishall be making use of
in the rest of the thesis, I want to turn to the pragmatic background against which my
account of the interpretation of singular expressions will be set. I have already laid
out, in section 1.2 above, the cognitive assumptions underlying Sperber and Wilson's
relevance theory: that the representational view of mind is broadly right, that mind is
modular and that human cognition is geared towards the maximisation of relevance.
Sperber and Wilson take these assumptions as the foundations upon which their
account of communication and the human pragmatic machinery which underlies it is
built.
On the relevance-theoretic view, the task facing a hearer is to form and
confirm hypotheses concerning speaker intentions. In a case of what Sperber and
Wilson (e.g. 1986/95) call ostensive-inferential communication, i.e. any case in which
we would intuitively want to say that lull communication takes place, these intentions
will come in two varieties: firstly the speaker will have an intention to inform her
hearer of something, her informative intention, and secondly, following a broadly
Gricean model, she will have the intention to inform her hearer of her informative
intention, an intention that Sperber and Wilson term the communicative intention. But
how might a hearer set about forming and confirming hypotheses concerning a
speaker's informative and communicative intentions? In doing so he may rely on the
fact that communicators exploit the hwnan cognitive tendency to maximise relevance.
Given this tendency, ic. given the cognitive principle of relevance, a hearer will only
attend to a stimulus if it offers him sufficient cognitive effects without undue
processing effort, i.e. Wit is relevant enough to him to be worth attending to. A
speaker who produces an utterance with the intention that a particular hearer should
attend to it there!bre communicates a presumption that her utterance is at least
relevant enough to the hearer to be worth processing. Wilson and Sperber spell out the
nature of this communicated presumption hi their communicative principle of
relevance:
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Communicative Principle of Relevance
Every ostensive stimulus conveys a presumption of its own optimai relevance.
Wilson and Sperber (2002, p. 256)
They cash out the notion of optimal relevance used in this formulation thus:
Optimal relevance
An ostensive stimulus is optimally relevant to an audience ifl
a. It is relevant enough to be worth the audience's processing effort;
b. It is the most relevant one compatible with communicator's abilities and
preferences.
Wilson and Sperber (2002, p. 256)
How, then, does the communication of a presumption of optimal relevance help the
hearer in his attempt to form and confirm hypotheses on speaker intentions? It does so
by justifying a particular interpretive strategy: given the communicative principle of
relevance a hearer is Justified in testing interpretations hi order of the. accessibility
until he comes across one that satisfies his expectations of relevance. He is then
entitled to stop and accept this ilerpretatioa. Why does the communication of a
presumption of optimal relevance justify this strategy? The key lies in clause (b) of
the definition of optimal relevance: a hearer is justified in trying out hypotheses in
order of accessibility since a speaker who wants to deliver on the presumption of
optimal relevance should make the intended interpretation as accessible as possible in
order to minimise processing eflbrt; equally a speaker wishing to maximise the
relevance of her utterance should not allow for there to be more than one
interpretation which satisfies the hearer's expectations of relevance on pain of putting
her hearer to the effort of choosing between competing interpretations. Since,
therefore, there can only be one interpretation which will satisfy the hearer's
e:cpectations of relevance, as soon as he finds such an interpretation, the hearer can
accepti
Finallyinthissectionlwaito flagupapointthatlshallreturntolaterinthis
chapter. In addition to the distinction drawn by Sperber and Wilson between
informative and communicative hlentions, I shall draw a further disthtion between
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different kinds of speaker intention which, so I shall claim when I come on to discuss
certain types of example kiter in the thesis play an importai* role hi determining
intuitions concerning the truth-conditional content of utterances. I shall, however,
leave the details of this distinction for a later section and turn now to the semantic
picture underlying the account of singular expressions which I wish to defend.
2.4 Relevance-theoretic semantics
Relevance-theoretic pragmatics, then, takes a hearer's job to be to the formation and
confirmation of hypotheses concerning a speaker's informative and communicative
intentions. But what role does hypothesis formation and confirmation have to play in
grasping speaker meaning? According to a traditional view within the philosophy of
language the propositional content of an utterance is determined by the meaning of
the sentence uttered. On this view, the sort of inferential processes involved in the
relevance-theoretic interpretation strategy may well have a role to play in the retrieval
of implicatures, but have no role to play in determining the proposition expressed by
an utterance. There are some respects in which linguistic meaning underdetermines
propositional content, according to this view; in particular a hearer will have to
resolve ambiguities and assign reference to indexical expressions before he can grasp
the proposition expressed by an utterance. However, these are not matters of
inferential input to propositional content, but aie rather matters which are
straightforwardly resolved by context.
Work within the relevance theoretic tradition and elsewhere has shown firstly
that an analysis of disambiguation and reference assignment requires more than a
general appeal to context and that the more required can be provided by the
machinery needed to analyse the retrieval of implicatures, and secondly that the
underdetermination of propositional content by linguistic meaning goes a great deal
deeper than ambiguity and referential indeterminac)fr. Such evidence supports a
conception of the semantics-pragmatics distinction which differs lbndamentally from
that presupposed by much work within philosophical and formal semantic traditions.
On the relevance-theoretic view, the retrieval of truth-conditienal content involves
6 Poc an ovotview of this work, and a detailed disaission of some of the ways m which saitance
meaning undotdetermines propositional cement, see Carston (2002a).
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two distinct types of process: on the one hand there is the dumb decoding of encoded
linguistic meaning by a dedicated language processing module, while on the other
there is higher-level pragmatic inference, which takes as input the output of the
language processing module and builds not just implicated meaning but also
propositional content. On this view, the output of the language module is standardly
(if not invariably) sub-propositional, viewed as something like a proposition schema.
This schema will provide just one type of input to the inferential processes involved in
forming and confirming hypotheses concerning speaker intentions.
The relevance-theoretic analysis thus recogmses a sub-propositional level of
representation which equates to the output of the language processing module, a level
of representation sometimes referred to as logical fonn within the RT-oriented
literature. Beyond logical form, it has become usual within relevance theory to draw a
distinction in the class of communicated assumptions between those which are
explicitly communicated and those which are hnplicitly communicated, between
explicatures and implicatures hi the RT terminology. This distinction mirrors,
although is not exactly coterminous with, the Gricean distinction between what is said
and what is merely communicated. In the next section 1 shall briefly compare these
two sets of distinctions in an attempt to spell out some of the points at which the kind
of semantic picture which underlies the analysis I shall propose diverges from
conceptions of semantics which are traditional in the philosophical literature.
Before coming on to that, however, I want to point towards One further
distinction that has become increasingly central to the relevance-theoretic view of
semantics. Within the RT framework there has been much work conducted over the
last few years into a distinction originally proposed by Blakemore (1987) between
two Ibndamentally different kinds of meiming Blakemore's original insight was,
roughly, this: since utterance interpretation involves two radically diireat kinds of
process, first the retrieval of a logical form and then the manipulation of That logical
form through pragmatic inference, we might weU expect to find two distinct kinds of
meaning corresponding to these processes. And this, for Blakemore, is just what we
do find. On the one hand there is conceptual meaning, which is straightforwardly
representational; on the other there is procedwnl meaning, which lays constraints on
the retrieval of implicatures. This distinction has been extensively applied to the
analysis of non-tnith-conditional meaning within the relevance-theoretic Iframework.
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Thus, fbr instance, both Blakemore herself (see, for instance, 1989, 2000) and lten
(e.g. 1998, 2000a, 2000b) have employed the conceptual-procedural distinction in an
analysis of concessives.
Over the last lëw years the application of this distinction has been steadily
extended within the relevance-theoretic framework. In particular, the assumption that
procedural meaning is involved only in the retrieval of implicatures has been
challenged. Wilson and Sperber (1993), among others, have suggested that indexicals
may encode procedures rather than, or as well as, concepts, procedures that arc
therefore involved in the retrieval of explicatures Throughout this thesis I shall return
to the question of whether the conceptual-procedural paradigm offers interesting
insights into the encoded meaning of different types of singular expression.
2.5 Explicature vs. what is said
As discussed above, there is a distinction drawn within the relevance-theoretic
framework between logical form and explicature, i.e. between the encoded meaning
of a sentence and something which k)oks veiy much like the truth-conditional content
of a located utterance of that sentence. There are certain key differences, however,
between that which relevance theorists take to be an explicature of an utterance and
what would be thought of as the proposition expressed by that utterance, or 'what is
said', within many philosophical frameworks. Sperber and Wilson (e.g. Sperber and
Wilson 1986/95, 1998; Wilson and Sperber 1992) and Carston (e.g. 1988, 1996/1997,
2000, 2002a), among others working within the RT framework, have pointed to
certain key points at which the philosophical notion of what is said diverges from the
level of explicitly communicated meaning relevant to an analysis of utterance
interpretation. Irony and metaphor, for instance, are both treated within RI as
contn1uthig to the level of explicit content i.e. as contributing to explicature, while
on philosophical analyses these tropes are standardly analysed as pad of what is
implicated by an utterance. Recently there has also been much debate in the literature
on so-called unarticulated constituents, elements which, according to certain criteria,
appear to form part of the truth-conditional content of an utterance while seemingly
unrepresented in the syntax of the sentence uttered. For those of a pragmatic bent,
such as Carston (e.& 2002b) and Recanati (2002), such elements should be viewed as
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genuine constituents of propositional content, constituents contributed not by syntax
but by pragmatics. For those of a more traditional philosophical bent, such as Stanley
(2000), by contrast, if such elements are genuine constituents of propositional content,
then they must be represented within the syntaL
What is at stake here? To answer this question we need to look at the
theoretical requirements made of the notions of explicalure and what Lc said by those
frameworks in which they are employed. In order to do this I shall have to generalise
in a way that may seem unpalatable there are, after all, wide discrepancies between
the takes on the notion of what is said or propositional content or the proposition
expressed employed by different frameworks within what might broadly be called the
truth-conditional tradition, and there is certainly not the space here to do justice to
each of these frameworks separately. In what follows, therefore, may aim is to tread
as neutral a path between diflërent takes on the notion of propositional content as
possible.
Common to all truth-conditional accounts is the idea that the relatively
tractable notion of truth can be used to approach the relatively intractable notion of
meaning. To put this idea into practice, a link must be established between linguistic
representations and truth. This link is effected via the assumption, which comes in
various different guises, that to give the meaning of a sentence is to give the
conditions under which that sentence would be true. Now if the truth-conditionalist
wants to give the meaning of a sentence via that sentence's truth-conditions, she will
need, for any unambiguous sentence, to find a way of giving truth conditions which
are constant across contexts of utterance. But this is just what the more pragmatically-
minded meaning theorist is claiming not to be possible if for instance, metaphor
should be viewed as contributing to truth-conditional content, then the same
unambiguous sentence can, on different occasions of use, give rise to different truth
conditions. To maintain the link between syntactic form and truth required by her
framework, therefore, the truth-conditionalist must deny that metaphor does
contribute to truth-conditional content. Equally, the hard-line truth-conditionalist is
committed to the position that apparently unarticulated constituents must either be
genuine constituents of propositional content but articulated at some level of the
syntax, or genuinely unarticulated but not constituents of truth-conditional content.
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The dyed-in-the-wool truth-conditionalist is thus committed to a filly
propositional level of truth-conditional content which is intimately anchored to the
sentence uttered. The relevance theorist, by contrast, is, as we have seen above,
committed to a sub-propositional level of representation which is intimately anchored
to the sentence uttered and one or more propositional levels of representation which,
akhough linked to the sentence uttered, may depart from encoded sentence meaning
in fundamental ways. Carston (2002a) argues that the philosophical level of what is
said can, with certain caveats, be eliminated from an account of utterance
interpretation. One of the themes I wish to explore in what follows is whether such a
level, viewed as a propositional level determined by sentence meanin& can also be
omitted from a theory of meaning. I clearly do not wail to suggest that one could not
work with this level of representation if one so wished. What I want to explore,
however, is the following possibility: that, at least as fur as an analysis of the meaning
of singular expressions is concerned, one can get away without an appeal to the
traditional philosophical notion of what is said, while one cannot get away without
including in one's ontology objects that look very like logical form and explicature.
To pave the way for the exploration of this idea, I wail to say a few words about the
place of intuitions in semantic theorising.
2.6 Semantic theory and intuition
When we talk about the truth-conditional content of an utterance, what is it that we
are talking about? Looking at this question from another angIe are there any
objective, theory-independent criteria by which we might say what the truth-
conditional content of a particular utterance is, Ic. by which we may determine what
is aid by that utterance? There have certainly been attempts made to pinpoint sudi
criteria. Within the relevance-theoretic framework it has been suggested that the
distinction between explicitly and implicitly communicated assumptions comes do
to whether a particular communicated assumption is a development of the logical
form of the sentence uttered. Carston (1988) offers a possible cashing out of this
suggestion in what she calLs the Functional Independence Pi*ic:ple. This principle
rests on the idea that explicatures and implicatures play independent roles ii
inferential processes. Thus, speaking very roughly, any communicated assunWtiofl
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which is a devek)pment of logical form shouki be viewed as an eqlicature, whereas
any communicated assumption which ts not a development of logical Ibrm should be
viewed as an implicature. Recanati (19891,191), however, shows that Carston's
principle throws up some unwanted resuks; in particular he shows that the principle
categorises some clearly implicated communicated assumptions as explicatures
Recanati himself (e.g. 1989h'9 1) offers two more promising candidate criteria
for discriminating explicitly communicated meaning from implicitly communicated
meaning. The first candidate, derived from a test used by Cohen (1971), Recanati
terms the Scope Principle:
Scope Principle: A pragmatically determined aspect of meaning is part
of what is said (and therefore not a conversational implicature) if—
and, perhaps, only if - it lls within the scope of logical operators
such as negation and conditionals.
Recanati (1989b191, p. 114)
Thus Recanati asks us to consider the following sentences:
2) Theoldkinghasdiedofaheartattackandarepublichasbeendeclared
3) A republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart attack
It seems that there is a temporal sequence interpretation associated with the use of
'and' in these examples; we take it, in other words, that there is a difference in the
ordering of events between (2) and (3). The question we want to address, however, is
whether this temporal ordering is part of what is said by utterances of these sentences,
or whether I arises at the level of implicature. In order to applythe scope principle we
must embed the sentences under a logical operator
4) If the old king has died of a heart attack and a republic has been declared, then
Tom will be quite content.
5) If a republic has been declared and the old king has died of a heart attack, then
Tom will be quite content.
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It seems, Recanati points out, that a rational agent could assert (4) at the same time as
denying (5), and that (4) and (5) must thus express distinct propositions. This seems to
oflr us strong evidence that the temporal sequencing asoclated with 'and' falls
within the scope of the conditional and should therefore according to the scope
principle, be treated as an element of what is said7.
The second criterion Recanati oflirs for distinguishing what is said from what
is merely implicated is embodied in his Availability Principle.
Availability Princ,ole: In deciding whether a pragmatically determined
aspect of utterance meaning is part of what is said, that is, hi making a
decision concerning what is said, we should always try to preserve ow
pm-theoretic intuitions on the matter.
Recanati (1993, p. 248)
The import of this principle is self-evident: if intuitkns suggest that a particular
utterance has a particular truth-conditional content, then we should take that as strong
evidence that that utterance does indeed have that truth-conditional content. Although
this principle is the only one to make overt mention of the place of intuition in
theorising about meaning, all the principles we have so far looked at depend for theh
utility on intuitions concerning what is said. This is hardly surprising, since both
Carston and Recanati are in the business of providing cognitively realistic accounts.
Of course such principles are at odds with the take t the notion of
propositional content empk)yed by those who seek to develop a pure truth-conditional
account of meaning by anchoring what is said by an utterance to the syntax of the
sentence uttered. What place is there for tnjtb-conditional intuitiaas on accounts of
this type? There seem to be two distinct trends within the recent hard-line truth-
conditional literature. On the one hand there are those, such as Stanley (2000), who
are prepared to take intuitions as genuine evidence concerning truth-conditional
content. For theorists of this stripe, as mentioned above, any element of meaning
which intuitively forms part of tnjth-condIional content must be 'epresented within
'ma's e, of cowse, cilia' storlen th may be told out such cInples, induding tint told by Cohat
himself. My interest ha's is not in defending the Saçe Principi; although I find the imds lint
Ranati provides in support o(the principle oonvinang rather I n interested in easuining the sort of
criteria that have been proposed acarding to which e may distinguish bcten explicitly and
inçlicitly ocinmunicatal meaning.
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the syntax, albeit covertly. On the other hand there are those, such as, fur instance,
Borg (forthcoming) who take the view that truth-conditional intuitk,ns are a very
poor guide to what is 'literally' said. For Borg, the literal meaning of any sentence can
be identified with a fully determinate proposition, although such propositions will by
and large be a k)ng way from the assumptions which a speaker wishes to
conununicate. Even accounts of this sort, however, standardly make appeal to truth-
conditional intuitions. Borg, fur instance makes the claim that interlocutors can be
retied upon to have intuitions concerning the distinction between literal sentence
meaning and speaker meaning; in other words, that they have reliable intuitions
concerning what is 'literally' said. She then makes use of such evidence in defence of
her claim that supposedly unarticulated constituents should be viewed as non-
semantic, i.e. as contriluting not to what is said but to what is hnplicated.
Why this digression through various takes on the notion of what is said and the
role of truth-conditional intuition hi each? The first lesson I want to draw is that,
however much we might want to, we cannot abandon such intuitions altogether, they
are, after all, one of the few types of evidence available to us if we want our take on
what is said to have an empirical dimension. I thus propose to take intuitions on truth-
conditional content seriously throughout this thesis, along much the lines suggested
by Recanati's Availability Principle: it seems to me that a theory which respects such
intuitions should, ceterisparibus, be preferred to one that rides roughshod over them.
it is in satisfying the ceterisparibus caveat, of course, that difficulties may arise.
Secondly, however, I want to point to an obvious problem in attempting to
build a theory of meaning which respects intuitions on truth-conditional content: such
intuitions are notoriously variable. To take just one example, the field on the
referential-attributive distinction in the interpretation of definite descriptions is
divided between those who find I intuitively plausible that a referentially-used
definite description may contribute to propositional content an individual other than
that which satisfies its descriptive content, and those who find such a notion
intuitively incredible. Each camp uses theie own intuitions in support of theie
particular position, often simply refusing to recognise opposing intuitions. I believe
that, if we are to take truth-conditional intuitions seriously at all, then we are honour
bound to take competing intuitions seriously too; we should, that is to say, expect an
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analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of singular expressions to be able to account
for contradictory intuitions where they arise.
There are two suggestions I want to make here which may hdp us when I
comes to explaining contradictory intuitions later in the thesis. Firstly, split intuitions
may be reconciled by taking them to concern not the content of one and the same
utterance but rather the content of two distinct utterances. Clearly the sort of split
intuitions we are concerned with here are intuitions about utterances of the same
sentence, but it is not so clear that those who claim to have contradictory intulions are
holding the context in which the sentence is located constant. In particular, as I shall
discuss at some length in later chapters, I want to explore the possibility that standard
philosophical notions of what is said tend to presuppose particular types of discourse
contexts, discourse contexts which are idealised in certain significant respects. Such
contexts are, I shall suggest, typically idealised with respect to the epistemic states of
their speakers and hearers: the intuitions adduced by hard-line truth-con4lIionalists
often presuppose a discourse context in which speaker and hearer have mutual
knowledge of all relevant contextual factors. This stands in clear juxtaposilion to the
relevance-theoretic view outlined above, on which limitations on the speaker's
abilities, built in to the definition of optimal relevance as they are, play a key role in
determining the explicature of an utterance. I shall return throughout the thesis to the
idea that contrary intuitions which seem to bear on the semantics of particular
expressions may in fact bear on no more a difference in the contexts in which the
utterances are taken to be located.
Finally in this chapter, Iwant to return to something Iflagged up atithe end of
section 2.3. Speiber and Wilson, as has already been discussed, distinguish tween a
speaker's informative intention and her communicative intention. I wish draw a
farther distinction between types of speaker intention. To say that a speaker has an
informative intention is just to say that she has an intention concerning which
propositional representation(s) she wishes to communicate to her audience. What I
want to suggest is that, separate from the informative intention itseff a speaker will
have specific intentions concerning the route via which her audience should reach the
content of her informative intention I shall call this the speaker's de'fvazionat
intention. To give a taste of this distinction, let's look at a brief example. Bert and
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Ernie are on a country walk when Bert notices a particularly lovely butterfly hovering
near a flower. Pointing in the direction of the butterfly, Bert says:
6) Thatisverypretty
It seems clear that, speaking in rough terms, the content of Bert's informative
intention is the thought that the butterfly he is pointing at is very pretty. But, m
addition, Bert has intentions regarding how Ernie should reach this thought, i.e.
regarding the strategy which Ernie shouki follow in deriving the intended
interpretation: he intends, for instance, that Ernie should take his ostensive gesture as
part of his communicative act, that he should therefore follow the line of Bert's finger
to see what Bert is pointing at, that the act of pointing should thus have the effect of
making a particular object, the butterfly, highly salient in the context, and that the
butterfly should therefore be the most accessible candidate interpretation for Bert's
utterance of 'that'. In this way, he maximises the relevance of an interpretation on
which the butterfly is taken to be the referent of 'that' by minimising the processing
effort to which Ernie must go in order to access such an interpretation5. This
distinction, between informative and dejivational intentions, offers another strategy
for reconciling apparently divided intuitions within a single account: hi cases where
these two intentions are divided, i.e. hi which the speaker's derivational intention does
not, in fact, lead to the content of her informative intention, intuitions may be
weighted towards either of the intentions, thus allowing for the possibility of t
distinct intuitions concerning what is said by one and the same utterance; imay, in
other words, be that two apparently conflicting intuitions are intuitions about diflërent
speaker intentions.
'You may n be convinced by my sialysi! (1 this pwtiailar cxamp1e although 1at' in the thesis I
shall wgue that it is along something like the rigk lines. I bope howeva, that it nondhdess saws to
ilu*ate thC distiniai I an intenflg to draW bdWeai infiwmative sid derivational intaitiom.
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Chapter three
Proper names
3.0
In this chapter, 1 want to embark on the project of applying the theoretical machineiy
presented in the last chapter to an analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of singular
expressions. The enquhy will lwoadly focus on three questions:
Ouestion I: what contribution do singular expression make to the truth
conditions of utterances of sentences in which they appear and how do
they make this contribution?
Question 2: what contribution do singular expression make to the
cognitive significance of utterances of sentences in which they appear
and how do they make this contribution?
Question 3: what are the conditions for understanding singular
expressions? What, in other words, has to be the case in order for us to
want to say that a hearer has understood an utterance of a singular
expression?
I want to start with an examination of the semantics and pragmatics of proper names.
The reason is partly historical: as discussed in chapter 1, it was with questions on
proper names, and in particular with the questions on names that give rise to Frege's
puzzle that the debate on singular expressions began to take its current shape. But
there are good reasons to start with names beyond the merely historical: names, as the
Millian intuition attests, have the appearance of being paradigmatically referential;
there seems intuitively to be no more to the meaning properties of a proper name than
that which I names. Since the position I intend to advocate will entail that there are
no linguistically reibrential expressions, i.e. no expressions which are constrained to
refer by their linguistic meaning, an analysis of proper names shouki make clear, at
least in outline, the shape that that position will take.
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In this chapter I want first to run briefly through the core data to which any
theory of names aiming to answer the three questions above must address itselE Once
I've done that, I shall lay out the account of the semantics and pragmatics of proper
names that I favour, and explore how this account can be put to work in tackling the
data already discussed. There is, however, a wide range of positions on names
currently on the market Once I have detailed my own account, I want to examine
some of the more plausible of these recent positions, in order to establish how they
compare with my own. I hope in doing this to show two things: firstly that many of
these positions are to a large extent, aiming at just the same insights about the
workings of proper names as my own account and, secondly that none of them is able
to capture the range of facts about proper names accessible to my account
Before examining the data, however, I want to say a lëw words on what proper
names are; on how, in other words, we want to individuate the object of our enquiry. I
should start with a warning: I do not intend to lay down a set of necessary and
sufficient syntactic and/or semantic conditions for name-hood. An intuitive grasp of
what makes an expression a proper name, or at least the intuitive ability to
discriminate between those expressions which are proper names and those which are
not, will have to do for my purposes. it is important, however, to raise two points
here, which should act as a reminder of some of the issues raised in chapter 2: firstly,
I am intending my claims to apply to an independently identffiable class of
expressions; I am not, that is, merely intending to make the general claim that there
are natural language expressions that work in such-and-such a semantic and/or
pragmatic way. And, deriving from this point, it is important that the enquiry not
presuppose a circular criterion of kientification for names. The kind of (partial)
criterion I have in mind would go something like: given that proper names are
referential, only expressions which are referential can be proper names. This kind of
criterion will do fine for formal languages, in which a very tight rein can be kept on
the syntactic and semantic properties of expression-types, but it will not do for a study
of natural languages: if proper names are, in fact, reibrential, that must only be
discoverable a posteriori. Any account on which this is an a priori truth is not an
account of the semantics and pragmatics of a class of natural language expressions of
the sort I aim to develop, but is, rather, an account of the contents of certain kinds of
thoughts. As I hope is already clear, an account of the contents and, in particular, of
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the truth conditions of thoughts is, I believe, a key component of any adequate theory
of the semantics and pragmatics of singular terms, but it is not the whole story. This
warning against circularity will play a central role not just in the examination of
proper names, but across all types of singular expression: I am interested in explaining
the behaviour of natural language expression types, in all their complexity, not the
behaviour of logical constants and quantifiers.
3.1 The central data on proper names
In this section my aim is to layout hi very brief form what have been taken to be the
central data for an account of proper names, data which we first saw in chapter 1.
There is something not entirely happy about this: after all, once I have presented my
own analysis, I shall go on to examine other available accounts and thus also the data
that each adduces in its own defence. This division of data is for ease of presentation:
my aim is to present a body ofcentral data, examine how my analysis can cope with
(or reanalyse) those central data, and, having done that, to ask whether there are any
other data which could cause my account difficulties. The division between the two
groupings is thus not intended to have any theoretical significance.
So what are the central data on proper names? They group broadly into three
classes, corresponding to co-relbrence5 emptiness and rigidity:
3.1.1 Co-reference
Recall that, on the account advocated by Mill (1843), the semantic properties of
names are exhausted by their bearers. Distinct names which share a bearer, therefore,
should also share semantic properties. Consider, however, the following sentences:
1) Satchmo is Louis Armstrong.
2) Satchmo is Satchmo.
3) Ella believes that Satchmo is a great trumpeter.
4) Ella believes that Louis Armstrong is a great trumpeter.
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On a Millian account, the move from sentences (1) to sentence (2), and also that from
sentence (3) to sentence (4), should not affect the meaning properties of the sentence:
in each case we are substituting one name lbr another co-reibrential name and since,
for Mill, two proper names which have the same reference also have the same
meanin& we are substituting one name for another with the same meaning. It seems
that there are good reasons to think, however, that the meaning properties of sentence
(2) are not identical to those of sentence (1) and, equally, that the meaning properties
of sentence (4) are not identical to those of sentence (3). The puzzle as it applies to
sentences (I) and (2) concerns cognitive significance: sentence (1) seems to lack the
cognitive significance of sentence (2), in that the proposition expressed by sentence
(2) seems a posterior!, whereas that expressed by sentence (I) seems a priori. As
Salmon (1986/91) has pointed out, this problem is not particular to the identity
predicate; just the same kind of difficulty arises with examples such as (adapting
Salmon's own examples):
5) Satchmo is a trumpeter if Louis Armstrong is.
6) Satchmo is a trumpeter if Satchmo is.
Here again we have two sentences which diflbr only in the substitution of one name
for another co-referential name, yet the substitution seems to have effected a change
in cognitive signi&ance just as for (1) and (2), (6) seems apriori, whereas (5) seems
a poseriori.
For sentences (3) and (4) the puzzle no longer concerns (only) cognitive
significance but rather, truth value: since there appear to be possible circumstances in
which (3) might be true and (4) false (any circumstance in which Ella is unaware that
Satchmo is Louis Armstrong is such a possible circumstance), it seems that we cannot
substitute co-referential proper names, at least in some contexts, salva veritate1. We
are thus pushed towards the conclusion that, contra MIII, names which share a
reference do not thereby share klenticai meaning properties.
'1 shall discuss below the question of whether failure of substitution salvo veritate is restricted to those
cuntexts which Quine labelled 'opaque', or whether, as Saul (1991) suggests, the pbeziomeson goes
beyond such onuted
46
3.1.2 Emptiness
The Millian account is also challenged by data on empty proper names, i.e. proper
names that fail to refer to any individuaL In 1998, a New York publishing company
published what purported to be the biography of a forgotten member of the abstract
expressionist schooL Nat Tate had, supposedly, after years of depression, destroyed
most of his works before leaping to his death from the Staten Island Ferry. It
eventually transpired, however, that the book was a hoax, devised by the writer
William Boyd: Nat Tate had never existed, the reproduced art works that had
supposedly survived were, in fact, by Boyd hinsell and the photographs of Tate were
from Boyd's collection of photographs of unidentified people. In light of this story,
consider the following sentences:
7) Nat Tate lived and worked in New York.
8) Nat Tate does not exist.
On a Millian account, both (7) and (8) should lack meaning: both contain an empty
proper name, 'Nat Tate'; the meaning of a proper name is exhausted, on the Millian
picture, by its bearer 'Nat Tate' should therefore lack meaning and both (7) and (8)
should fail to be meaningfiul, since they both apparently predicate a property (in (7)
the property of living and working in New York and in (8) the property of not
existing) of nothing. But this once more runs counter to some reasonably robust
it would seem that (7) expresses a complete thought, while (8) not only
expresses a complete thought, it expresses a true thought (I am Ibllowing Fregean
tradition in using the terms 'proposition' and 'thought' interchangeably here). It might
be thought that the puzzle illustrated in (8), the puzzle that concerns the ability of
sentences containing empty proper names to express true propositions, is specific to
negative existentials, or more generally to negative sentences, but this is not so, as
illustrated by(9) and (10):
9) Nat Tate did not live in New York, he didn't live anywhere.
10) Nat Tate is a figment of William Boyd's imagination.
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In (9), a predicate other than the existence predicate is used, while (10) involves no
negatkrn, yet both intuitively express true propositions. The meaningfulness of empty
flames thus seems to constitute another fundamental challenge to the Millian position.
3.1.3 Rigidity
While data on co-reference and emptiness seem to weigh against any account of the
semantics of proper names along Millian lines, data on rigidity seem to weigh against
any account along non-Millian lines. The intuitions which form the evidence for
rigidity concern a comparison between the behaviour of different expression types in
modal contexts. There are diflrent ways of getting at these intuitions on modal
profile: imagine (if you need to) that in the actual world Louis Armstrong is (leaving
tense to one side) the greatest jazz trumpeter. The expressions 'Louis Armstrong' and
'the greatest jazz trumpeter' are thus co-extensive in the actual world. Now consider
the following sentences:
11) Louis Armstrong perlbrmed with Ella Fitzgerakt
12) The greatest jazz trumpeter performed with Ella Fitzgerald.
The question we want to ask is: on whom do the truth values of these two sentences
depend? In the actual world, given the above supposition, they will both depend on
Louis Armstrong; they will in other words both be true if Louis Armstrong performed
with Ella Fitzgerald, and both be fuse if he didn't. Consider, however, on whom the
truth values of the propositions expressed by these sentences would depend in a world
in which Miles Davis, not Louis Armstrong. is the greatest jazz trumpeter. It seems
clear that the proposition expressed by (11) will still depend on Louis Armstrong.
whereas that expressed by (12) will depend on Miles Davis. So what does this
suggest? It has been taken by many to suggest that proper names pick out the same
individual across possible worlds (leaving aside issues concerning worlds in which
the bearer of a name does not exist, and questions raised by names with more than one
bearer), that they are, in Kripke's terminology, rigid whereas definite descriptions arc
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non-rigid in that they pick out in any possible world the individual that satisfies their
descriptive content in that world.
Essentially the same sorts of intuition can be approached from another angle,
from the angle of II istically modal contexts. Thus consider:
13) Louis Annstrong might not have played the trumpet.
14) The greatest jazz trumpeter might not have played the trumpet.
Itseemsthat,whereas(13)hasonlyonereading,inwhichkistniesolongasthereis
a possible world at which Louis Armstrong doesn't play trumpet, (14) has two
readings: one on which it's true in the same circumstances as (13), i.e. on which it is
true if there is a possible world at which whoever is the greatest jazz trumpeter at the
actual world, i.e. Louis Armstrong, does not play trwnpet, and one on which it is true
so long as there is a possible world at which whoever is the greatest jazz trumpeter (at
that world) doesn't play trumpet.
What are these intuitions supposed to tell us? The lesson that Kripke (1972)
and those who have followed him draw is that, whereas definite descriptions
contribute complex descriptive conditions to propositional content, names contribute
nothing more than their referents (or, perhaps more accurately, constant functions
from Kaplanian circumstances of evaluation to their referents); they see this evidence,
in other words, as supporting a return to Milhianism. I shall not, for the time being, be
too concerned with these conclusions, akhough I shall have more to say about certain
recent versions of them once I have laid out my own analysis of proper names; what I
am interested hi here is the intuitions themselves, constituting, as they do, a testing
ground for analyses of proper names.
Before leaving the intuitions on rigidity, I want to flag up one issue that will
play a significant role later on. The same issues as Illustrated in sentences (11) to (14)
above seem to arise with the Ibilowing sentences:
15) Louis Armstrong is ajazz musician.
16) The person called 'Louis Annstrong' is ajazz musician.
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In (16), the subject position is occupied by what has been called a nominal
description2, i.e. a description which makes explicit mention of the name that its
denotationbears.Alllwanttopointouthereisthat,onthelitceofit,theuseofa
nominal description seems to have no effect on the truth-conditional intuitions
adverted to above. Just as (11) will be truth-conditionally dependent on the same
individual in every possible worki, whereas (12) will not, so (15) is anchored across
worlds to Louis Armstrong, whereas (16) is not: (16) will be true at a possible world
so long as the person who at that world is called 'Louis Armstrong', be that Louis
Armstrong or someone else, is a jazz musician.
3.2 Proper names and individual concepts
Now that what I have called the central data on proper names are in place, I want to
outline the kind of analysis of names that I fiwour. The shape of this analysis will be
brought out in three ways: firstly, and probably least helpfully, I will directly lay out
the bare skeleton of the analysis, detailing how, as I see 1, the theoretical notions
explicated in chapter 2 can best be applied to the semantics and pragmatics of proper
names; secondly I want to examine how the analysis can be used to address the
central data above, and finally, as already mentioned, I want to compare my own
analysis with certain of the most plausible accounts currently available. I do not
expect the full nature of the analysis I am advocating to be clear until all three of these
stages are completed.
3.2.1 The bare bones
The analysis that I bvour sees proper names as tools 1r the communication of
individual concepts. As I hope is clear from the discussion in chapter 2, 1 am
approaching singular expressions from a relevance-theoretic perspective on which the
central role of language is to constrain Inference, specifically to constrain the
inference that a hearer undertakes in order to access the content of a speaker's
informative intention. What I want to claim, therefore is that proper names guide a
2	 fr instancc, Bath (1987)
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hearer's inferential processes m particular ways, ways determined by thefr lexically
encoded meaning.
In what, then, might the constraint laid by proper names on interpretation
consist? In broad terms, the answer I want to suggest is that, by dint of their encoded
linguistic meaning, names constrain interpretation to certain types of individual
concept. As throughout, I am assuming that the process of interpreting an utterance
involves building a primary propositional representation, the explicature of that
utterance (and may also involve building further, secondary propositional
representations, i.e. implicatures). As detailed in chapter 2 there is, on the relevance-
theoretic view, a structural homomorphism between sentences and the expilcatures
they give rise to on occasions of use: explicatures are taken to be developments of a
sentence's logical form. Given such a sentence-explicature homomorphism, I am
assuming that, for any utterance of a name sentence (i.e. a sentence with a name in
subject position), the explicature of that utterance will contain a structural slot
corresponding to the syntactic slot which is occupied by a name in the name
sentence3. To claim that names constrain interpretation to certain types of individual
concept is thus to say that this name-slot in the utterance's explicature must be
occupied by a certain type of individual concept.
It is, however, going to be onc of my central claims that all singular-
expression-types are tools for expressing individual concepts. In what way, then, do
the constraints encoded by proper names difIbr from those encoded by other singular-
expression-types? Before pointing to a difference I want to suggest a further
similarity: I do not believe that the semantically encoded meaning of any singular-
expression-type is sensitive to what in chapter 2 I called the external dimension of
individual concepts; that is, on the analysis I shall propose, the linguistic meaning of a
singular expression is blind to such properties of individual concepts as being de or
being descriptive. This of course, given the discussion in chapter 2, has a knock-on
eftbct for which internal properties of individual concepts are exploitable by the
linguistically encoded meaning of singular expressions; hi particular, that linguistic
meaning cannot make use of the REF property, since to be sensitive to REF would be
3 Th1s assumption is, of cwrse, m odds with Russell's position on prop names. Howev, eves those
who now adcate a desaiptiw analysis of pmpez nwass along Russellian lines would, I am SUTC, shy
away from accepting Russell's fill incemplete-symbol analysis, gives its implausibility kr a
compositional semantics.
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the internal corollaiy of being sensitive to a concept's external dimension. This claim,
that the linguistic meaning of singular expressions is blind to the external properties
of the individual concepts which, on occasions of use, constitute their interpretations,
does of course have wide-reaching implications for the take on the notion of reference
embodied in this account. The most obvious of these implications is that reference is
not a linguistic notion; that is to say referentiality is not a property of linguistic
expressions themselves, but rather of the thought components to which they may, in
certain contexts, correspond. Any account of this sort is going to come up against
some obvious objections; in particular it seems that one of the three central categories
of data for any account of proper names, the data from intuitions on rigidity, may be
out of reach. I shall discuss this issue in due course, when 1 come on to explore more
broadly how my account might fare with all three types of central data outlined above.
What I have claimed so far is that the linguistically encoded meaning of
proper names is such that the interpretation of names is constrained to certain types of
individual concept, but is silent on facts concerning the external dimensions of those
concepts4. I have not yet addressed the question posed above concerning the
difference between the encoded meaning of proper names and that of other types of
singular expression, i.e. concerning which properties of the internal dimensions of
individual concepts the encoded meaning of proper names is sensitive to. Since we are
dealing only with the internal dimension, this reduces to the question of which type or
types of descriptive information the semantics of proper names exploit. It is in the
answer to this question that the special nature of proper names comes out: essentially
proper names are sensitive to themselves. On, as far as I can see, more or less all
accounts of their semantics, names are viewed as two-dimensional tools: on the one
hand they are used to assign properties to individuals (the property of bearing) and on
the other they are used to talk about individuals via the exploitation of this assigned
property. As I will discuss in greater detail when I come to compare my own account
4 This is not to say that in order to understaid a partiail& use of a proper name it is not neaSWy kr a
hearer to establish whether the individual concept to which the name is intended to correspond is
descriptive or de re (contains REF or doesn't contain REF). The claim I am here making is simply that
the interpretation of iroper names does not always invelve entertaining a t* re concept (or always
involve entertaining a descriptive concept). Thus the linguistic meusing of proper names is blind to the
de re-descriptive distinction. Speaker intention, of course, may be mything but blind to the distinction
and it will be my daim, which I shall outline in greater detail below, that inferring whether the
speaker's intention involves a de re concept or a desaiptive concq may be a key part of inferring ai
overall bterpretawsi.
52
with others currently on the market, one of the key questions that distinguishes
different accounts is the precise nature of the role played by the assigned property m
the referential (using the term loosely) exploitation of names: for some, the property
of being the bearer of 'PN' contributes directly to the truth conditions of utterances of
sentences in which 'PN' appears; fbr others, the property makes no appearance in
propositional content, but is manipulated so as to constrain that to which the name
may refer, and on yet others it simply determines reference. The account I advocate
can be seen as following a version of the middle path: I believe that the property of
being the bearer of 'PN' is used to constrain that to which 'PN' can refer, although
not, as I hope will become clear, quite the same constraint as has been championed by
others who have been tempted to follow the middle path.
Here! must come clean on just what Jam claiming about the semantics of
proper names. As are all linguistic expressions, on the framework within which I take
myself to be working, proper names are viewed as tools used by speakers to give
clues about the content of certain of their mental representations (those
representations which they wish to communicate). VThat, then, does a proper name
'PN', uttered by a speaker S as part of the sentence 'PN +s', tell a hearer H about the
mental representation which S wishes to communicate? It tells H two things: firstly, it
tells him that S's mental representation contains an individual concept; and secondly
it tells him that S's individual concept contains the entrfx Ls called 'PN'. My claim is
that this information essentially constitutes the linguistic meaning of a proper name. If
this were so, what knock-on effect would it have for H's interpretation procedure? H
would know, by dint of knowing the meaning of the proper name, that, in order to
interpret S's use of 'PN', he must access an individual concept, and, bevnd that, that
it should be an individual concept which he either already associates, or which be
comestoassociate,withtheinformationxL,calkd 'PN'.That,Iclahn,isasfarasthe
linguistic meaning of 'PN' will take him. The rest will be down to the application of
pragmatic principles in context.
Much of the rest of this chapter wIll be concerned with addressing potential
objections to this sort of account. However, I want to address two of those objections
before going any further. Firstly, imagine that S wishes to communicate to H the
singular proposition that is $; while is in flict the bearer of 'Bill', S mistakenly
believes him to be the bearer of 'Ben'; in order to communicate the proposition that
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is 4, therefore, S utters the sentence 'Ben is 4'; although H knows that a is the bearer
of 'Bill', he either knows or works out that S mistakenly believes a to be called 'Ben'
and is intending to say something about him; H thus interprets S's utterance as
expressing the proposition that a is 4,. It thus seems that, on the kind of story that I
have laid out above, there is nothing to stop S literally expressing a proposition about
Bill by using the name 'Ben', a result which, in one fbrm or another, has seemed
unacceptable to many'.
My response to this objection is to challenge the intuition underlying it; I am,
in other words, prepared to accept, given the approach to propositional content
developed in chapter 2, that S has indeed expressed (rather than merely
communicated) a proposition about Bill by using 'Ben'. This does not, of course,
mean that nothing has gone wrong here; clearly something has: S entertains a false
belief and an attribution of this false belief to S is one of the premises used by H in
the inferential process via which he retrieves the proposition expressed by S's
utterance. Thus the interpretation of S's utterance has gone wrong, in that, in order to
access the intended interpretation, H has had to follow an inferential strategy other
than that which S intended him to follow. Putting this in the terms developed in the
last chapter, there is a mismatch between S's informative and derivational intentions.
From that, however, we don't need to conclude that the interpretation reached by H
does not equate to the explicature of S's utterance. Approaching the question from
within the framework outlined in chapter 2, there is every reason to suppose that it
does: there are, as far as I can see, reasonably strong intuitions that, on the assumption
that Bill is indeed 4,, S has, in uttering 'Ben is 4,' got something rightand something
wrong. We have already seen what she's got wrong: she has the flilse belief that Bill
is called 'Ben', a false belief that H must access to retrieve the intended content. It
seems natural, then, to say that what she has got right is thst the proposition expressed
by her utterance is tnje.
Given that my response follows on from the discussion in chapter 2,1 am not
making quite the substantive claim that I might at first sight seem to be making.
Identif3'ing, as I did m that chapter, the object of the truth-conditionalist's intuitions
with the explicature of an utterance of a sentence in an idealised discourse context, it
5 See, for instancc Knpkc (1972,1977).
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is going to be true that, on this view of propositional content, an utterance of 'Ben s'
will never be able to express the proposition that Bill 4s. The reason is this: an
omniscient speaker utters 'Ben +s'; by doing so, she indicates, given the meaning for
proper names proposed above, that she believes the individual she is talking about to
be called 'Ben'; since she is omniscient, she must be right about this - her intention,
that is, must be to talk about an individual who is called 'Ben'; so an omniscient
speaker cannot use 'Ben' to talk of Bill6. Recall the role playvd by a speaker's
abilities and preferences within the communicative principle of relevance discussed in
chapter2.Anotherwayofpresentingthepointlammakhigisthatiiskeytothe
original example that H should take as a premise in his inferential process that S is
fallible, that her abilities may skew what she takes to be the optimally relevant
interpretation of her utterance. Without this premise, H would never have been able to
reach the intended interpretation. But of course that premise is unavailable in the case
of an omniscient speaker, who can thus never use a name to talk about an individual
other than the name's bearer. I therefore, as again should be clear from the discussion
hi chapter 2, have no substantive argument against standard philosophical/semantic
claims on this point: it is of course open to the truth-conditional semanticist to posit a
level of semantic representation defined according to this idealised discourse context
and doing so makes his claim true. My argwnent, as presented in chapter 2, is shnply
that this level of representation is dispensable. This discussion should make it clear,
however, why the truth-conditionalist's intuitions on these cases are as they are.
The second potential objection to my analysis that I want to raise at this point
is the following: if the meaning of a proper name is really as I have suggested, then it
seems that a speaker may never use a proper name to refer to an individual whom he
does not believe to be the bearer of the name. Yet there are clear cases where this is
possible. Consider S and H again: H now wishes to communicate to S the proposition
that a is w; he could of course say to S something like: that person who you think is
called 'Ben well he's actually called 'Bill' andBill's y. But he could instead exploit
his knowledge that S believes to be called 'Ben' and convey the same message with
an utterance of 'Ben is 1,'.It seems I am committed to saying that, in this case, H will
succeed in expressing the proposition that is ip, and yet he has used a proper name to
'Or st least she cannot do so if she is unmasicating with an oinnisciait hecr.
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talk about an individual whom he does not believe to be the bearer of the name. This
seems incompatible with the claim that in using a proper name, a speaker indicates
that she believes that which she wishes to talk about to be the bearer of the name.
There is, in 1àct no incompatibility. In this case, H is manipulating the discourse
context and the nature of pragmatic inference. It is of course not the case that he
believes Bill to be called 'Ben'. It is nevertheless crucial to the success of his
communicative aim that S shouki take him so to believe. IfS does not believe that H
believes that is called 'Ben', then she will never reach H's intended interpretation
(unless of course she sees the light, realises that ! , hi fact, called 'Bill', that H
believes her to have a false belief and that he is tiying to exploit that belief in order to
communicate the proposition that! is w). The imagined objection, therefore, simply
fails to appreciate the nature of the interaction between linguistic meaning and
pragmatic principles, and the uses to which speakers can put this interaction.
3.2.2 Names, individual concepts and questions 1 to 3
I have, so far, laid out the bare bones of an analysis of the lexically encoded meaning
of proper names, although, as I indicated earlier, I do not expect the fall nature of the
analysis I support to be clear until I have addressed how this account fares with the
central data, and how it compares with other accounts currently available. Before
getting on to the central data however, I want to do a bit more spelling out; in
particular, I want to examine in broad outline what answers my account suggests to
the three questions presented at the start of this chapter, questions concerning the
truth-conditional contribution and cognitive significance of names and the conditions
under which we would want to say that a speaker has understood an utterance of a
name.
What I have so far claimed is that proper names are tools far communicating
individual concepts specifically, a speaker uses a proper name 'PN' where she wishes
to communicate a proposition her mental representation of which contains an
individual concept which she associates with the information 'x is called 'PN". What
constraints, then, does the use of a proper name, on this account, lay on the truth-
conditional content of an utterance containing 1? It is a consequence of my claim that
the constraints laid on truth conditions by the lexically encoded meaning of proper
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names are minimal; in particular, since proper names are silent on the external
dimensions of the concepts which constitute their interpretations on occasions of use,
they can be used to express either de re or descriptive individual concepts according
to speaker intention. This is so not just at the level of utterance content that I take to
be theoretically significant, but also at the level taken to be significant within the
truth-conditional literature, i.e. the level which I have identified with the proposition
expressed in an idealised discourse context. On my analysis, even an omniscient
speaker communicating with an omniscient hearer could use a name to express either
a de re or a descriptive concept.
One of the very few points of agreement between opposing camps in the
debateon names has been that, whateverstoiyyoutell, ithasto beastoryon which
either names always express de re concepts (i.e. always give rise to singular truth
conditions), or on which they always express descriptive concepts (give rise to
general propositions). it is of course the case that, given the assumptions discussed in
chapter 2, any account on which name sentences can be used to express either
singular or general truth conditions, is, qso facto, an ambiguity account of proper
names, and ambiguity accounts have, quite rightly, seemed to many to be an
unappealing last resort. I shall leave a detailed discussion of the question of ambiguity
until I have presented my analyses of a range of different singular-expression-types,
since the same considerations will apply across the board. My claim, however, will be
that, although names can, on my analysis, be used to express concepts with either
truth-conditional profile, i.e. with either type of external dimension, this does not
make my analysis an ambiguity account, or, at least, it does not make it an ambiguity
account in any way that should worry us from a methodological point of view.
What reason might there be to hold that name sentences can express either
singular or general truth conditions? I have already outlined, hi section 3.1.3 above,
the intuitions which seem to support the view that names are rigid designators, i.e.
that they give rise to singular truth conditions. This evidence is of course not
uncontroversial: it is, for instance, central to Russell's position, discussed in chapter
2(7), that proper names, as we use them in natural language, never give rise to
singular truth conditions7. The Russellian picture on proper names is not without its
am assuming. I hope w oonfroversially th, from the pertiw o(modcrn linguistic thuiy, we
would n* be tempted to go along with Russell in claiming thst danonstratives are thin znes.
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latter-day supporters, and I shall come on to discuss some of those Russell-flavoured
accounts below. For now, however, I want to point to some of the evidence used in
support of the view that name sentences (can be used to) express general propositions.
There are (at least) two types of example which have been taken to demonstrate non-
referential uses of names. Firstly there is the type of descriptive name discussed by
Evans (1982) and also by Grice (1969). Evans asks us to consider a naming
convention on which whoever invented the zip is to be called 'Julius'. Basing our use
on this convention, we can, it seems, use 'Julius' as any other proper name. It is
plausible, however, that our use of 'Julius' is not referential (in the terms I lhvour, the
interpretation of our use of 'Julius' does not involve a de re individual concept), since
we do not know, in the appropriate sense, which individual 'Julius' refers to (or,
rather, since the concept we associate with 'Julius' is not linked to an individual in the
way required for de re-ness).
In an attempt to rein such cases back into the direct reference fold, Recanati
(1993) argues that to use a proper name in such a way that it is backed only by a
descriptive psychological mode of presentation (individual concept) is to use that
name non-literally. For Recanati, Evans-type descriptive names are, essentially,
referential expressions in search of a referent:
If we use a descriptive name rather than a description, this is precisely
because we look forward to a richer state of knowledge in which we
will be able to think of the referent non-descriptively. A descriptive
name ... is created only in the expectation that more information about
the bearer will accumulate, thus eventuating ii the possibility of
thinking of the latter non-descriptively. This possibility Is shnply
anticipated by the use ofa descriptive name.
Recanati 1993, p. 180.
I think there is something right about this but also something wron& As I shall discuss
when I come on to examine how my account fares with intuitions on rigidity, it does
seem to be the case that names are mostly used as tools of reference, i.e. used to
communicate de re individual concept& I shall argue however that this is not a fact
concerning the semantics (i.e. encoded meaning) of proper names, but is a pragmatic
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fact, deriving from considerations of cognitive utility. Thus, although Recanati is iight
to claim that there is an intimate connection between proper names and de re
individual concepts, it is my belief that he's looking for an account of this relation hi
the wrong place.
Beyond that, however, his account seems to make certain counterintuitive
predictions. Imagine that I decide that I am going to call whoever is the male star of
the film Notorious 'Eric'; now I happen to know that the male star of Notorious was
Cary Grant; on Recanati's account, I am in a cognitive position to assign a referent to
'Eric', thus my use of 'Eric' should be referentially anchored to Cary Grail. Compare,
however, sentences (17) and (18):
17) CaryGrantmightnothavebeenEric.
18) Hesperus might not have been Phosphorus.
Kripke (1972) has convincingly argued that the proposition expressed by (standard
uses of) (18) is necessarily false; Hesperus, that is, just could not have failed to be
Phosphorus. I have the intuition, by contrast, that there is a reading of(17) on which it
is true given that James Stewart (or anyone for that matter) might have been the star
of Notorious. This intuition seems to weigh against the position that 'Eric' is
referential and refers to Cary Grant. I presume that Recanati's response would be to
claim that the proposition which I have hi mind involves a non-literal use of 'Eric',
whereas the proposition literally expressed by (17) is just as necessarily false as that
expressed by (18). Since, however, I have stipulated that 'Eric' should express a
descriptive concept of whoever is the male star of Notorious and since that is just the
concept that it seems to express in what I take to be the proposition expressed, we
should require a powerful argument to convince us that this proposition is non-literal
(inasmuch as the idea of literality or non-literality has any role to play within the kind
of framework I have adopted). Recanati, I seems to me, has no such argument.
Evans-type descriptive names thus seem to offer evidence that proper names
can be used non-referentially. It might be objected, however, that we are, in
examining these names, a long way from proper names as they are actually used hi
natural language; we do not, that is, go around deciding to call the inventor of the zip
'Julius' or the male star of Notorious 'Eric'. There are two responses to this: firstly,
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even if it were the case that natural language names were never, in fact, assigned via
descriptive concepts, what Evans shows is that they could be so-assigned without
thereby ceasing to be names, a fact which should be accommodated by an analysis of
names. SecondIy however, there are cases in which names are so assigned, the best-
known example, discussed by, among others, Kripke (1972), being 'Jack the Ripper'.
Our use of the name 'Jack the Ripper' is backed not by acquaintance, in Russellian
terms, but by a description something like 'the person who committed such-and-such
rairders'. And again we can use this name to show that all is not well with any
attempt to salvage refërentiality lbr Evans-type names, along the lines followed by
Recanati. Imagine we discover that Jack the Ripper was hi fact Liverpool
businessman James Maybrick. Now consider a possible work! in which precisely
those murders which Maybrick committed hi the actual world were committed by
Edward Prince of Wales. It seems clear that, as used in that world, the name 'Jack the
Ripper' would designate Edward rather than Maybrick. But beyond that, it seems that
this is a work! in which James Maybrick is not Jack the Ripper. Again, Recanati
would have to claim that, here, I am (in the imagined context) using the name 'Jack
the Ripper' non-literally, since, once I is established that Jack the Ripper is James
Maybrick, 'Jack the Ripper' becomes referentially anchored to Maybrick. I can see no
evidence for non-literality, however, in the claim that Maybrick is not Jack in the
inagined world.
The behaviour of Evans-type names thus offers strong evidence that (a) names
can be (and sometimes are) assigned via descriptive concepts and (b) these descriptive
concepts can constitute the truth-conditional contribution of such names. Kent Bach,
whose overall account of the semantics of proper names I shall discuss in greater
detail later hi the chapter, oflrs another sort of example: firstly, Bach (1987) asks us
to consider a discussion on the US presidential electoral process; one contributor
suggests that given recent results, alphabetical order might prove a better criterion for
selection; under those conditions, she claims:
19) Aaron Aardvark might have been president.
Bach 1987, p. 143.
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The speaker of (19) clearly does not intend to use the name 'Aaron Aardvark'
referentially - not only does she have no individual hi mind, her utterance does not
require that she shoukl believe there to be an individual who the name picks out. It
seems, therefore, that 'Aaron Aardvark' is used descriptively and that the tnith
conditions of an utterance of (19) are generaL More specffically it seems plausible
that in this case 'Aaron Aardvark' is interpreted as equivalent to the description 'the
person called 'Aaron Aardvark", giving (19) an interpretation on which it is
equivalent to (20):
20) It might have been the case that the person called Aaron Aardvark was
president.
Bach (2002) offers a further example on which a proper name seems to give rise this
sort of nominal interpretation:
21) If his parents had named him 'Aristocrates', Aristotle would have been
Aristocrates instead of Aristotle.
Again, it seems that the property of being called 'Aristotle' is part of the contribution
made by (at least one of the occurrences of) 'Aristotle' to truth-conditional content.
I am not sure how convinced a dyed-in-the-wool Millian would (or should) be
by Bach's examples, or rather by the conclusions he draws from them. While Bach,
advocating as he does an account on which name sentences express general
propositions, must allow that they can nevertheless be used to communicate singular
propositions, it is open to the Millian to claim the reverse: that name sentences
express singular propositions but may be used to communicate general propositions.
For sentence (19) in particular this kind of story seems to offer a plausible analysis:
given what seems to me to be an intuitive oddness about (19), it may well be that an
utterance of (19) falls, in the truth-conditionalist's terms, to express a literal
proposition, but may nevertheless be used successfully to communicate propositions
such as that the president might have borne the name 'Aaron Aardvark'. I shall return
to a discussion of Bach's position beiow, but for the time being I shall put his
examples to one side, and rely instead on the evidence from Evans-tWe names to
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Support my contention that proper names may be used non-referentially. This claim
only makes sense, of course, within a framework on which proper names are not taken
to be defined according to the type of their truth-conditional contribution. As
discussed in section 3.0 above, however, my claims, as certainly, for instance, those
of Bach, should be taken to concern the class comprising those expressions which are
intuitively taken to be proper names, not a semantically-individuated sub-class.
In answer to question 1,1 is central to the account I propose, then, that proper
names can make either singular or general contributions to truth-conditional content,
according to speaker intention. The answer my account suggests to question 2 will
become clearer when we come on to discuss the data concerning co-reference and
emptiness. In outline, however, it should be clear that, on this analysis, the cognitive
significance of a proper name is determined by the internal dimension of the
individual concept which, on an occasion of use, constitutes its interpretation. It may
seem, however, that there is an obvious objection to any account of this sort: the
cognitive significance of a singular expression, its sense, in Fregean terms, is not a
subjective property that differs from cognitive agent to cognitive agent, but must be
constant as between different cognitive agents; how else, the Fregean might ask, could
we account for successfiul communication? On my analysis, however, there is no
reason to suppose that mere co-reference would guarantee any overlap between the
internal dimensions of the individual concepts of two cognitive agents, leaving
successful communication as something of a mystery. This objection, however, has no
force, since there is no requirement that the cognitive significance of proper names
should be intersubjective in the sense that an utterance of a name sentence should give
rise to the same inferential effects for diflërent cognitive agents. Consider sentence
(1) again, repeated here as (22):
22) Satchmo is Louis Armstrong.
Sentences such as this have received the attention they have because although they
seem to predicate the identity of an object to isell they are nevertheless cognitively
significant. But the cognitive significance of this sentence is clearly relative: to some
it may express a new and surprising piece of information, to others what I expresses
may be limmiliar. The importance of such sentences is not, thereibre, that what they
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express must be cognitively significant, but that it can be so. And this thct can be
explained, on the picture! am presenting, by the observation that the names such
sentences contain can be associated by a cognitive agent with different individual
concepts (as can any two proper names) 8. For the time being that is all I shall have to
say but, as mentioned above, the details of how my account deals with cognitive
significance will be spelled out when we come to discuss co-refrrence and emptiness.
Finally, what answer does the analysis I have proposed suggest !tw question 3,
the question of what it is to understand a proper name? On the sort of picture I am
painting a picture on which there are two distinct theoretically-significant levels of
representation for sentence meanings, this question conceals two sub-questions.
Firstly, there is the question of what it is to grasp the linguistic meaning of a proper
name. Given the discussion in the previous section, the answer that my analysis offers
to this question is quite straightforward: to grasp the linguistic meaning of a proper
name 'PN' is to grasp that any speaker uttering 'PN' as part of a name sentence is
thereby indicating that a constituent part of the mental representation which fbrms the
content of her informative intention is an individual concept associated with the
iilbrmation 'x is called 'PN". This is not sufficient, however, to understand the use
of a name at the level of propositional content, at the level of explicature. To
understand an utterance, it is not enough merely to entertain what one might call
meta-conceptual representations concerning the speaker's thought; it is aLso necessary
to entertain a propositional representation which stands in certain relations of
similarity to the speaker's own representation. To see what this means, consider a
complete stranger approaching you and uttering (23):
23) Larsisaliar.
It seems that you are in a position to understand certain things about the mental
representation which the speaker is trying to communicate: you can, for instance, inlër
'The names they contain being associated with ffezait individual concepts is not in ki quite enough
iw these sentences to be cognitively significait it is aftor all, entirely plausible that I have dit1rait
individual concepts associated with 'Supamen' arid 'Clark Kent', while the sentence 'Supern is
Clark Kent' would still be uninbmativc Rw me. It is therthre nsswy for cognitive signifiouicc not
just that the two names should be associated with difforent individual concepts, t*jt that those concepts
should not contain inrmation about naitual identity, i.e. that, in this case, the concept I associate with
'Supuman' should not contain the information 'x is the bearor of 'Clark Kent" and 'ice usa.
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that her mental representation contains an individual concept (that she is talking about
an individual) and that her individual concept contains the information 'x is called
'Lars" (that she intends to talk about someone she thinks of as 'Lars'). There is what
seems to me to be a robust lituition, however, that you are not in a position to grasp
the MI propositional content of her utterance, just as you would not have been if
instead of (23), she had uttered 'he is an impostor'9. This intuition is not universally
held: as I shall discuss later in this chapter, there are accounts of the semantics of
proper names which are committed to the claim that you are able to grasp what the
speaker has said, in something like the Gricean sense, by an utterance of(23), without
any further inlbrmation'°. As will become clear, I have no knock-down argument
against such positions; they do, however, give rise to theoretically unwelcome results,
not the least of which is their violation of the intuition under discussion. Assuming
that this intuition is as robust as it seems to me to be, what extra information do we
need in order to grasp the propositional content of an utterance of(23)? We need to
know who Lars is. In the sort of framework I have laid out, this is equivalent to saying
that we need to be able to entertain an individual concept of Lars of the appropriate
sort. The question thus comes down to how we want to explicate the notion of
appropriateness used here. What makes i individual concept entertained by a hearer
an appropriate interpretation of a speaker's use of a proper name?
It would seem to be at least a necessary condition that the hearer's concept and
the speaker's concept should not differ in their external dimensions, that they should,
in other words, be truth-conditionally equivalent. The question then becomes: is this
condition sufficient? It seems clear that it is not: if all that were required for
understanding were tnith-conditional equivalence, then we would be unable to
distinguish between the conditions for understanding of utterances of(l) and (2). Yet
it seems clear that a hearer who merely grasps a proposition that is true 1ff Satchmo is
Satchnio has not thereby understood an utterance of (1). What more is required for
understanding? What I want to suggest is that we should look to the process of
interpretation for an answer to this question. In interpreting (I) a hearer will arrive at
the individual concept which constitutes his interpretation of 'Satchmo' vi the
property of being the bearer of 'Satchmo' just as he will, mutatis mutandas, for 'Louis
'For moue on the puallels bweai propu nu ud indexicals/danonstratives, son section 32.4.2
below.
'°Bath's acix*jnt, montioned above, is one sudi.
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Armstrong'. Given this, the hearer will have understood an utterance of (I) 1ff he
entertains two distinct concepts which are truth-conditionally anchored to Louis
Armstron& one of which presents its referent in a Louis-Armstrong kind of way and
the other of which presents its referent in a Satchmo kind of way. But what does a
Satchino way ofpresenting a referent inok like? All we can say about this is that an
individual concept of Louis Armstrong presents him in a Satchmo way 1 it is
associated with the inlbrmation x is called 'Satchmo'. Although this will stairlardly
require that the concept entertained by the hearer as a constituent of his interpvetation
will itself contain the information x is called 'Satchmo' this need not be the case;
there will, after all, be some contexts in which it will be optimally relevant to ivlër to
an individual by using a name of which that individual is not the bearer, a ct of
which both speaker and hearer may be aware. Nevertheless, for a name successfully
to refer to an individual, it must be the case that that individual is apprqpriately
associated with the property of being the bearer of that name. And it is this fact about
the referent that a hearer must grasp for understanding.
3.2.3 Individual concepts and the core data
As discussed in section 3.1, data concerning co-reference and emptiness have been
taken to provide an acid test for accounts of the semantics of proper names. In this
section 1 want to examine these data in rather greater detaiL Once we have a better
understanding of their significance, I hope to show that they are naturally captured
within the analysis I have proposed.
3.2.3.1 Co-reference
Co-referring names, as 1 outlined in 3.1, give rise to two distinct problems for
analyses of the semantics of proper names: on the one hand they seem to be capable
of differing hi cognitive significance despite sharing a referent, and, on the other, they
seem, in certain contexts, not to be substitutable salva verirate; in Fregean terms, they
seem to raise problems both at the level of sense and at the level of reference. Taking
these problems in order, think back to sentences (1)-(2), repeated here as (24)-(25):
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24) Satchmo is Louis Armstrong.
25) Satchmo is Satchmo.
The difficulty lies in explaining how these two sentences, diflbring only in the
substitution of one proper name for another co-referential name, can differ in
cognitive significance. As is well-known, it is in an attempt to address this question
that Frege (1952) introduces the distinction between sense and reference. But a closer
look at Frege's proposed solution might oflèr us a clearer insight into what is really
going on here. Frege's proposal, as it applies to the examples at hand, would claim
that 'Satchino' and 'Louis Armstrong' differ in cognitive significance because they
differ in sense. There is a tension, however, between this clahn and another central
element of Frege's analysis, the intersubjectivity of sense: it seems clear that I do not
need to associate the name 'Satchmo' with precisely the same descriptions with which
you associate it in order to understand your utterance of 'Satchmo' and in order for
(24) to be cognitively significant to me. It thus seems that, on a Fregean picture, sense
is needed to account for the shift in cognitive significance from (24) to (25), yet the
senses on which Frege must rely lack one of the key elements required by his non-
cognitivist perspective: intersubjectivity. Frege himself recognised this tension. In an
oft-quoted passage, he says:
In the case of an actual proper name such as 'Aristotle' opinions as to
the sense may diflër. It might, lbr instance, be taken to be the
following: the pupil of Plato and teacher of Alexander the Great.
Anybody who does this will attach another sense to the sentence
'Aristotle was born in Stagira' than will a man who takes as the sense
of the name: the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in
Stagira. So long as the reference remains the same, such variations of
sense may be tolerated, although they are to be avoided in the
theoretical structure of a demonstrative science and ought not to occur
in a perfect language.
Frege (1 893, p.159, flu. 4)
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It is a commonplace to point out that providing an articulated semantics for natural
language expressions was no part of Frege's aim, but it nevertheless worth noticing
that this tension strikes a blow at the applicability of the sense-reference distinction,
as fonnulated by Frege, to an analysis of natural language proper names. For Frege,
what it is to understand an expression is to grasp that expression's sense, yvt Frege
himself is prepared to accept the possibility of a hearer understanding a use of a
proper name without associating the same sense with that name as does the speaker".
The tension that Frege's account thus 6ces is illuminating: on the one hand it seems
that the difference in cognitive significance between distinct but co-referential names
depends on there being more to the meaning of a proper name than its referent, while
on the other hand it seems that understanding of a proper name is possible where the
only common ground between speaker and hearer is at the level of reference, i.e.
where all that connects them is that they are thinking of the same thing.
Beyond this tension within Frege's analysis, there are also, of course, the
problems for descriptive accounts raised by Kripke (1972)12. In particular, the
sentence:
26) Aristotle was born in Stagira.
will end up, on Frege's analysis, being analytic for anyone who takes the sense of
'Aristotle' to be the teacher of Alexander the Great who was born in Stag Ira. This
result, as Kripke has argued, seems plainly wrong: (26) expresses what is inescapably
a contingent truth, if truth it be. Yet there is some intuitive basis for the Fregean
position on this question: while the proposition expressed by (26) seems clearly
contingent, it is nevertheless the case that, for a cognitive agent who associates the
description the teacher ofAlexander the Great who was born in Stagira with the name
'Aristotle', sentence (26) will not be cognitively significant in the way that it is fbr an
agent who does not associate this description with the name. There is thus a relation
between the descriptions associated by an agent with a proper name and the cognitive
"It is opai to the Fregeas lo claim that in such cases the hearer does not hiily undstand the speak&s
use of the pçer name. Such a mcJv, howesa, t1es a kwig way from any intuitive notion of
undustandmg.
'2 See chapter 1.
67
significance that an utterance of the name will have for that agent. It is ii the relation
he posits between such descriptions and meaning that Frege goes wrong.
These apparent problems lbr a Fregean analysis of proper names fall away
when we approach the question of co-refbrence from within the framework I have
outlined. Remember that, on my ana1ysis, to understand a name 'PN' it is necessary to
access an individual concept which shares the object of its external dimension with
that of the speaker. The only constraint laid on the internal dimension is that it should
contain the in!brmation the speaker believes that x Lc called 'PN'. How, on this
picture, would we want to account lbr the shift in cognitive significance between, for
instance, (24) and (25)? The answer is that such a shift is just what we should expect:
the cognitive significance of a proper name is a function of the internal dimension of
the individual concept which constitutes its interpretation; it is thus independent of
facts about reibrence and, a foiliori, of facts about co-reibrence. That is just to say
that we should expect different proper names to be associated with individual
concepts with different internal dimensions and thus with different cognitive
significance. When it comes to questions about cognitive significance, therefore, co-
rekrence is simply a red herring.
On the face of it, there are certain similarities between an account along these
lines and Frege's account: on both, the reference of a proper name is distinct fim the
bearer of that name's cognitive significance. So how can this analysis tackle the
problems fur Frege outlined above? For Frege, a proper name is such that in order to
grasp its meaning. it is necessary to grasp a sense, i.e. a particular descriptive
condition'3. This descriptive condition then determines which object it is, if any, that
the name refers to. On my account, by contrast, all that is required to understand a
proper name is to entertain some individual concept which is co-extensive with the
speaker's concept and which is appropriately associated with the name itself The key
pohit, as mentioned above, is that there are no constraints on the relations of similarity
that must hold between the internal dimensions of the two concepts. it is thus the case
that, on this picture, there is more to the meaningrmterpretation of a proper name than
its referent: there is the internal dimension of the individual concept which constitutes
that interpretation. However, there is no obstacle to speaker and hearer associating
am bise disaissing whst I take to be the views of Frege, not the views of those who following in
his footsteps, have sought to do away with the deeaiptivaiess of Fregose sensos. See, for instance,
Evans (1982) and McDowell (1977).
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different descriptions with the name's referent, since there are no constraints on how
similar the internal dimensions must be. To put it another way, the meaning of a
proper name is such that it marks the fact of associated descriptive information,
without determining the nature of that information.
This analysis also offers a solution to the second problem, the problem of
accounting for cognitive significance without analyticity. Given the anatomy for
individual concepts which I have proposed, the cognitive significance of(a referential
use of) a name is independent of its truth-conditional contribution; the counterpart of
sense in my picture, that is, does not determine reference, for de re individual
concepts. On such a picture, then, cognitive significance depends on the individual
concept which constitutes the interpretation of a proper name, while the descriptive
content of that individual concept, its internal dimension, does not determine
reference and is not, therefore, analytic. It is, however, clear on this analysis why
there should be a difference between the cognitive significance that (26) has for an
agent who associates the description the teacher ofAlexander the Great who was born
in Stagira with the name 'Aristotle' and the significance for an agent who does not
associate description and name. It is not that for one agent the proposition expressed
by (26) is analytic while for the other it is synthetic, it is rather that for one it is
informative while for the other it is uninformative; for one, that is, it offers a novel
piece of information while for the other it does not.
It is important to note, however, that these points apply only to referential uses
of proper names, i.e. to those uses the intended interpretation of which is a de re
individual concept. It seems clear, for instance, that Kripke's objection concerning
analytic ity does not apply to descriptive uses of proper names. Consider, for instance:
27) The Whitechapel murders were not committed by Jack the Ripper.
For most (although not all) utterances of (27), the proposition expressed by this
sentence seems contradictory; it seems, that is, làlse at all possible worlds'4. This
suggests that, unlIke (26), sentence (28):
14 The on-most-kses caveat is necey due to the wabi1ity of the esta'nal dimonsion of desaij*ive
concqts dissed in chaj* 2. Continuing with the example of 'Jack the Ripper', there are various
pieces of inlbrmation standardly associated with the anme two of which might hex committed the
Whilechapel imirders and x wrote a series of letters to the police signing himself 'Jack'. Now since the
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28) Jack the Ripper committed the Whitechapel murders.
is (again, on most uses) analytic, or at least expresses a necessary truth. The problem
of differing cognitive significance also disappears when we come to look at
descriptive names, since there is no more temptation to equate the cognitive
significance of co-extensive descriptive names than there is to equate the cognitive
significance of co-denoting definite descriptions.
My claim is, therefore, that the account I am proposing offers a natural
analysis of those data concerning the cognitive significance of co-referring proper
names which have been taken as a key testing ground for theories of the semantics of
proper names. What, then, of the data concerning the failure of substitutivity of such
names, salva ventate, in certain contexts? I want first to raise a caveat: how opaque
contexts should best be handled within a general theory of meaning is one of the most
fundamental areas of debate in current work in formal and philosophical approaches
to meaning, and it goes well beyond the scope of this thesis to provide a filly
articulated account of the semantics of such contexts. However I want at least to
suggest a direction in which it might be worth looking for such an account, given the
kind of framework I have advocated.
There is much evidence to suggest that any analysis on which belief is taken as
a direct relation between individuals and propositions faces formidable problems
when it comes to the semantic analysis of belief contexts' 5. It seems quite natural,
however, on the sort of account I favour, to view belief not as a direct relation
between individuals and propositions but as a direct relation between individuals and
mental representations, and thus as an indirect relation between individuals and
propositions. Again, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to examine in depth precisely
what sort of relation this belief relation might be, but it will most likely look
something like:
conceç* associated (by most of us) with 'Jack the Ripper' is descriptive, either of these descriptions
ny be central to the oontnbution to thdh conditions of an utterance of 'Jack the Ripper'. Thus if a
speaker intends to link ha use of the iusne to the first of these pieces &incmation, then her utterance
of(28) will indeed eqress a neoess&y truth, althongh her utterance of 'Jack the Ripper wrote letters to
the police' will not, whereas the situation will be reused if she intends ha use to be linked to the
saxmd piece of inforntion.
5 Fcr one particularly weH-knn presaitation of such probIemi see Sehiffer (1987).
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A believes that p 1ff A entertains a mental representation M which is a
representation of p and A adopts an endorsing attitude to M.
Clearly this formulation leaves a great many questions open, but it will, I believe, do
for our present purposes. What implications would such a construal of the belief
relation have for problems concerning the interpretation of proper names in belief
contexts? Consider once more (3) and (4), repeated here as (29) and (30):
29) Ella believes that Satchmo is a great trumpeter.
30) Ella believes that Louis Armstrong is a great trumpeter.
The first things to point out is that each of these sentences seems to have two distinct
readings, one reading on which the embedded name is referentially transparent and
one on which it is referentially opaque. Since 'Satchmo' and 'Louis Armstrong' are
co-referential, the readings on which they are interpreted transparently will be truth-
conditionally equivalent, each predicating of Louis Armstrong that he is such that Ella
believes him to be a great trumpeter. On the view of belief sketched above, these
transparent readings give us only partial information about Ella's belith: they give us
the external dimension but not the internal dimension; they tell us, in other words,
what are the objects of Ella's belie1 but nothing about how she thinks of those
objects.
On the opaque readings, we are not left so much in the dark: with the
embedded names interpreted opaquely we know that Ella thinks of the object of her
belief in (29) as 'Satchmo' and of the object of her belief in (30) as 'Louis
Armstrong'. Put in the cognitive terms I favour, we know, for (29), that the individual
concept which forms a constituent of Ella's belief is associated with the information x
is called Satchmo' and, for (30), that Ella's individual concept is associated with the
information x Lr called 'Lows Armstrong'. On this analysis of opacity the failure of
substitutivity typical of opaque contexts falls out naturally in essence, what (29) tells
us, on an opaque reading is that Ella stands in the belief relation to a mental
representation containing an individual concept associated with the information x Lr
called 'Satchmo', while what (30) tells us is that she stands in this relation to a
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representation containing an individual concept associated with the information x Is
called 'Louis Armstrong'. Since 'Satchmo' and 'Louis Armstrong' arc different
names, we have no reason to suppose that Ella associates these names with the same
individual concept (as we know, co-reference is a red herring as far as cognitive
significance is concerned) and thus no reason to suppose that, in the move from (29)
to (30) we are exchanging like for like. On this analysis, the names 'Satchmo' and
'Louis Armstrong' have just the same encoded meaning as in any other context; what
differs is to whom the information associated with the name is attributed, this
attribution being a matter of speaker intention.
This is only the briefest outline of a possible approach to the bdaviour of
proper names in referentially opaque contexts within the framework I am flying to
develop. There is, however, a potential challenge to the analysis, even in Ibis vaguest
of forms. Saul (1997) points to what she perceives as failures of subsPitutivity of
proper names parallel to those occurring in belief contexts but whidb occur in
unembedded positions. She asks us to consider the following sentences:
31) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Superman came out.
32) Clark Kent went into the phone booth and Clark Kent came out.
It seems, at least to Saul, that if(3 1) is an accurate description of an event (within the
fictional world of Metropolis) then (32) is not. That is to say, her claim is that if(31)
is true (in the fiction), then (32) is false. This presents an apparent problem for those
who hold to a direct reference flavoured account of proper names, just as does fitilure
of substitutivity in opaque contexts: it seems that (31) and (32) differ in truth value
while being identical but for the substitution of one name for another co-referential
name. But Saul's data also seems to present a problem for those who adopt a more
Fregean approach: the Fregean accounts for referential opacity in propositional
attitude contexts by appealing to indirect references, i.e. by positing that names (and
other singular expressions) refer not to their customary referents when they appear in
such contexts, but rather to their customaiy senses. As Saul points out, this story is
simply not open to the Fregean in accounting for failure of substitutivity in
unembedded contexts, since it is unclear what it could mean to claim that names do
not refer to their customary referents in simple contexts.
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It might also seem that Saul's examples pose a threat to the kind of analysis
which I have advocated, problems along much the same lines as those faced by a
Fregean analysis: although my account can provide what I take to be a plausible
analysis of the difference in cognitive significance between (31) and (32), an analysis
of the potential difference in truth value seems beyond it. On the account I flivour, the
truth-conditional contribution of a referential use of a proper name isJust that name's
referent Since, in the fiction, 'Clark Kent' and 'Superman' refer to the same
individual, the two names should make the same contribution to truth conditions, and
(31) and (32) should therefore be truth-conditionally equivalent. The analysis of belief
contexts I have sketched above does not extend naturally to such cases, since it
depends on two features, neither of which seem necessarily present for Saul's
examples: the involvement of a cognitive agent other than the speaker and hearer, and
a thilure to reallse, on the part of that cognitive agent, the identity central to the
examples. Taking (29) and (30) again, the potential difference in truth value depends
on the involvement of Ella as a cognitive agent, and Ella's fitilure to realise that
Satchmo is Louis Armstrong: it is only in those worlds at which Ella is not aware of
this identity that (29) and (30) may differ in truth value. Saul's examples, by contrast,
seem to rely on no such lack of enlightenment: if we know anything about the
Superman stories, we know that Clark Kent is Superman, yet it still seems that, for us,
(31) and (32) may differ in truth value.
How might we tackle these problems within the framework I favour? One
obvious strategy might be to claim that there is something special about Saul's
examples; they do, after all, involve fictional names, which have often been seen as
requiring a separate account from non-fictional names' 6. We can, however, dismiss
this idea for the simple reason that the same sorts of failure of substitutivity seem to
occur in non-fictional cases. Consider sentences (33) and (34):
33) Norma Jean Baker wasn't a film star but Marilyn Monroe was.
34) Norma Jean Baker wasn't a film star but Norma Jean Baker was.
"though I shall be arguing that fictional and non-fictional names do not in fact need to be treated
separately (see section 3.2.3.2 below).
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Here we see much the same pattern as in Saul's examples: it seems that (33) may be
irue whereas (34) is a contradiction, although the sentences differ only in the
substitution of one name for another co-referring name.
There are two key questions that arise: firstly, if we cannot look to the
fictional nature of these examples for a key to the failure of substitutivity involved,
where should we look? And secondly, should we expect whatever story we end up
telling about these examples to extend to failure of substitutivity in propositional
attitude contexts? If we answer 'yes' to this second question, then it would seem that
the sort of account of such contexts which I have sketched above would receive a
serious blow, given that, as we have seen, it does not naturally extend to simple
contexts. Taking this second question first, there are good reasons to suppose that,
whatever the source of the failure of substitutivity in Saul's examples, it is different
from the source of failure of substitutivity in propositional attitude contexts. Consider
the following example: Bill has read two novels, one a novel in Spanish called
'Rayuela' by a novelist called 'Julio' and another a novel in English called
'Hopscotch' by a novelist called 'Julius'. Being rather unobservant, Bill has failed to
notice that Hopscotch is a translation of Rayuela. Now this scenario gives us a more
or less standard context for building failure-of-substitutivity4n-propositional-attitude-
context cases. Thus, sentences (35) and (36) may have different truth values:
35) Bill believes that Julio is a great writer.
36) Bill believes that Julius is a great writer.
although 'Julio' and 'Julius' are co-extensive. This is not however a context in which
Saul-type examples can get off the ground. 1f for instance, sentence (37) is true, then
so is sentence (38):
37) Julio wrote Rayuela and Julius wrote Hopscotch.
38) Julio wrote Rayuela and Julio wrote Hopscotch.
Examples such as this offer at least prima fade evidence that Saul's examples are not
of the same kind as examples of failure of substitutivity in propositional attitude
contexts.
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Predelli (200 Ia) offers convincing evidence that, whatever the source of the
failure of substitutivity in Saul's examples, it is not down to the semantics of proper
names (or other singular expressions for that matter). He points out that much the
same sort of thing happens where there is no singular expression to give rise to it lie
asks us to consider a situation in which the notoriously unsuccessfW-with-women
Clark Kent is sitting in a conference room with equally timid Art and Bart. In this
situation, it seems that an utterance of(39) will be true:
39) Nobody in the conference room is successful with women.
Later that day, however, the notoriously successful-with-women Superman is being
interviewed in the conference room by Art and Bart In this context, it seems that an
utterance of (39) will be false. Thus, although, given the identity of Clark and
Superman, the set of individuals in the conference room seems unchanged from one
context to the next, the truth value of an utterance of(39) has changed.
What might all this suggest? Many of those who have addressed the questions
raised by Saul's paper have introduced what we might call sub-individual
metaphysical entities to do so: Forbes (1997, 1999) makes use of ways ofdressing and
personae; Moore (1999) appeals to aspects, Pitt (2001) talks of alter egos and Saul
herself (1997) mentions the possibility of using temporal phases to do the job. The
evidence presented by Predelli (1999, 200 Ia) strongly supports an analysis in terms of
some such entities: what Predelli's evidence suggests is that, in the move from (3!) to
(32), we are not swapping like for like, and thus that, as they are used in these two
sentences, the names 'Superman' and 'Clark Kent' are not co-referential. How could
this idea be developed within a cognitive framework making use of the notion of
individual concepts? Ask yourself whether the following sentence is true:
40) Superman works as a reporter on the Daily Planet.
It seems to me that there are conflicting intuitions on this question: on the one hand
there seems to be a strong intuition that Superman does not work as a reporter on the
Daily Planet, while on the other there is the intuition that, since Superman is Clark
Kent and Clark Kent works for the Daily Planet, so does Superman. How might we
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explain these conflicting intuitions? On an individual concept analysis there is a
straightforward story to tell: we have three separate individual concepts, one of
Superman-Clark Kent, one of Superman and one of Clark Kent. In other words, we
conceptualise as an individual not just that entity who appears sometimes as a
superhero and sometimes as a reporter but also both of the sub-parts of that entity.
This analysis receives support from a range of beliefs concerning Superman and Clark
Kent: Superman wears a red cape but Clark Kent doesn't; Clark Kent wears glasses
but Superman doesn't, and so on. Were we to have just a single Superman-Clark
concept, then, given these beliefs, that concept would be riddled with contradiction. It
seems, however, that there is, intuitively, no contradiction in these beliefs. What this
comes down to is that, as well as conceptualising Superman and Clark Kent as distinct
dimensions of the same individual, we also conceptualise them as discrete individuals.
This analysis leads to a natural interpretation of the conflicting intuitions
concerning the truth value of(40): we will take the proposition expressed by (40) to
be true when we interpret 'Superman' as corresponding to our Superman-Clark Kent
concept, whereas we will take it to be false when we interpret 'Superman' as
corresponding to our Superman concept. I conclude, therefore, that Saul's examples
of failure of substitutivity in non-embedded contexts require separate treatment from
failure of substitutivity in propositional attitude contexts, and not only pose no threat
to the kind of analysis of proper names that I favour, but can, in fact, be handled
naturally within such an analysis.
3.2.3.2 Empty names
In the previous section I aimed to show that an account of the semantics and
pragmatics of proper names along the lines I favour can offer a plausible solution to
the puzzles concerning co-referring names that have so worried philosophers of
language. In this section 1 want to turn to how my account might handle data
concerning empty names, i.e. names that fail to name any individual As with co-
referring names, there are, broadly speaking, two distinct problems raised by empty
names, one concerning significance and the other concerning truth value. I shall
address these problems in order.
Recall sentence (7), repeated here as (41):
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41) Nat Tate lived and worked in New York.
The problem raised by examples such as (41) can be illustrated thus: shortly before
William Boyd's hoax is revealed to the world, Bill, a leading light on the New York
art scene, utters (41) to Ben; a few days later Bill and Ben discover that they have
been taken in by a hoax and that Nat Tate is no more than a figment of Boyd's
imagination. What will Bill and Ben now think of Bill's utterance of (41)? Intuitively
it seems that Bill will now believe that what he said in uttering (41) was not true,
given the non-existence of Nat Tate, but he will surely not believe that it was
meaningless; equally it will seem to Ben that his lack of awareness of the hoax barred
him from grasping the truth value of Bill's utterance, but did not bar him from
grasping its meaning. These intuitions of course pose something of a problem for
accounts of proper names within the direct reference tradition: if as the classical
direct reference position holds, the meaning properties of a proper name are exhausted
by that name's referent, then 'Nat Tate', filling as it does to designate any individual,
should lack meaning. Yet both Bill and Ben's intuitions seem incompatible with this
result: Bill's intuition suggests that his utterance is fully meaningful, while Ben's
intuition suggests that understanding an empty proper name is compatible with failing
to realise that it is empty.
There have been many attempts, within the direct reference framework, to
address these problems. Some have bitten the bullet and accepted the conclusion that
Bill's utterance of (41) does fail to express a full proposition, explaining away Bill
and Ben's intuitions by appealing to extra implicated descriptive propositions'7;
others have found this result unacceptable and have instead eliminated empty names
by positing an onto logically special class of objects for them to refer to' 8. There is not
the space here to examine these accounts in detail (although I shall be saying more
about accounts such as Salmon's below). The problem for almost all, however, is that
they violate one or other half of the key intuition: either, as with bite-the-bullet
accounts, they violate the intuition that empty names sentences are fully meaningful,
'7 see, for exi1e, Braun (1993), Taylor (2000) aud Reimer (2001).
' See Salmon (1998) for one of the most recent vasions o(this type of view.
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or, as with Salmon-type accounts, they vk)late the intuition that empty names are
empty.
Accounts of proper names within the direct reference tradition thus seem to
face serious difficulties in dealing with the data concerning empty taames. That is not
to say that these difficulties are fataL It; however, we could find an account which
could respect the intuition that empty name sentences are fully significant as well as
the intuition that the names they contain are genuinely empty, then we shouki, ceteris
par!bus, prefer it. The account of proper names proposed by Frege seems to be able to
reconcile just these two desiderata. For Frege, the name 'Nat Tate', as a meaningful
linguistic expression, must be associated with a sense. That Nat irate does not exist
simply tells us that whatever the sense of 'Nat Tate' may be, it ioes not happen to
determine any individual However, since, for Frege, the bearer of a sentence's
cognitive significance is identical to the proposition expressed by that sentence is
identical to that sentence's sense, the failure of the sense of 'Nat Tate' to pick out an
object in the word is neither here nor there for the propositional content or
significance of a sentence such as (41). (41) will still express a complete proposition
and will thus be fully significant. The problem, of course, lies in the ceteris paribus
caveat above: as Kripke (1972), Donnellan (1970) and many others have shown, all
things are not equal for descriptive theories of names. It thus seems that our best
chance of accounting for the significance of empty name sentences has been snatched
away.
The account I have outlined, however, is able to reconcile Fregeanism on
empty names with Kripke's objections to description theories (in the case of
referential uses of proper names, the only type of use which gives rise to the problems
under discussion). The key to this reconciliation lies once more in the anatomy of
individual concepts which I proposed hi chapter 2 for de re iadividual concepts,
descriptive content is overridden, as far as truth conditions are concerned, by causal
relation; what a de re individual concept is a concept o that is to say, is determined
relationally, not satisfactionally. One corollary of this mutual independence between
internal and external dimensions is that a de re individual concept may have a fully
articulated internal dimension, without its external dimension happening to pick out
anything in the world. Once more we return to the idea, mentioned in the previous
section, that as far as the cognitive significance of referentially-4ised proper names
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goes reference is simply a red herring. There is thus no reason, on the present picture,
to suppose that a sentence containing an empty name should be any more or less
cognitively significant than an equivalent sentence containing a non-empty name.
This analysis of the cognitive significance of referential uses of empty names is not
necessarily in conflict with direct reference positions. The key claim of the direct
reference position on names is that referential uses of names (which is to say, on the
DR position, oil uses of names) contribute nothing to truth conditional content other
than their referents, and this is just what my analysis holds. Given that it does not
identi1' meaning with truth-conditional contribution, however, my analysis makes
available an account of the cognitive significance of names based on their linguistic
meaning.
It is of course the case that, for non-referential uses of proper names, there is no
problem with intuitions on the significance of name sentences. Imagine that it turns
out that those women who it is believed were murdered by Jack the Ripper died, in
läct, of a peculiar illness which leaves its victims looking as if they had been
gruesomely murdered. Under those circumstances a use of 'Jack the Ripper' intended
by the speaker to be truth-conditionally anchored to the property of having committed
the Whitechapel murders would, presumably, be empty. Given the analysis of
descriptive individual concepts in chapter 2, however, there is no temptation to think
that a sentence such as (42) should, on such a use, be meaningless:
42) Jack the Ripper came from LiverpooL
for more-or-less Fregean reasons: given the speaker's intentions, there will be an
entirely determinate condition for denotation, and thus an equally determinate
proposition expressed.
What I hope I have established so far is that the account I favour ties in with
intuitions on the significance of sentences containing empty names; it ties in, that is,
with the intuition that a sentence containing an empty name can be as meaningful as
one containing a non-empty name. But what, on the present picture, does this notion
of meaningfulness amount to? Given the picture of individual concepts with which I
am working it amounts to the idea that, from a solipsistic perspective, there is nothing
to distinguish the type of thought expressed by a sentence containing an empty name
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from that expressed by a sentence containing a non-empty name. What it does not
amount to is a claim that all utterances of sentences containing empty names express
detenninate sets of truth conditions. In this respect, my account inherits what has been
seen by many to be an unacceptable aspect of the Fregean picture: it is committed, as,
pace the views of Evans (1982), is Frege, to the possIbility that a sentence may be
fully meaningful while lacking a truth value. I first want to outline why and how my
account is committed to this conclusion; once I have done so, I shall examine why this
result has seemed so unpalatable and whether we should really be worried by it
For variety's sake, consider sentence (43):
43) Nat Tate was over six feet tall.
Has a speaker, in uttering (43), said something true or false? Intuitions on this sort of
question are notoriously variable, but there is surely one point on which all sides can
agree: an utterance of(43) does not express a true proposition". Beyond this it seems
that there is no consensus for the direct reference theorist the failure of sentences
such as (43) to express any proposition and thus to bear a truth value is in line with
the referential view of proper names, while for the descriptivist, (43) expresses a
complete and false proposition, thus supporting a descriptive view of names. Of
course, as with most of the extensive use made of truth-value intuitions in the
literature, opposing intuitions are either ignored or dismissed out of hand 20. My
intuition is that the imagined utterance of(43) fails to have any truth value. But what
is my intuition an intuition of? And why (other than for reasons of theoretical
expediency) should others have opposing intuitions? An account able to capture such
apparently opposing intuitions should, I suggest, be preferred to one that embraces
one intuition at the expense of another.
How should we analyse what a speaker of(43) has said on the sort of analysis
I have proposed? There is no one answer to this question: how we analyse the content
of(43) will depend on the external dimension of the individual concept corresponding
to the speaker's use of 'Nat Tate'. My intuition, on which (43) has no truth-value,
"Thinp are not, I believe, in thct as simple as this. The judgrnezit that (43) is not ue depends, I shall
claim below, on our taking it as a ateinont about the actual world. Taken as auth. howe, this
intuition seans reasonably ri*ust.
Notable excqtioon to this genaalisation can be bind in the growing litaature in support of multi-
proposition semanti. See, b instance, Bach (1999) and Neale (1999).
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might naturally be seen to correspond to an utterance of (43) on which the speaker
takes her individual concept to be IC-anchored relationally or to be IC-anchored to
the actual satisfier of some descriptive condition. In other words, my intuition
concerns referential uses of proper names: on a referential use, a speaker cedes control
over the truth-conditional content of her use of a name, with the resulting possibility
that the name may IIiil to have any truth-conditional content. It is, of course, one of
my central claims that these are not the only truth-conditional possibilities for
individual concepts: it is open to a speaker to TC-anchor her use of a name directly to
a descriptive condition. It seems plausible to suppose that it is this sort of use which
the descriptivist has in mind when considering these examples, and which underlie his
intuitions on truth value. There is, after all, quite an impetus in this direction: as we
have seen, an utterance of(43) seems to be meaningfiul although there is no individual
designated by 'Nat Tate', thus 'Nat Tate' must be semantically linked to some
descriptive condition. It is only in the light of a two-component analysis of individual
concepts that this line of reasoning loses its force. Given that it makes available more
than one type of proposition expressed, truth-conditionally individuated, the two-
component picture is thus able to accommodate both the referentialist's intuition that
(43) lacks a truth value and the descriptivist's intuition that (43) expresses a false
proposition.
As I have already mentioned, however, it accommodates these intuitions at the
cost of allowing for the possibility that an utterance may be, in some sense, fully
meaningful, while litiling to bear a truth value, a result that many have seen as
unappealing. So why this distaste? The account which standardly bears the brunt of
this criticism is Frege's, and I suspect that we can trace the criticism back not to the
result itsell but to Frege's version of it, or rather to how it fits in to Frege's overall
account. As mentioned above, Frege identifies the proposition expressed by a
sentence with the cognitive significance of that sentence and with that which
determines the sentence's truth value, all roles played by the sentence's sense. For
Frege, the claim that a sentence containing an empty name can be fully significant is
the claim that it has a complete sense. However, to claim that a sentence has a
complete sense is, on Frege's picture, also to claim that it expresses a complete
proposition, and this is where I think the problem lies it has seemed to many that on
Frege's (or any other) account, it is simply incoherent to claim that a sentence can
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express a complete proposition yet lack a truth value. But it is important to realise that
this is not the claim I am making: on my analysis, an utterance containing a referential
use of an empty name fails to express a complete proposition, ic. fails to express a
determinate truth condition, for the very reason that the name is empty and thus fails
to contribute anything to truth-conditional content. This does not, however, rob the
utterance of meaning since, from an internal perspective, its interpretation will be
type-indistinguishable from that of an utterance containing a non-empty name. This is
simply the result of the abdication of responsibility for truth-conditional content
which characterises referential uses of names (and other singular expressions). It
seems to me, therefore, that we should not be too worried about allowing in
meaningful utterances without truth values. I shall discuss in chapter 7, however, the
implications of such a conclusion for truth-conditional approaches to natural language
meaning.
On my analysis the truth-conditions of a name sentence, and thus the possible
truth values of sentences containing empty names, are not predetermined by linguistic
meaning: some utterances containing empty names may fail to express any
determinate set of truth conditions, while other may be false. There is, however, one
class of empty name sentences which seems to resist such an analysis, and which has
been the subject of much interest in the literature: the class of negative existentials.
Recall sentence (8), repeated here as (44):
44) Nat Tate does not exist.
The problem here is that, not only is (44) clearly significant, it also has every
appearance of being true. This presents problems for all sides: for the referentialist,
(44) should fail to express a determinate set of truth conditions, since 'Nat Tate',
being empty, fails to contribute anything to propositional content. And, while the
possibility that a sentence might express a complete proposition yet lack a truth value
has seemed unappealing, the possibility of a sentence failing to express a complete
proposition yet having a truth value seems simply incoherent For the Fregean
descriptivist there are problems too: as a meaningful name 'Nat Tate' surely has a
sense; it is thus to be expected that (44) should express a full proposition and be fully
211 am once more absszading away, I believe hmIesIy, from issues o(tcnse.
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cognitively significant. However, since, on Frege's picture, the truth value of a
sentence is a function not of the senses of the sentence's component parts but of their
references, the failure of 'Nat Tate' to refer should rob (44) of a truth value. Yet there
is what is at the least a strong intuition that (44) is true. Negative existentials are, in
fact, true in precisely those cases where the name they contain does fail to refer.
Drawing back a bit, we can see that the problems for both sides are of the same kind:
on both referentialist and Fregean positions, a name sentence will be true 1ff the object
designated by the name satisfies the property expressed by the predicate; in other
words, a name sentence is viewed, on both these pictures, as a tool used to say of
some object that it has some property. But on such a view it is entirely mysterious that
negative existentials should be capable of being true.
The version of descriptivism espoused by Russell seems to offer a way out of
these pmblems. On Russell's analysis, discussed briefly in chapter 1, a natural
language proper name such as 'Nat Tate' must be reanalysed as a disguised
description. Thus sentence (45) is semantically equivalent to sentence (46):
45) Nat Tate exists.
46) The 4 exists
where 4 is to stand for some property which Nat Tate uniquely satisfies. This, in turn,
given the Theory of Descriptions, has the logical form:
47) 3x(4xAVy(4y-+y=x)AEx)
Now, since, on Russell's picture, the locutions 'there is a such-and-such' and 'a such-
and-such exists' are taken to be equivalent, the existence predicate in (47) is otiose,
and we can thus reduce (47) to (48):
48) 3x (4x A Vy (4y -+ y = x))
See, fir instance Russell (1905).
Pre Sainshury (1995)'s inteiprdation of Russell's views.
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given which, the logical form of(44) comes out as:
49) —.3x(xAYy(4y—y=x))
This analysis seems to be in better shape than the alternatives canvassed so far: it has
a story to tell not just about why negative existentials appear to be true when the name
they contain fails to designate an individual, but why they actually are true in those
circumstances. Given the logical form in (49), a negative existential will be true so
long as there is no individual which satisfies the description for which the name is
shorthand, i.e. so long as the name fails to denote, in Russell's terms. Russell's
analysis however will not do: not only does it suffer from the problems faced by any
descriptive general account of names, it also violates grammatical appearance by
treating 'exists' not as a genuine first-order predicate. It seems therefore that we must
look elsewhere for a solution to the puzzle set by negative existentials.
The proper treatment of existence and of negative existentials is a complex
question and one which we shall only have the space to skate over here. I do however
want to suggest the direction in which I would be inclined to look for a solution, given
the sort of analysis of the cognitive underpinnings of reference outlined in chapter 2.
The first point to notice is that, whatever, the right solution may be, it is not to do with
the specifics of the semantics of proper names. Just the same phenomenon arises with
all types of singular expression. Consider Bill and Ben again, who are playing a
virtual reality game in which slavering monsters appear to be rushing towards them
with unfriendly intentions. Bill, concerned that one particularly fearsome monster
might seem too lifelike for Ben's comfort, may utter any of the following:
50) That doesn't exist.
51) Hedoesn'texist.
52) That monster with green eyes and red fur doesn't exist.
53) The monster with green eyes and red fur doesn't exist
Any solution that we may want to propose to the problem raised by (44) will have to
apply equally to (50X53). So where might we look for such a solution? I want to start
not with the sort of empty names that we have been concentrating on so far, but with
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fictional names, and with what I take to be a key intuition about such names. Consider
the following sentence:
54) SherlockHolmesplaysthe violin.
Is the proposition expressed by (54) Irue or fulse? The intuition that I want to focus on
is that, although in the actual world (54) does not express a true proposition, it is true
in the fiction. How might we read this intuition? One natural way might be to say that
what truth value we will be inclined to assign to (54) will depend on the context in
which it is used, and, in particular, on what, given the context, we take (54) to be a
statement about. If we take (54) to be a statement about how things are in the actual
world then we would not be inclined to judge it as true. If, however, we take it as a
statement about how things are, not in the actual world, but in the non-actual world of
Conan Doyle's fictions, then it seems entirely natural to judge (54) as true. What
might this suggest? On the fact of it, it seems to suggest that we might try and
approach fictional names via a notion of parallel non-actual worlds inhabited by non-
actual individuals; via, in other words, a version of Lewisian realism on possible
worlds24.
How might such an approach help us with an analysis of (54)? What we would
have to say is something like this: although 'Sherlock Holmes' doesn't have a referent
in the actual world, it does have a referent in Conan Doyle's non-actual world. So,
when we take (54) to be a statement about that non-actual world, there is no problem
with it expressing a full set of truth conditions, and no problem with it being true.
What if we take it as a statement about the actual world? Here we return to a case
similar to that discussed in relation to (43), although concerning an overtly fictional
names, rather than a supposedly non-fictional name. The hearer who takes (54) to be a
statement about the actual world must choose whether the name 'Sherlock Holmes' is
intended to refer in the actual world or not. This is clearly a problematic question: if
he decides the former, then, since Sherlock Holmes does not exist in the actual world,
(54) will fail to express a complete proposition; on the other hand, if he decides the
latter, then, since individuals who do not exist in the actual world cannot hold
' That is nt* to say, as will bemc clea below, that the conception of non-actual worlds with which I
want to work is Lewis's own (see. fr instance, Lewis (1986)), or that I ultimately wad to coninit
myself to any version of modal realism oonstniul in the strong sense used by Lewis himself.
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properties in the actual world, (54) will, although expressing a complete proposition,
express a proposition that must be false.
This analysis glosses over two interesting questions: firstly, if we can entertain
both de re and descriptive concepts of individuals existing in the actual world, can we
entertain both kinds of concepts of individuals existing in non-actual worlds? As far
as (54) is concerned, not much hangs on this, but there are, it seems to me, examples
which suggest an answer. Consider (55) and (56):
55) Sherlock Holmes might not have been a detective.
56) Sherlock Holmes might not have been called 'Sherlock Hohnes'.
It seems to me that both of these sentences are straightforwardly true in Conan
Doyle's fictional world. This suggests that fictional names used in statements about
fictional worlds can be used eveiy bit as referentially as non-fictional names in
statements about the non-fictional world. But via what mechanism might this work? I
do not believe it is plausible that we stand in a causal relation appropriate for
reference with non-actual individuals. The only other option, then, is that this
referentiality is effected via what in chapter 21 called 'stipulative de re-ness'; in other
words, the referentiality of 'Sherlock Holmes' as used in statements about the world
of Conan Doyle's fictions is based on our ability to anchor individual concepts truth-
conditionally to worlds.
The second question concerns the sort of abstract objects posited by Salmon
(and by ersatzists more generally). For Salmon, (54) will be true in the fiction not
because 'Sherlock Holmes' refers to an individual who has the property ofplaying the
violin in any world, but because 'Sherlock Holmes' refers to an abstract object
existing in the actual world, and, as part of his fictions, Conan Doyle pretends that
that abstract object plays the violin. Should we accept such abstract objects into our
ontology, and, if so, what role should they be assigned? I believe we should accept
them, but that they should not be taken to be the only referents of fictional names.
Consider the following two sentences:
57) Sherlock Holmes was so-named by Conan Doyle.
58) Sherlock Holmes was so-named by his parents.
86
(57) seems to be true if taken as a statement about the actual world, although false if
taken as a statement about the fictional world created by Conan Doyle, since Conan
Doyle himself does not exist in that fictional world. (58), by contrast, seems (likely to
be) true in the fiction, although Ihise in the actual world (or failing to express a
complete proposition). This seems to suggest that 'Sherlock Holmes' can be used to
pick out some actual entity, and the abstract fictional characters of Salmon's ontology
will do as well as anything else for this role, It; however, we take these abstract
entities to be the only referents of fictional names (if we take, for instance, 'Sherlock
Holmes' always to refer to the real-world fictional character created by Conan Doyle),
then we wifi be forced to provide an analysis of the truth conditions of (58) of an
entirely different kind from the analysis we provide of the truth conditions of (57),
and this is just what Salmon does. This seems at least a methodologically undesirable
result; an account which could assign truth conditions to (57) and (58) via the same
mechanism would presumably be preferable to one that required an appeal to entirely
separate mechanisms. Furthermore, as Phillips (2001) points out, if Salmon-type
abstract object are the only entities to which empty names can refer, then there is no
principled way of preventing non-empty names from also referring to abstract objects.
It; however, we allow for the possibility that 'Sherlock Holmes', for instance, refers
not only to an actual abstract object but to a non-actual concrete object, then we can
begin to see a way out of this difficulty. An account along these lines would also be
likely to fare better in its approach to negative existentials, to which we now return.
How might taking non-actual, fictional worlds seriously help us to address the
problems raised by negative existentials? We first need to say something about
existence. When we say that something exists or doesn't exist, we are usually taken as
meaning that it exists or doesn't exist in the actual world. But, just as other
predications can be taken to be true or false relative to non-actual worlds, so can
existence predications. In Hitchcock's Psycho, Norman Bates spends much time
talking off-screen with his mother. As the film progresses, however, it becomes clear
that he's actually talking to himself and that there is no mother. Now someone
watching the film could, it seems to me, gasp halfway through and, having picked up
on the way things are going, utter (59):
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59) Oh no, Mrs. Bates doesn't exist.
and I think we should be inclined to say that she's right, that Mrs Bates doesn't exist
in the world of the fiction. Of course Mrs. Bates doesn't exist in the actual world
either, but it is surely not this that makes what the speaker of(59) has said true (59)
could, as far as the speaker knows, turn out not to be true, i.e. it might turn oi* that
Mrs. Bates does exist in the world of the fiction, although she still doesn't exist ii the
real world. So it seems that, as with any other predication, we need to know which
world an existence statement is intended to be a statement about in order to establish
what proposition has been expressed and thus whether it's true or false.
It seems to me, however, that it is in respect ofjust this question, the question
of which world a statement is intended to be interpreted as being about, that the
special nature of existence statements comes out. Consider (60):
60) Sherlock Hobnes doesn't exist.
How will a hearer interpret an utterance of (60)? The first question he will have to
answer is which world it's intended to be taken as a statement about, a question that
he should resolve on the basis of pragmatic principles and context. Let's take that
it's intended as a statement about the actual world (this is of course not necessary -
Sherlock Holmes after all doesn't exist in War and Peace). In that case, how ould
we interpret the name 'Sherlock Holmes'? As with (54), we have two choices: either
'Sherlock Holmes' is intended to pick out an individual in the actual world, or it is
intended to pick out an individual in a non-actual world. The former possibility diould
be eliminated on grounds of relevance: if 'Sherlock Holmes' were intended to pick
out an individual existing in the actual world, then, given its predicate, (60) would
necessarily express a false proposition. We are left, then, with an interpretalion on
which 'Sherlock Holmes' is taken to pick out an individual in a non-actual woild, Ic.
on which it picks out the individual in Conan Doyle's fictions. On this interprdation,
(60) will express a proposition which looks something like (6!):
61) Sherlock Holmes [the detective in Conan Doyle's stories] does not ist in
the actual world.
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Putting this in the cognitive terms developed in chapter 2, the Interpretation of
'Sherlock Holmes' should consist in an individual concept which is truth-
conditionally anchored not to the actual world but to the non-actual world of Conan
Doyle's fictions. What it would take for this Sherlock Holmes, or any other fictional
character, to exist in the real world, is an open question. It may very well be that
Sherlock Holmes necessarily does not exist in the actual world. But this isn't a
question we need to worry about here - we can, it seems to me, assume that, since
sentence (61) is meaningfiil we do have some intuitive grasp of what conditions
would have to be fliffihled in order for Sherlock Holmes to exist in the real world,
although those conditions may in fact be unsatisfiable.
So far we have restricted ourselves to a discussion of fictional names. How
might we extend this account to non-fictional empty names? There seems to be a very
natural extension to the example we began with, the example in (44), repeated here as
(62):
62) Nat Tate does not exist.
It seems that what we need to say is that, just as Sherlock Holmes inhabits the world
of Conan Doyle's fiction, so Nat Tate inhabits the world of William Boyd's hoax
biography. It seems, in fact, that Nat Tate is really a fictional character, although this
is hidden from us by the fact that at one time some people believed he was not, i.e.
believed that the person who inhabited the book existed in the actual world. So
maybe, to see how the story goes, we should set ourselves a slightly harder task.
Consider sentence (63), the example which is universally used in the literature on
empty names:
63) Vulcan doesn't exist.
Nineteenth century astronomers looked into the skies and noticed an anomaly in the
orbit of Mercury. They posited that this anomaly could only be caused by the
presence of another planet in an orbit between Mercury and the Sun and they named
this planet 'Vulcan'. Of course it actually turned out that there was no such planet,
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and that the oddities were simply a result of general relativity, thus 'Vulcan' turned
out to be an empty name. How, on the sketch above, should we analyse this story?
The natural analysis would look something like this: when astronomers posited the
existence of Vulcan, they thereby posited a world that was, in fact, different from the
actual world; they posited, in other words, a non-actual world. And it is this world that
Vulcan inhabits. Given this analysis, sentence (64):
64) Vulcan is a plant affecting the orbit of Mercury.
should be taken as true if intended as a statement about the relevant theoretical
constructs, although of course it will not be true if taken as a statement about the
actual world. So the negative existential in (63) will fall out in much the same way as
the others we've seen: on the intended interpretation, the individual concept which
constitutes the interpretation of 'Vulcan' will be truth-conditionally anchored not to
the actual world but to the non-actual world of astronomical theory, and (63) will
express the proposition that the object to which it is truth-conditionally anchored does
not exist in the actual world. It looks, therefore, as if our story may be applicable to
non-fictional as well as fictional negative existentials. The analysis it offers comes
down to this: what negative existentials express is not the problematic proposition that
some actual object does not exist, but rather a proposition concerning the failure of an
individual existing at one world to exist at another.
But, given how unappealing a metaphysical commitment to possible worlds
has seemed to so many, how should we take this talk of non-actual worlds? Should we
accept that, given the explanatory advantages to be bought by an appeal to non-actual
worlds, we must, in the spirit of Lewis, bite the bullet and accept the reality of non-
actual worlds? Or should we, as many analyses of modality have done, attempt to
have our cake and eat it attempt, in other words, to retain the explanatory advantages
of possible worlds without the unappetising metaphysical commitment? I want to try
to steer a middle course. Again, it is not my aim here to provide a filly articulated
analysis of the metaphysical status of non-actual worlds My aim is the much more
modest one of sketching the outline of what might prove a profitable line of enquiry.
On the cognitive picture I have so far elaborated, what is the relation between
individual concepts and the actual external world? We might look at it in these terms:
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the world is an information base for individual concepts; that is to say, our cognitive
aim is to maximise the correlation between the information we store in our individual
concepts and the way things are with the objects our concepts are concepts of. If, for
instance, I have a concept of Tipper Gore, I am only justified in adding the piece of
information x Lv married to Al Gon to that concept if the world is such that Tipper
Gore is indeed married to Al Gore. Now what I want to suggest is that we should, in
providing an analysis of empty names, commit ourselves metaphysically to non-actual
worlds only so far as is necessary in order to accept that the actual world is one of
many information bases. This sort of analysis is not entirely dissimilar to some
varieties of what Lewis (1986) calls linguistic ersaizism; for Adams (1974), for
instance, possible worlds are to be identified with maximally consistent sets of
propositions. However, I believe that, restricting ourselves to an application of this
notion to empty names, rather than to the broader question of modality, and viewing it
from a cognitive perspective, we need not fall prey to the problems facing accounts of
a linguistically ersatz stripe.
What I want to suggest, then, is this: we treat information-bases other than the
actual world conceptually in just the same way that we treat the actual world. We take
such information bases to support the formation of individual concepts, to verii' or
1àlsil' predications, to support inferences and so on. And, just as with concepts that
correspond to the actual world, we can perform particular operations on concepts
linked to non-actual information-bases. We can, for instance, actualise them to the
particular information base to which they relate; we can, in other words, attach a REF
feature to them which anchors them truth-conditionally to that particular information
base. This is just what we saw above in relation to examples (55) and (56). On this
analysis, (54), for instance, will be true in the fiction, because the predication it
expresses is verified by the fictional information base. What, then, is it for a particular
predication to be verified by an information base? This is where, I suspect, the actual
information base (i.e. the actual world) and non-actual information bases part
company: whether a predication is verified by the actual world will depend, assuming
that some correspondence theory of truth is right, on whether it corresponds to how
non-mental things are arranged in the world; whether a predication is verified by a
non-actual information base, by contrast, will presumably depend on whether it
corresponds to how its creator has decided things are with the information base. I do
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not, however, wish to suggest that information bases, as I conceive of them, are
simply Adams' sets of maximally consistent propositions in disguise; they are in some
ways narrower and in others broader. On the one hand, there are many predications
which any particular non-actual information base will neither veri1y nor falsif'. So,
for instance, the information base that Conan Doyle created in writing the Sherlock
Holmes stories has nothing to say on whether (65) is true or not:
65) Sherlock Holmes met Florence Nightingale.
On the other hand, the predications supported by an information base go well beyond
the propositions explicitly expressed in the process of its creation. Thus the Sherlock
Holmes information base, would, I imagine, falsi1' (66), although of course no claim
one way or the other is explicitly made in the stories themselves:
66) Sherlock Holmes met Philip Marlowe.
This conception of non-actual workis as information bases is clearly a long
way from Lewis's notion of possible worlds. In particular it is incompatible with the
causal isolation that Lewis takes as a fundamental property of possible worlds. On the
conception of non-actual worlds which I want to make use of; there are causal
relations running in both directions from actual to non-actual worlds: things are as
they are in non-actual worlds because of facts about the actual world, fucts concerning
the intentions, belie1 and so on of human agents; Sherlock Holmes plays the violin,
for instance, because of an intention on the part of Conan Doyle. At the same time, we
may believe that Sherlock Holmes plays the violin because of the way things are with
the information base created by Conan Doyle in writing the Sherlock Holmes stories.
This is of course only the barest outline of a possible strategy for tackling
empty names within a cognition-based framework. The idea that I want to focus on,
however, is that the puzzles raised by empty names and by negative existentials in
particular are a product of our conceptual abilities, specifically of our abilities both to
create individual concepts which fiiil to pick out anything in the actual world, and to
treat information bases which are not intended to correspond to the actual world
conceptually in the same way as we Ireat the actual world. My claim is that the
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combination of these two factors provide the key to unlocking the puzzles posed by
negative existentials.
3.2.3.3 Individual concepts and rigidity
So far I have attempted to show how my account might be applied to the sort of data
that have traditionally been taken to weigh on the descriptive side of the debate on
names. Now I come to the key data adduced by the referential side, data concerning
the apparent rigidity of proper names. As discussed in 3.13, it has been taken as the
fundamental intuition underlying direct-reference accounts that name sentences (and
sentences containing certain other singular expressions) depend truth-conditionally on
the same individual across possible worlds. Consider once more (II) and (12),
repeated here as (67) and (68):
67) Louis Armstrong performed with Ella Fitzgerald.
68) The greatest jazz trumpeter performed with Ella Fitzgerald.
The intuition we are focusing on is that, whereas (67) will depend truth-conditionally
on the same individual, Louis Armstrong, across possible worlds, i.e. the proposition
expressed by (67) will be true at a possible world if Louis Armstrong perfbrmed with
Ella Fitzgerald at that world, (68) will depend truth-conditionally on different
individuals at different worlds; specifically it will depend on whoever is the greatest
jazz trumpeter at that world.
Such intuitions constitute one of the most serious challenges to descriptive
accounts of proper names, and much ingenuity has been expended by those who
fitvour such accounts in attempting to explain them away. The problems for my
account, as a mixed referential-descriptive account, are rather different, however. I
have no reason to deny the referentialist's intuition; it is, after all, central to my
account that proper names, as used in certain contexts, can and do contribute nothing
but their referents to truth-conditional content. I am thus happy to accept that an
utterance of(67) may be truth-conditionally anchored to the same individual across
possible worlds. At the same time, I have claimed that proper names, as used in other
contexts, contribute descriptive conditions to truth-conditional content. Thus I argued
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that, even were it to be established that Jack the Ripper were actually James
Maybrick, one could still consistently conceptualise a possible world at which Jack is
not Maybrick, a world at which someone other than Maybrick committed the murders
attributed to Jack. In order to conceptualise such a world, we must take 'Jack the
Ripper' not to be truth-conditionally anchored to any individual ii the actual world,
but rather to be anchored to a descriptive condition which will be satisfied by different
individuals at different worlds, If this is right, that proper names can give rise to
descriptive truth conditions, then the challenge posed by intuitions of rigidity to my
account is not to explain why utterances with descriptive truth conditions appear to
have singular truth conditions, but is rather to explain why, when both types of truth-
condition are available, referential uses of proper names so heavily outweigh
descriptive uses. If you already accept the conclusion that names can give rise to
general truth conditions, then it may be that not a great deal hangs on this. You may,
however, feel that, in the absence of an explanation of this datum, you are inclined to
reserve judgment on the descriptive use of names. In which case, what I am trying to
persuade you of is this: there are good reasons why names should predominantly be
used referentially which have nothing to do with the constraints laid on interpretation
by their encoded meaning; we can, that is, get predominant relërentiality without
encoding universal referentiality.
The idea I want to explore is that the predominant referentiality of uses of
proper names derives (at least partly) from facts not about the semantics of names but
rather about naming practices, and that these facts about naming practices derive, in
turn, from general facts about human cognition. Just as most uses of proper names are
referential, so most acts of naming are demonstratively de i; they are constituted,
that is, by utterances such as 'I name this child...', 'I shall call this place...', where
the demonstratives involved are truth-conditionally anchored to objects of immediate
perception. Thus acts of naming which are backed by non-perceptual descriptive
conditions are clearly the exception, although not, of course, unheard of as examples
such as 'Jack the Ripper' and 'Deep Throat' attest. Why should it be, then, that most
acts of naming are demonstrative rather than descriptive? The answer I want to
suggest is that we name in this way because of facts about our cognitive architecture;
in particular, we are cognitively designed primarily to track physical objects rather
than their properties. Things could of course have been otherwise. As Bach (2002)
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points out, we could have been cognitively geared towards properties, such as name-
bearing, rather than to the objects that held those properties:
Suppose we cared about the proper names people had regardless of
whose names they were. An employer might want to hire someone
because his name was 'Cedric Scampini', a tourist might visit a city
because its name was 'Cincinnati', and a diner might be tempted to tiy
a restaurant called 'Colestra'. However frivolous such sentiments
might be, people could attach great importance to names and come to
regard bearing a certain name as a noteworthy property, regardless of
who or what the name belongs to.
Bach (2002)
What I want to suggest is that Bach's idea can be extended to properties other than
name-bearing. Although we are cognitively designed so as primarily to discriminate
individuals on a physical basis, we do sometimes discriminate according to properties,
both where we have to, for lack of the appropriate relation with a physical object, and
where the property concerned is, for whatever reason, highly significant in its own
right. The examples we have seen so far, 'Jack the Ripper' and 'Deep Throat' seem to
combine both of these features: it is presumably the case that both names were
originally assigned descriptively because those doing the naming did not hi some
sense know who they were naming. But why should we bother to assign a name
descriptively at all? Because the description via which we assign the name is
significant enough that we want a way to talk about whoever satisfies it. It seems, in
fact, that these two features standardly come together for descriptive naming: if the
property in question is not significant in its own right, then there will be no motivation
to coin a name at all, while if we know from the start who the description picks out
and which name that individual bears, then we will usually use this pre-existing name.
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, however, this does not entail that descriptive
names are names in search of a referent once they have been coined, descriptive
names can continue to be used to express descriptive individual concepts, whether or
not a de , concept of the description's satisfier is available.
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On this picture, on which names are descriptive because of facts about the
circumstances of their coining, it seems that context can play only a limited role in
determining whether a use of a name is descriptive or referential: it cannot, for
instance, allow a name which has been assigned demonstratively to be used
descriptively. But is this right? Is referentiality a once-and-for-all thing for proper
names? There is at least some evidence to suggest it may not be. Returning to
Superman and Clark Kent, and taking all statements to be statements about the
fictional world created by Siegel and Shuster, we would presumably want to say that
the name 'Superman' was demonstratively assigned; it was assigned, that is, while
either explicitly or implicitly demonstrating Superman himsell i.e. while
demonstrating the Superman-Clark Kent individual in his Superman guise. Now
imagine that the Superman stories had taken a rather different turn; that when Lois
finally uncovers the man of steel's true identity, it is Lex Luthor she finds beneath the
cape. In that turn of events, sentence (69) is presumably true:
69) Superman is Lex Luthor.
in which case, in the actual world of the stories (actual relative to the stories, that is),
(70) will be true (on one reading):
70) Superman might have been Lex Luthor.
If this is right, then 'Superman', although demonstratively assigned to Clark Kent,
seems not merely to contribute Clark Kent (or, given the discussion in 3.2.3.1, a sub-
part of the Clark-Superman individual) on all uses, but may instead contribute some
descriptive condition, presumably a condition something like x flies around
Metropolis in a cape and tights saving people.
This raises a further question however: if names that are demonstratively
assigned can be used descriptively, why do we come across so few clear-cut examples
of this? One answer might be that it is simply a matter of salience. What we are
concerned with here is individual concepts for which there is a possible de r anchor
but which are nevertheless capable of being used descriptively. The claim might go:
such concepts are typically so rich in descriptive content that no one condition is
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sufficiently salient to be retrievable consistent with the presumption of optimal
relevance. I doubt whether this claim will stand up as it is, however. Consider the
name 'George W. Bush'. It seems that, for most of us, there will be one descriptive
condition associated with this name which has much greater salience than any other,
the condition x Lc the President ofthe United States. Yet it does not seem that we can
use the name 'George W. Bush' in such a way that it is truth-conditionally equivalent
to the description 'the President of the United States'. To see this consider (71) and
(72):
71) The President of the United States might have been a woman (if Hilary
Clinton had stood instead of Al Gore).
72) George W. Bush might have been a woman (if Hilaiy Clinton had stood
instead of Al Gore).
Such examples seem to weigh heavily against any straightlbrward salience story. So
why can we get a descriptive reading of (70), but not a descriptive reading of (72)?
What I want to suggest is that the salience story is right inasmuch as it locates the
problem in how rich in information certain individual concepts are, but that it is
taking things from the wrong end. The problem with retrieving a descriptive
interpretation of(72) is not that there is no one salient descriptive condition, but that
there are too many non-salient conditions. in order to interpret 'George W. Bush'
descriptively, we would have first to access an individual concept which is rich with
descriptive conditions, conditions such as x is the son offormer president George
Bush, x is the former Governor of Texas, x is the brother of the Governor ofllorida
and of course x Lr the President ofthe United States. Having accessed this concept, we
would then be forced to ditch all but one of these conditions in order to interpret the
name descriptively. Compare this with a descriptive interpretation of (70). The
individual concept associated with 'Superman' wifi presumably contain conditions
such as x can fly, x wears a cape, x saves peopk in Metropolis, and so on. In order to
retrieve the imagined descriptive interpretation of(70), we need jettison none of this
information; more or less the only information we will have to jettison, in fact, is the
condition x is Cith* Kent. It seems plausible that this distinction between the
descriptive interpretations of (70) and (fl) should have a knock-on effect for
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relevance: while (72), on the intended interpretation, will put a hearer to gratuitous
processing effort, gratuitous since there is a more relevant utterance available, i.e.
(71), and will thus Ihil to be optimally relevant, (70) will not put the hearer to
gratuitous effort and should thus pass the relevance test.
In this section, then, we have discussed why, although descriptive
interpretations of proper names are available on the story I want to tell, they are so
markedly less common than referential interpretationa. The answer I have given is
essentially that there are two causes: firstly, descriptive interpretations of
demonstratively-assigned names are hard to come by because the jettisoning of
descriptive information standardly robs descriptive interpretations of optimal
relevance, and secondly descriptively-assigned names, although standardly open to
descriptive interpretation, are rare due to underlying facts about human cognitive
architecture. The rarity of descriptive uses of proper names does not, however, render
such uses insignificant: it is, so I want to claim, central to an understanding of proper
names as linguistic expressions, rather than an understanding of the individual
concepts that standardly constitute the interpretations of proper names, that we should
recognise the availability of non-referential interpretations.
.3 Names, individual concepts and alternative accounts
So far in this chapter I have laid out the bare bones of the account of the semantics
and pragmatics of proper names which I favour and I have examined how this account
might offer solutions to some of the more pressing problems for analyses of names.
Now I want to move on to look at some other accounts of proper names within the
philosophical literature, and in particular at how these accounts compare with my
own. In doing so, we will come across questions on proper names that we have not yet
addressed, in particular how best to analyse the quantified use of proper names and
what story to tell about names with more than one bearer.
As discussed in chapter 1, truth-conditional accounts of singular expressions
work on the assumption that tokens of a singular expression-type must make the same
type of contribution to the truth conditions of any utterance of a sentence in which
they appear. The main positions on proper names can be divided, therefore, according
to the type of contribution they take proper names to make to truth conditions. The
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culTent dominant positions might best be viewed as occupying a spectrum as regards
truth-conditional coniribution. At one end of the spectrum are those who take the
meaning properties of a proper name to be exhausted by the name's referent, while at
the other end there arc those who believe that its referent constitutes no part of the
meaning of a name, with names contributing descriptive conditions to truth-
conditional content. Between these two extremes are those who clahn that the
meaning properties of a proper name do go beyond that name's referent but that,
nevertheless, its referent is all that a name contributes to propositional content Let me
say a bit more about each of these positions in order to draw out the parallels and
differences between each and my own account.
3.3.1 Neo-descriptivism on names
Recent champions of extreme descriptivism, i.e. the thesis that proper names are
semantically equivalent to definite descriptions, are hard to come by, given the attack
on descriptivism launched by, among others, Kripke (e.g. 1972), Donnellan (e.g.
1970) and Kaplan (e.g. 1989a). I want here, however, to examine two such accounts,
that of Bach (1987,2002) and that of Geurts (1997). These accounts have broadly the
same shape: for both, a proper name is semantically equivalent to a nominal
description, i.e. a description which contains the name itself: For Bach 'PN' is
semantically equivalent to 'the bearer of 'PN", while for Geurts it is equivalent to
'the individual named 'PN". As far as I can see nothing hangs on this minor
difference in formulation. Both also accept that, although the proposition literally
expressed by a name sentence (i.e. the proposition determined by linguistic meaning)
is descriptive, name sentences may be and often are used to convey singular
propositions: in this regard, Bach draws a distinction between what is literally said
and what is communicated, while Geurts distinguished between the proposition
expressed and the asserted content of an utterance. If! understand these distinctions
correctly, a little more may hang on which of these formulations one adopts. Beyond
these general sintilarities, Bach and Geurts diverge in the overall framework within
which they place their accounts of names: Bach's account is placed within a largely
traditional Russellian framework, while (ieurts adopts a DRI-flavoured framework,
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within which all definites are taken to be presuppositional. Given this divergence I
shall briefly examine these two accounts separately.
Bach's account is chiefly motivated by two types of evidence: what he takes to
be descriptive uses of names constituting complete NPs and quantified uses of proper
names. We have already seen examples of the former kind in sentences (19) and (21),
repeated here as (73) and (74):
73) Aaron Aardvark might have been president
74) If his parents had named him 'Aristocrates', Aristotle would have been
Aristocrates instead of Aristotle.
Sentences (75) to (77), taken from Bach (2002), offer examples of the latter kind:
75) There are seven David Smiths in the APA.
76) There are other inteffigent David Kaplans.
77) OnlyonestatehasaSalemthatisitscapitaL
Bach takes these examples to show firstly that proper names when they appear as full
NPs are semantically equivalent to nominal descriptions and secondly that names can
appear as predicates within larger NPs. What should we say about such examples? As
I have already indicated, I am not sure how convinced a committed Millian would or
should be by the examples in (73) and (74). There is, it seems to me, no pressing
obstacle to prevent the Milian claiming that these uses are non-literal. Bach's own
account depends on the underlying idea that speakers rarely if ever intend to
communicate precisely what is said by the sentences they utter. He accepts, therefore,
that names are predominantly used to communicate singular propositions, although,
on his account, the propositions expressed by name sentences are generaL Given this,
it seems that he is, at least in principle, open to the reverse position, i.e. the position
that name sentences express singular propositions but can be used to communicate
general propositions.
Beyond this potential counter-argument there is a more fundamental problem
facing Bach's account in light of the soit of account which I have proposed above. As
Bach himself admits, the level of propositional content with which he is working,
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what he takes to be essentially Grice's what Lr said, is not accessible to speaker
intuitions. Thus it seems to intuition as if the proposition expressed by (78), for
instance:
78) Louis Armstrong was born hi Storyville.
will be true at any possible world if Louis Armstrong was born in Storyville at that
world. On Bach's story, by contrast, what is literally said by (78) will be true 1ff there
is a unique bearer of 'Louis Armstrong' at that world and he was born in Storyville
(or rather at the unique bearer of 'Storyville' at that world). Equally, if someone utters
(79) to you:
79) Dave has left town.
two things seem intuitively to be the case: firstly, you will not have fully understood
the proposition expressed by the utterance if you do not know, in some sense, who
Dave is, but secondly that, if you did know who Dave was, you might find that the
proposition expressed by (79) was true. On Bach's picture, neither of these hold at the
level of what is said. For Bach the literal propositional content of(79) is the general
proposition in (80):
80) The bearer of 'Dave' has left town.
the grasping of which requires no knowledge of any particular individual, while, since
there are in reality many Daves, the proposition ni (80), construed Russellianly, is
doomed to be false. Of course Bach accepts that the proposition literally expressed is
not standardly an object of speaker intuitions, and that such intuitions usually concern
some extra pragmatically communicated proposition. He nevertheless holds that
proper names murt literally express general propositions since, for him, examples
such as (73) and (74) show that they can express general proposkions. This
I do n want to suggeat that this is the only basis on which Bath makes this claim. My point is that,
in the absence of speaker intuitions concerning what Bach takes to be the oposition literally
e,qcase4 any umii* bthe literal propositional content of name sentences which Bath proposes
nit depend cii Lroed thcorical considaations i.e. on how things e with other parts of his theory.
101
argument rests on the Iruth-conditional assumption that whatever type of contribution
we can show proper names to make to the literal content of some sentences, they must
make to the literal content of all sentences. This form of argument is, however,
undermined by the availability of the type of account which I have outlined, if proper
names may, without being ambiguous in any theoretically interesting Wa?, be used
to express either singular or general propositions, then we may accept that certain uses
of proper names do give rise to general truth conditions without thereby being
committed to the claim that names always give rise to general truth conditions. This
move allows us to accommodate the sort of intuitions on descriptiveness that Bach
takes to be central to an account of proper names, without riding roughshod over the
very robust intuitions of rigidity that standard uses of proper names give rise to.
What of the examples in (75) to (77)? As Bach points out, such predicative
uses of proper names have been largely ignored in the philosophical literature on
names. The reason they have been so ignored is, I imagine, that they simply fall
outside the concerns of many of those who have addressed the question of the
semantics of proper names. For many, the interest of proper names lies in the light
they shed on the nature of reference and thus uses of proper names which do not
involve reference are simply beside the point. I, however, committed as I am to
providing an account of proper names as linguistic expressions, must take such uses
rather more seriously. How might predicative uses of proper names fit in to the
picture I have so far been painting? On my account, as on many others, there is a strict
division between the property of bearing a proper name and the linguistic use which
we may make of that property. The uses of proper names which I have been looking
at so far, and which have been the main focus of attention in the philosophical
literature on names, usc the name-bearing property in order to pick out particular
individuals. Thus when I utter (78), for instance, I use the name 'Louis Armstrong' in
order to pick out a particular individual, the property of being the bearer of 'Louis
Armstrong' playing an intimate role in determining which individual it is that I am
talking about. What examples such as (75) to (77) seem to show, however, is that this
is not the only linguistic use we may make of the name bearing property. We may
also, it seems, use proper names as predicates, with the extension of 'PN' being
We shall me on to the discussion of ambiguity in thapt 7.
27 The mo notable eceptkin is Burge (1973), of which more below.
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bearers of 'PN'. This much I hope is reasonabjy uncontroversial. But what does this
tell us about the semantics of proper names? Does it, for instance, tell us that proper
names just are predicates applying to their bearers? Although I have a certain
sympathy with this view, I do not believe it can be quite right.
There are certain clear distinctions between proper names and standard one-
place predicates. In particular, standard one-place predicates standing alone cannot
have the individual-concept uses typical of proper names. Thus ff1 call the desk I am
working at 'Florence' I can use (81) to express the proposition that my desk has six
drawers, but I cannot use (82):
81) Florence has six drawers.
82) 7 Desk has six drawers.
One can get round this by claiming that when proper names appear as complete NPs,
as in (81), there is a covert determiner in the logical form of the name sentence. You
can then, with Bach, semantically identify this covert determiner with 'the', or you
can, with Burge (1973), identify it with 'that'. Either way, however, you need to be
able to tell some stoly about why proper names license such covert determiners,
whereas standard one-place predicates do not.
This and other differences between the syntactic behaviour of names and that
of one-place predicates28 seem at least to cast doubt on the idea that proper names,
wherever they appear, are predicates. In the light of this, I would like to suggest an
alternative analysis of the predicative use of names. I have, in fact, already more or
less pointed to the kind of account lam drawn to: predicative uses of names are just a
different way in which we can exploit the name-bearer relation linguistically. I
suspect, however, that this use is in some sense derivative of the individual concept
use of proper names. What I mean to suggest by this is that proper names are
bestowed on individuals primarily for the purpose of allowing us to think and talk
about those individuals efficiently. However, the referential exploitation of proper
names works as it does because, in bestowing names, we assign properties to
individuals. Although the property thus assigned is assigned primarily for referential
exploitation, it is nevertheless a property in its own right and, as any other property,
inWcsting discussicci of ssch diffi - çg (2001).
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can be exploited for a variety of linguistic purposes. On this picture, then, a name is
bestowed for the purpose of allowing us linguistically to express and to entertain an
individual concept of the bearer and it is this use to which names are most often pitt.
A by-product, however, of this process is that we may make use of the nominal
property assigned to the bearer in other linguistic ways.
Such an analysis gives rise to two questions. Firstly, does this amount to
positing an ambiguity in proper names? Yes and no. Proper names are, on this picture,
ambiguous in that they can make fundamentally different kinds of contribution to
truth conditions: they can either contribute individual concepts, loosely speaking ar
they can contribute properties. But it's hard to see how we might avoid this
conclusion: even those such as Bach and Burge who take the referring use of proper
names to be derivative of the predicative use must accept that the same expression can
make these two different types of contribution to truth conditions. Bach, for instance,
accepts that, when appearing as a full NP, a proper name is semantically equivalent to
a definite description, whereas when appearing as a part of a larger NP, proper names
simply express nominal properties. There thus seems to be no escape from Iruth-
conditional ambiguity. On the other hand, the predicative use of proper names is, on
the picture I favour, a by-product of the individual-concept use: without the one, the
other cannot get off the ground. The ambiguity, such as it is, is therefore of a vely
different kind from standard cases of lexical ambiguity.
The second question concerns how, on this picture, predicative and individual-
concept uses of proper names relate truth-conditionally. Will the individual concept
use of proper names end up, as Bach and Burge would have it, being semantically
equivalent to a determiner ^ predicative use? Again the answer is yes and no. There
is, of course, nothing to prevent us from defining a detenniner, call it Dname, such
that when it is concatenated with a predicative use of a name it delivers the
appropriate truth-conditions (or, better, delivers the appropriate individual concept). I
do not believe, however, that English has a determiner which is equivalent to Dname.
The only two obvious candidates would, I presume, be 'that' and 'the'. Segal (2001),
following Hlgginbotham (1988), runs a convincing argument to show that, if there is
an implicit determiner in individual-concept uses of proper names, then it isn't 'that'.
He asks us to consider Fred Schmidt stumbling out ofapub. 1, who mistake him for
Fred Bloggs, might say either (83) or (84):
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83) Fred has had a little drink.
84) That Fred has had a little drink.
I would not, however, be making the same claim in both cases. My utterance of(83)
seems to make a possibly false statement about Fred Bloggs, whereas my utterance of
(84) seems to be a probably Irue statement about Fred Schmidt. It seems, therefore,
that 'Fred' and 'that Fred' are not equivalent. But nor are 'Fred' and 'the Fred' (or
perhaps better 'the person called 'Fred", given the ungrammaticality of 'the Fred').
Imagine that we have been invited to a party by our good friend Fred. Turning up we
find the room is full of people who are all called 'Fred'. You could in that context,
utter either (85) or (86):
85) Fred is surrounded by Freds.
86) The person called 'Fred' is surrounded by Freds.
There seems, however, to be a clear distinction between these two utterances in the
context imagined: the first appears to express a true proposition about our friend Fred,
whereas the second does not. The problem here, as I shall argue when I come on to
discuss definite descriptions, is that the use of a definite description requires that its
nominal element should be uniquely denoting in an available context, whereas the use
of a proper name involves no such requirement. Given evidence such as the above, it
seems that 'the' is out of the ninning too. Since, therefore, the property of being the
bearer of a proper name, the very property expressed by predicative uses, plays a role
in the interpretation of individual concept uses of proper names, such individual
concept uses are potentially susceptible to a determiner + predicate analysis. No
English determiner, however, will do the job for us.
Overall, then, the evidence Bach adduces does not, it seems to me, force us
towards a nominal description account of proper names. Given bow robust intuitions
of the referentiality of standard uses of proper names are, an account which must posit
that all such uses are non-literal should be rejected, ceterLparibus, for one that can
allow for such uses literally to express singular propositions. Within the ceteris
paribus proviso, however, is the requirement that the account we adopt should allow
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for names in argument positions to make descriptive contributions to truth-conditional
content on occasion, given what I take to be the equally strong intuitions in support of
that claim. The account I have proposed stands as a possible way out of this
theoretical deadlock between referentialists and descriptivists.
The descriptivist account of names offered by Geurts (1997) is of a rather
different kind from Bach's. In rough outline, (3eurts' central claim is that all deflnites
are presuppositional expression. In the DRT-flavoured approach to presupposition
with which Geurts is working, this amounts to the claim not just that definites encode
an existential presupposition, but that the presence of this presupposition has certain
implications for the interpretation procedure followed by a hearer. For Geurts,
presupposition and anaphora are closely linked. A hearer interpreting a definite will
first search for an antecedent for that definite in his current DRS. If he fails to find
such an antecedent then he will accommodate the definite's presupposition while
attempting to link it to an element of his pre-existing representation of the world.
Given this background story on definites, Geuits' claim is that an utterance of a
sentence containing a proper name 'PN' will give rise to the same proposition
expressed and the same interpretation procedure as an utterance of an equivalent
sentence in which the definite description 'the individual named 'PN" is substituted
for 'PN'. Consider (87):
87) John is a stockbroker.
This will, on Geurts' picture, give rise to a DRS which will look something like:
88) [A: individual called 'John' x. stockbroker x]
This, as it stands, equates to a descriptive proposition, given a standard analysis of
DRSs and reference markers. However, the underlining indicates that there is a
presupposition which requires resolution. The hearer is thus semantically mandated to
search for an antecedent for the reference marker within his DRS. In this case the
search will fail, although Geurts offers an example using a proper name in which the
search will succeed:
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89) I have three friends: John, Jack and Joe. My best friend is John.
Once the search has failed, the hearer of (87) will do two things. First he will
accommodate 'John', leading to a representation which will look something like (90):
90) [x individual called 'John' x, speaker believes: [. individual called 'John'
L stockbroker x]]
and secondly, he will attempt to link the discourse referent with some pre-existing
representation. It: for instance, he knows of an individual called 'John', he may link
the reference maricer in his DRS with his mental representation of this individuaL
The picture Geurts paints thus makes use of a variety of distinct levels of
interpretation. Firstly there is the initial DRS constructed by a hearer, a DRS which is
entirely determined by linguistic meaning and is therefore context-independent.
Secondly there is the DRS which results from following the instructions encoded by
presuppositional expressions, i.e. a DRS in which the discourse referent introduced by
the proper name is either bound or accommodated. And finally there is the
representation which results from linking this DRS to pre-existing conceptual
material. In parallel with these distinct levels of interpretation, Geurts draws a
distinction between the proposition expressed by an utterance and the asserted content
of that utterance. (liven this distinction, he runs a story on rigidity which has much in
common with that told by Bach: in very rough terms, most utterances containing
proper names appear to express singular propositions because their asserted content is
demonstratively linked to objects of perception, although the propositions they
literally express are in reality descriptive.
Geurts bases his claims on a range of evidence which he takes to show that
names pattern with definite descriptions and should thus be taken to fall within the
same semantic class. Among these pieces of evidence is, for instance, that names are
subject to definiteness effects in just the way that definite descriptions are. Thus (91)
is grammatical whereas (92) and (93) are not.
91) There is a philosopher available.
92) *l'here is the philosopher available.
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93) •Th is John available.
I find much to agree with both in the weight Geurts attaches to such evidence
and in the account he proposes. As will become clear once I have come on to discuss
the semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions, I believe Geurts is right to hold
that there is much semantic similarity between names and descriptions: both, in the
terms I favour, are tools for expressing individual concepts, although, as argued
above, I do not believe that proper names are semantically equivalent to nominal
descriptions. To say, however, that there is much semantic similarity between names
and descriptions is not, on the picture I am painting, equivalent to the claim that
proper names can only literally give rise to general truth conditions. Given the
framework within which he builds his account, Geurts does seems committed to this
claim, a claim that I have already argued against above. In his distinction between
proposition expressed and asserted content, however, Geurts appears to be pointing
towards the sort of account that I have proposed. One could look at his story on names
as follows: the context-independent meaning of a proper name consists in a
descriptive condition combined with an instruction consiraining the use to which a
hearer may put this descriptive condition; given this context-independent meaning, a
hearer will build an interpretation which may be anchored to certain of his pre-
existing conceptual representations. Expressed in these terms, there is much common
ground between my account and Geurts'. There are, however, certain key differences.
For Geurts, the context-independent meaning ofa name sentence determines a
set of (general) truth conditions, whereas I take there to be no such complete context-
independent truth-conditional content. How might we decide between these two
positions? Given that, for Geurts as for Bach, this literal content is standardly not
accessible to intuition, it may be difficult to find conclusive evidence. There do,
however, seem to be at least some considerations that weigh ii favour of my account:
as argued in chapter 2, there are many sentences for which no context-independent
proposition, however minimal, is reiiievable. I then, we must accept that the
linguistic meaning of these sentences cannot be identified with propositional content,
then much of the impetus behind maintaining this identification for other sentences is
lost: if we can't analyse linguistic meaning via propositional content for all sentences,
then why would we want to do so for any sentence? Secondly, as argued above, the
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descriptive propositions on which nominal-descriptivist accounts of names depend not
only are not accessible to intuition but run directly counter to some fairly robust
intuitions. Thus it should be the case that we can IWly understand the literal
propositional content of (79) despite having no idea who Dave is. It certainly seems
that, in such a case, we can grasp the linguistic meaning of the utterance, since that is
just to say we can grasp its context-independent meaning, and, on the strength of this,
we may in1r certain entailments of the proposition expressed, such as that someone
left town, but there seems a strong intuition that we do not know under what
conditions the utterance itself is true. Equally it seems at least counterintuitive that if I
uttec
94) Noam chomsky is a Gemini,
the meaning of my sentence determines a proposition which is true if someone called
'Noam Chomsky' is a Gemini, regardless of whether Noam Chom sky is a Gemini. All
this is, however, inconclusive: given his willingness to accept that literal propositional
content is inaccessible to intuition, Geurts may maintain that the counterintuitiveness
of these results is neither here nor there, being a result not of the truth-conditions of
the linguistically determined DRS, but of the asserted content of the utterance. It is
also, perhaps, to do Geurts an injustice. He is, after all, happy to accept that the
eventual interpretation of an utterance of; for instance, (94) will be anchored to a
mental representation of Noam Chomsky, and that this anchoring may take any of a
variety of different forms, some of which lead to apparent rigidity. The key distinction
between my account and that of Geurts may thus come down to whether one takes the
propositions expressed by referentially-used name sentences actually to be rigid, or
whether one takes them to be descriptive, but so linked to de re mental representations
as to appear rigid. It seems to me that, whether the possibility of denying the
significance of intuitions is available to us or not, we should be inclined to prefer an
account that does not do so if one is available. What I have attempted to show in this
chapter is that such an account is available. There does not, in fact, appear to be any
veiy pressing reason why (Jeurts should not accept such a conclusion, other than the
standard truth-conditional assumption that one type of singular expression should
make one type of contribution to truth-conditional content. He could, after all, claim
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that the reference marker hi the DRS which constitutes the eventual interpretation of a
name sentence may be anchored to an individual or not according to context.
How overall then does the account I have proposed compare to the two neo-
descriptivist accounts assessed? On the one hand I am sympathetic to such accounts:
given the analysis of names that I have outlined and the analysis of definite
descriptions that I shall outline in chapter 5,1 go along with the neo-descriptivists in
seeing a high degree of similarity between the encoded meaning of proper names and
that of definite descriptions. On the other hand, there seems to be overwhelming
intuitive evidence, which we should respect if at all possible, that names do not
standardly give rise to general truth conditions. The account I have proposed aims to
respect this intuitive evidence at the same time as allowing for the possibility that
names can give rise to general truth conditions given an appropriate context.
3.3.2 Proper names as indexicals
For the descriptivist names are univocal and make the same contribution to the truth
conditions of all sentences in which they appear. Thus, taking sentence (95):
95) Louis is a trumpeter.
the descriptivist is committed to the following claim: although there are many bearers
of 'Louis' and thus many statements that (95) em be used to make, this fact is
semantically irrelevant. On all uses, (95) will literally express something like the
proposition in (96):
96) The person called 'Louis' is a trumpeter.
It is of course the case, for the descriptivist, that (95) may be used to convey a
proposition that is truth-conditionally anchored to, say, Louis Armstrong, but that is a
pragmatic fact, not a semantic one.
The second position I want to examine goes along with descriptivism in
holding names to be univocal, but does not hold that they make the same contribution
to propositional content on all uses. This is essentially to claim that names are
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context-dependent expressions, I.e. that they should be viewed on the model of
indexicals (or perhaps demonstratives) rather than on the model of definite
descriptions3. This claim has taken various forms. For Burge (1973), as has already
been mentioned, proper names express properties; specifically 'PN' expresses the
property of being a PN, where an individual is a PN if it bears 'PN'. Burge then
posits that, when appearing in argument positions, names take covert demonstrative
determiners. Thus the 'Louis' in (95), for instance, will be semantically equivalent to
'that Louis'. I have already argued, following Segal (2001) and Higginbotham (1988),
that if there is a covert determiner it cannot be semantically equivalent to 'that'.
Should we therefore abandon a covert determiner analysis altogether? Segal (2001)
offers some interesting, if merely suggestive, evidence in support of the position that
we should. He points, in particular, to deficit and developmental data both of which
appear to suggest that proper names and predicates are lIindamentally different kinds
of linguistic objects. As he himself accepts, however, his evidence is not conclusive.
There is also a certain amount of syntactic evidence, marshalled by Longobardi
(1994), which weighs against a determiner + predicate analysis of proper names.
Overall, however, as Segal (2001) argues, the jury is still out on whether we may
analyse proper names along these lines. The question I shall address below is in what
respects such an analysis differs from others in the same general logical vicinity.
More recent versions of the names-as-indexicals story have been told by
Recanati (1993), Pelczar and Rainsbury (1998) and Pelczar (2001) among others. I
shall here focus on just one of these accounts, that of Recanati, in assessing how my
own account compares with indexical accounts of names 30. Recanati's analysis of
proper names is quite straightforward: making use of the Kaplanian distinction
between character and content, Recanati's central claim is that proper names, like
indexicals but unlike definite descriptions, have different character and content. On
his analysis, the character of a proper name 'PN' is the nominal description 'the
bearer of 'PN" while the content of 'PN' is simply PN; the name 'PN' is, in other
words, a referring expression which is constrained by its linguistic meaning to refer to
the bearer of'PN'.
Although this defines a dew distin*kin on most aLmts, there we son, such as that of Gcurts
disoussed abovc on which indexicab and definite desaiptions we viewed 'ong similar lines. As I
indicated above, I have a ctain sympathy with Gesrts' position.
I will, however, briefly return to Pekzar and Pdci and Rainabny below.
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Recanati's position, then, differs from a descriptivist position such as those
discussed above not in the linguistic meaning it assigns to proper names, since on
both views the linguistic meaning of 'PN' is simply a nominal description. Rather the
difference lies in the step from linguistic meaning to propositional content: for the
descriptivist the propositional contribution of a proper name is shnply its linguistic
meaning; for Recanati, by contrast, the descriptive meaning of a proper name drops
out of the picture before the level of propositional content, with proper names
contributing nothing but their referents to truth conditions. This middle position thus
agrees with descriptivism on meaning but not on propositional content. The situation
is entirely reversed when we come to compare the indexical account of names with
the neo-Millian account which I shall come on to discuss in more detail below:
whereas the indexical story agrees with the neo-Miffian on propositional content, the
accounts disagree on linguistic meaning. The essential distinction between Recanati's
account and the neo-Millian story comes down to whether one takes the conventions
linking names and their bearers to be linguistic or not For the Mihian, these
conventions are linguistic and therefore the meaning of a name isst its bearer. For
the indexicalist like Recanaif, by contrast, the name-bearer convention is non-
linguistic, and names therefore depend for their content on non-linguistic contextual
features, i.e. on the name-bearer relations that obtain in the context of utterance.
Two questions immediately arise from Recanati's account: what evidence
might there be that name-bearer conventions are non-linguistic and, lilt turns out that
he is right and that the conventions are non-linguistic, does this entail that names are
indexical? There is some evidence that seems to suggest that name-bearer relations
are non-linguistic: both Recanati (1993) and Bach (2002) argue that, whereas we
would be inclined to say that someone who did not know what, for instance, the word
'tiger' designated was thereby a less competent speaker of English, we would not be
inclined to level the same charge at someone who did not know who, for instance, the
name 'Noam Chomsky' designated. Equally, any view on which the name-bearer
relation is taken to be linguistic, i.e. on which the meaning of a name it taken to be
just its bearer, will have to posit massive ambiguity for names such as 'John' and
'Jane' which are shared by large numbers of bearers. While such massive ambiguity is
probably not fatal to accounts on which name-bearer relations arc linguistic, it is at
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best counterintuitive: 'Jane' does not, on the face of it, seem to be ambiguous in the
way that, for instance, 'bank' is
It seems plausibi; then, that name-bearer relations are non-linguistic. On such
a view, being the bearer of a name subserves reference just as might any other
property. Thus, wanting to talk about someone in a crowd, I may, if! know it, use his
name. Failing this, however, I may pick on his particularly garish green jacket as a
means to facilitate reference; I may, for instance, say.
97) Green jacket looks like he's having a good time.
On an indexical view, the relation between a name and its bearer is much the same as
the relation between the green jacket and its wearer. There is, of course, the obvious
difference, that names are designed for the purpose of facilitating reference, whereas
green jackets are not. Does the view that name-bearer relations are non-linguistic,
however, entail an indexical view of names? On the account I have developed above,
name-bearer relations are indeed taken to be non-linguistic; my account is not,
however, an indexical account in quite the sense that Recanati's is. To see how the
two accounts differ in this respect, it may be useful to examine a recent objection to
indexical accounts of proper names of the sort championed by Recanati raised by
Predelli (2001b).
Predelli's objection concerns our intuitions on the truth conditions of certain
sentences as assessed against particular contexts. He asks us to consider a context, call
it c, in which there is one and only one bearer of the name 'London' which is not the
city that we call 'London' but rather the city that we call 'Boston'. Against such a
context, on what will the truth value of(98) depend'?'
98) London is in England
Note that we are not concerned with the truth value of an utterance of(98) in c - it is
clear that an utterance of(98) in c would depend lbr its truth value on how things are
with Boston in c. Rather what we are interested in is the truth conditions of(98), used
in just the way we use it, with the reference of any indexical expressions assigned
against c. Predelli's intuition is that against c, (98) says something that is true 1ff
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London is in England, regardless of how things are with Boston; that, in other word;
'London' picks out the actual bearer of 'London' rather than the bearer of 'London' in
c. Compare this to sentence (99):
99) I am in England
It seems to Predelli that, as assessed against any context c, (99) will be true 1ff the
agent of(99) is in England in c. if this intuition is right, it seems to offer usa clear
distinction between proper names such as 'London' and indexicals such as 'I':
whereas 'London' seems to pick out London across contexts, regardless of whether
London is the bearer of 'London' in those contexts, 'I' seems to pick out for any
context the agent in that context. It thus seems that, whereas 'I' encodes a character
which looks something like 'the agent of this context', 'London' does not encode the
character 'the bearer of 'London". This, in other word; appears to be good evidence
against Recanati's position31.
What should we say about Predelli's claims? Firstly, they depend on intuitions
not about the truth conditions of utterance; but about the truth conditions of sentences
in contexts. It seems less than clear that we should have reliable intuitions on such
objects. In particular Predelli requires that we should, in accessing the appropriate
intuition; hold constant meaning properties while shifting both the context against
which indexical reference is resolved and the circumstance against which the sentence
is assessed for truth or falsity. It would hardly be surprising if a certain amount of
slippage were to occur in the attempt to access such intuitions. Nonetheless it does
seem that there is some intuitive difference between the examples in (98) and (99), a
difference which would appear to weigh against a straightforwardly indexical account
on which 'PN' simply refers to whatever is the bearer of 'PN' in the appropriate
context. It seems to me, however, that this does not force us towards Millianism on
names.
What game is Predelli asking us to play? Although, for reasons that need not
concern us here, he makes his object of study sentences in contexts rather than
utterances, we can, I believe, translate Predelli's claims into the language of
utterances. When Predelli asks us to consider (98) in c, what he is essentially asking is
31 Ofaurse this evideace, if Tight, also weighs heavily against descriptivi statics cci
	 ur nsoies.
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that we should consider what truth-conditions an utterance of(98) would have were it
tobeutteredincbyanagentskingthclanguagethatwespeakheisaskingusin
other words to consider what proposition we would express by an utterance of(98) in
c. Viewed from this perspective, it does seem intuitively right that if I utter (98) to
you in c I thereby express a proposition not about Boston but about London, and if I
utter (99) to you in c I thereby express a proposition about myself: This, however, is
just what the account of proper names which I have outlined above predicts. In
interpreting my utterance of (98) in c, you know, given the encoded meaning of
proper names, that the mental representation I wish to explicate contains an individual
concept which I associate with the infonnation x £r called 'London . This is, of
course, a veiy different thing from knowing that I am entertaining a concept of
whatever is the bearer of London in the context of utterance. You should, on this
analysis, accept London, rather than Boston, as the optimally relevant interpretation of
my utterance of 'London' given what )VU know about the naming conventions which
I associate with the name 'London'. Put another way, when I use the name 'London',
it refers to London, regardless of the naming conventions in force in the context of
utterance, because of the naming conventions which I and the rest of my linguistic
community associate with the name 'London'. These conventions, although non-
linguistic, get carried over to the counterIctual contexts against which Predelli asks
us to assess (98) and (99). There are, by contrast, no parallel context-independent
conventions governing the use of 'I' which can be carried over to counterfäctual
circumstances in assessing the truth conditions of (99). Whereas the name-bearer
relation which links 'London' to London available for linguistic exploitation across
a wide range of different contexts, 'I' can only refer to me if! am the speaker.
It seems to me, then, that Predelli's examples do pose a threat to imicxical-
flavoured accounts of the type supported by Recanati (1993), Pelczar and Ramsbury
(1998) and Pelczar (2001) among others. They do not, however, pose a tiveat to the
kind of account which I lhvour, on which 'PN' is not constrained to refer to the actual
bearer of'PN' in the context of utterance, but refers (speaking loosely) rather to the
optimally relevant individual appropriately linked to the information x a the bea,rof
'PN'.
3.33 Neo-Millianiam on names
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Finally in this chapter 1 want to say a couple of words about the neo-Millian position
on proper names, a posion that has for some time been dominant in the literature. I
don't want to go into any great detail, since both the position and its motivation are
clear and have already been discussed at some length in this chapter. For the Millian,
following Kripke (1972 etc), Kaplan (1989a etc) and Donnellan (1970), the semantic
properties of a proper name are exhausted by that name's referent In Kaplan's
framework this comes out as the claim that the character of a proper name is a
constant function from contexts of utterance to a content which is a constant function
from circumstances of evaluation a referent The motivation for this kind of story
comes largely from the intuitions on rigidity which I discussed in section 3.1.3 above:
proper names seem to pick out the same individual across possible worlds. The
position is also motivated negatively by the battery of arguments which Kripke (1972)
levels at descriptivism, arguments that are sufficiently well-known not to need
repetition here.
As far as referential uses of proper names go, my account has much in
common with certain flavours of Millianism. In particular, I agree with the Millian
that a referentially-used proper name contributes nothing to truth-conditional content
but its referent. I am also, so fuìr as referential uses are concerned, broadly in
agreement with the Millian, such as Wettstein (1986), who holds that facts concerning
cognitive significance should be treated separately from facts concerning truth
conditions. Given the anatomy for de ie individual concepts outlined in the last
chapter, on which the internal dimension of a de re individual concept does not
determine the referent of that concept, cognitive significance, which is the domain of
the internal dimension, is separate from truth-conditional contribution, the domain of
the external dimension. I of course part company with the Millian on the question of
how a use of a proper name is anchored to its referent. On this question, my analysis
of referential uses of proper names comes closer to the indexically-fiavoured account
of Recanati (1993), although, as discussed hi the previous section, there are
significant diflerences between Recanati's account and my own.
In its analysis of referential uses of proper names, then, my account has a
certain amount in common with analyses of a neo-Millian stripe. It is in the treatment
of non-referential uses of proper names that the two accounts come apart most clearly.
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For the neo-Millian, descriptive uses of names simply fall outside his area of enquiry,
whereas I have taken such uses seriously. Whereas my account can handle both
referential and non-referential uses with the same theoretical machinery, the neo-
Millian must account for descriptive uses of names with a machinery other than that
which he uses to account for referential uses, if he is to account for them at all.
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Chapter 4
Indexicals
4.0
In this chapter I want to turn away from proper names and towards another class of
singular expressions: the class of indexicals. I shall, for the time being, be restricting
my discussion to syntactically simple indexicals, i.e. the so-called pure mdexicals
(expressions such as 'I', 'today', 'here') and simple demonstratives ('this', 'that' etc),
leaving a discussion of complex demonstratives ('this cat', 'that moose') to a later
chapter'. I also want to stress once more a caveat that I raised earlier: I shall not be
directly concerned with the anaphoric uses of indexicals and demonstratives (although
they will be mentioned in passing). This omission is for reasons of space: as the vast
literature on the subject attests, the complexities of anaphora are worthy of many
theses in their own right I make this omission, however, in the belief that a proper
theosy of indexicals should be able to provide a unified account of anaphoric and non-
anaphoric uses, and that, suitably developed, the story I shall go on to outline below
should provide the basis ofjust such a theory of indexicals.
Both the key questions which I want to address hi this chapter and the
structure within which I shall address them will be more or less familiar from the last
chapter. Again I shall centre my discussion on questions concerning linguistic
meaning, truth-conditional contribution, cognitive signillcance and conditiotis for
understanding. I shall do so by once more laying out a body of core data, some of
which will be closely related to the core data of the previous chapter. Once I have
done this I shall present the account of the semantics and pragmatics of simple
indexicals which I livour, and show how this account can deal with the core data.
Before launching into the meat of the chapter, however, I want, as I did for
names, to say a few words about how we would want to individuate the dass of
indexicals. In general terms, the answer must be that the class is indi'viduated
'My use of the tam 'indacical' to oosu both pure indexicals and danoustrstives may strike anise as
less than athrdy felicitous. Tha'e ac two things to be said thout this: firstly, so ksig as it is bcane in
mind th my intaition is to usc the turn in this way it shoulcbi't prove too pctnicicus and saicndly, as
Sdiiffer (1981) points out, It Is a usage which has beai reasonably widely adopted.
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according to certain facts concerning context-dependence. Whereas it has usually
been held that proper names make the same contribution to propositional content
regardless of the context in which they are uttered (although I have, of course, taken
issue with this claim in the preceding chapter), there seem to be other expressions
which make different propositional contributions according to context of utterance.
Thus, if I say 'Elvis Presley loved peanut butter' and you say 'Elvis Presley loved
peanut butter', then it seems intuitively clear that we have said the same thing. if on
the other hand, I say '1 love peanut butter' and you say 'I love peanut butter' then,
although we have again both uttered the same sentence, it seems we have said
different things: I have said something which depends for its truth value on my
predilection for peanut butter whereas you have said something that depends on your
predilection for peanut butter. Equally, if you say 'he loved peanut butter' and I say
'he loved peanut butter', you may succeed in saying something about Elvis, while I
may succeed in saying something about my dog Rex. At the heart of the notion of
indexicality, therefore, lies context-dependence, the ability of certain expressions to
give rise to different interpretations in different contexts. But is there more to
indexicality than that? When we talk about indexicals, are we talking about a subset
of context-dependent expressions? It seems clear that the answer to this question is
'yes', but quite how we would want to demarcate the class of indexicals from other
context-dependent expressions is less clear.
For Periy (I 997a, 199Th, 2001 etc.), following Reichenbach (1947), the key to
indexicality is token reflexivity an expression is indexical if the referent of its
utterance in a context is determined by certain facts holding between the referent and
the utterance itself. Thus x is the referent of an utterance u of'!' if x is the speaker of
u; y is the referent ofan utterance u, of 'here' iffy is the place in which u 1 is produced
and z is the referent of an utterance u, of 'now' iffz is the time at which ii,, is
produced. Even if we accept this picture, and I shall argue later in this chapter that we
should certainly think twice before doing so, the token-reflexivity criterion only
applies (relatively) unproblematically to pure indexicals. it is far from clear how we
might extend such a picture to expressions such as 'that', 'he', 'it' and so on. In what
relation must an object stand to an utterance of 'that' in order to be the referent of that
utterance? As we shaH see, the answer given by some is that it must be the object of
an accompanying demonstration. When we start to pick at the notion ofdernonstration
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presupposed by such accounts, however, it becomes apparent that, if it is to do the job
we want of it, then to say that something is the object of an associated demonstration
amounts to no more than saying that it is the object referred to.
How then should we discriminate the class of indexicals from other context-
dependent expressions? As was the case for proper names, I'm not sure that there is
any clear criterion which we can point to in advance of developing an account of the
semantics and pragmatics of indexicals it may, for instance, turn out that proper
names are context-sensitive in much the same way as many of those expressions
which have traditionally been thought of as indexicals2. We shall, for the time being,
therefore, have to rely on what amounts to little more than a list: I shall take the class
of indexicals to include personal pronouns, 'that', 'this', 'now', 'here', 'today', and
other similar expressions. We must, however, bear in mind the same caveat as I raised
in the last chapter: the semantic properties of this group of expressions are an
empirical matter, and cannot be viewed as stipulated in advance. Looking at this from
another direction, what I am interested in exploring are the meaning properties of a
group of linguistic expressions, not the semantic properties of particular kinds of use
to which these expressions can be put. I shall return to this point towards the end of
the chapter, when I come on to discuss how the account I flivour relates to other
accounts of the semantics of indexicals, since it will turn out that my account may not
be quite as antithetical to certain others as it might at first seem.
4.1 The central data on indexicals.
What are the core data to which any account of the semantics of indexicals must
address itself? There is much overlap here with the core data laid out for accounts of
proper names in the last chapter just as with proper names, our analysis must be able
to account for the behaviour of co-referring and empty indexicals, and must also be
able to address their apparent rigidity.
2 As discussed in the previous chapter, the claim Out proper names are best viewed as a variety of
indexical is not without its supporters.
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4.1.1 Indexicals and co-reference
In the last chapter 1 discussed at some length what has come to be known as Frege's
puzzle, the puzzle of how identity statements can be both true and informative. So,
although 'Satchmo' and 'Louis Armstrong' are co-referential, sentence (I) seems a
priori, whereas sentence (2) seems aposteriori
1) Satchmo is Satchmo.
2) Satchmo is Louis Armstrong.
Equally, although 'Satchmo' and 'Louis Armstrong' are co-referential, a rational
agent may assent to (3) while dissenting from (4):
3) Satehmo is a great trumpeter.
4) Louis Armstrong is a great trumpeter.
so long as she is unaware of the truth of(2).
Puzzles concerning co-reference and cognitive significance arise or indexicals
just as for proper names, although, given the particular nature of indexicals, they raise
somewhat different questions. Whereas the proper-name version of Frege's puzzle
arises when we substitute one name for another co-referential name, two co-
referential uses of one and the same indexical can give rise to much the same effect.
To see that this is so, consider the following scenario: Bert and Ernie are standing in
Bert's garden; in front of him, Ernie can see what he takes to be a particularly hideous
piece of garden statuary, let's call it ; at the same time he can also see what he takes
to be a rather lovely ornament through Bert's French windows; unknown to Ernie
however, what he has taken to be the lovely ornament inside is no more than a
reflection of the back of s. Wishing to apprise Bert of his views, Ernie says 'I like that
(pointing at the reflection oft) but I don't like that (pointing directly at p)'. This
immediately gives us a corollary of the second part of the puzzle above: in this
context, Ernie will be disposed both to assent to and dissent from utterances of(5),
associated with distinct demonstrations, although the tokens of 'that' refer to one and
the same object in both utterances
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5) Thatis lovely.
We need take the scenario just one step further to produce a corollary of the first part
of the puzzle above. Bert, realising Ernie's mistake, says to Ernie:
6) Butthatisthat.
again pointing first at the reflection of in the window and then directly at . Here,
despite the fact that Bert's identity statement involves two uses of the same
expression with the same referent, it is nonetheless informative: it should, for
instance, cause Ernie to revise his willingness to both assent to and dissent from
utterances of(5). The puzzle then is this: on the face of it, demonstratives seem to be
about as referential as any expression can be; given that they appear to encode no
particular property, what else but their referent might they introduce into propositional
content3? It also seems reasonable to hold that a hearer who understands an utterance
must grasp the proposition expressed by that utterance. Yet what the above evidence
seems to show is that these two premises are incompatible: if demonstratives
introduce their referents to propositional content, and if grasping propositional content
is a necessary condition for understanding, then so long as Ernie is rational and
understands the two utterances of(S), he should not be able to assent to one while
dissenting from the other. Equally, if he has understood Bert's utterance of(6), then
what he has grasped in so doing should be uninformative to him, since, if 'that' is
referential, (6) simply predicates of its identity with itself. It seems that one of our
two premises must go.
We have seen, then, that co-referential demonstratives give rise to puzzles
concerning cognitive significance ai much the same way that co-referential proper
names do. What of co-referential pure indexicals? This is a rather more fraught
question. Corazza and Dokic (1992) attribute to Wettstein (1986) the view that pure
indexicals, or at least 'here', may give rise to similar puzzles4. Thus they ask us to
consider Pierre who, falsely believing that he has moved between t1 and t2, is inclined
3 As I shall disss below, there are a variety o1 possible answers to this question.
4 1t seen less than entirely dear whether Wettstein does indeed hold this 'view.
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to assent to 'here is fine' at t1 but inclined to dissent from 'here is fine' at t2. Whether
such examples can be taken as genuine instances of the puzzle we are discussing is
unclear: the time lapse between t1 and t2 may, as Recanati (1993) points out, influence
the cognitive difference in these cases. There are, however, much clearer examples in
which pure indexicals, or at least the expression types which are standardly identified
as pure indexicals, can give rise to the puzzle. Bert and Ernie are discussing Bert's
recent holiday; in front of them on a table are two maps; Bert points to a spot on one
map and says:
7) I stayed here.
He then turns to a point on the other map and says:
8) I didn't stay here.
Of course, unbeknownst to Bert, the two map co-ordinates he has pointed at represent
the same spot. So again we have our puzzle: Bert is simultaneously disposed to assent
to one utterance of(7) (accompanied by a demonstration of a particular spot on the
first map) and inclined to dissent from another utterance of (7) (accompanied by a
demonstration of a particular spot on the second map), although the two occurrences
of 'here' refer to the same place5.
It seems, then, that 'here' can give rise to the same sort of puzzle as can 'that'.
How about other pure indexicals6? Examples with 'now' are rather harder to come by,
but there are some plausible candidates. Bert and Ernie are playing a musical game:
they have separate recordings of all the instrumental parts of a particular orchestral
work; at one point in the work there is a particularly loud cymbal crash; what they
have to do is listen to one of the instrumental parts and say exactly when they think
S1 have no dout* that some will find thanselves instinctively resisting this and other subsequent
iiples. I n not at this point however, making any theoretical claims about their proper analysis I
ma merely attaiqling to establish that there ma at least some uses of some expression types standerdly
identified as pure indexicals whidi oni be co-referential without being cognitively eqiñvalad. I shall
come on to discuss the pailicul&s of sudi cxmaples below, where I shall be defending the position that
they can be accounted kw with the minimal uniw.cal somantics that I shall outline, along with an
adequate pragmatic machinay. For tha time being, however, I am not intending to presuppose any
rttcular analys of the examples I present.
I am here using 'pure Indexical' to denote a set of expression types, not a subset of the uses of these
expression types. I shall come on to discuss this distinction below.
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the cymbal crash happens. Bert first listens to the piccolo part and at a particular point
says:
9) The cymbal crash happens now.
Hethenlinstotheoboepartand,justastheyarecomingtothesamepointinthe
work, Ernie asks Bert whether he thinks this is the point at which the cymbal crash
happens. Bert replies:
1O)No, the cymbal crash doesn't happen now.
Again we seem to have same expression, same referent, but different cognitive
significance.
Finally, can we find the same puzzle with uses of 'I'? While such cases are
inevitably bizarre, there may again be some candidates. Bert and Ernie are on a
mountaineering holiday. At the top of a mountain, Bert shouts as loudi as he can:
11)Iam Bert.
Such is the acoustic of the mountain that thirty seconds later an echo of Bert's shout
comes back to him. His voice has been so distorted by its journey, however, that Bert
does not recognise this as an echo of his own utterance, and believes instead that
someone else must be repeating his message. Thus, although he wotild be inclined to
assent to his original utterance of(ll) he might well be inclined to dissent from the
echo of his utterance. So again we appear to have a situation in which a rational agent
can both assent to and dissent from utterances of (or, indeed, one and the same
utterance of) the same indexical sentence in which the indexical relërs to the same
object.
What we have seen is that co-referring indexicals give rise to puzzles similar
to those raised by co-referring proper names. Just as with names, distinct co-referring
indexicals appear capable of differing in cognitive significance. Moreover, two
distinct but co-referential utterances of the same indexical expression also seem
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capable of bearing different cognitive values7. There does, however, seem to be a
disparity between the ease with which the puzzle can be set up using demonstratives
and the relative difficulty of finding examples using pure indexicals. 1 shall come on
to discuss why this might be so when I examine how my account of the semantics and
pragmatics of indexicals can be used to address the core data.
4.1.2 Indexicals and emptiness
In the last chapter I discussed how the Millian position on pmper names appears to be
threatened by uses of empty (i.e. non-referring) proper names. Thus, although 'Nat
Tate' does not in flict refer, sentence (12) appears to express a complete thought:
12) Nat Tate lived and worked in New York.
Furthermore, certain sentences containing 'Nat Tate' appear capable not just of being
filly meaningfiul but of being true:
13)Nat Tate does not exist.
Although this has sometimes been overlooked, parallel examples threaten a
referential semantics for indexicals. In the last chapter I asked you to imagine Bill and
Ben, who are playing a virtual reality game populated by monsters. During the game,
Bill, seeing one particularly fierce monster, may utter either (14) or (15):
14) That is horrible.
1 Looking bad at proper names, we cas see that they too can give rise to this version of Frege's puzzle.
Salmon (1986/91) asks us to axisider Elmer, a bounty hunter, who is on the trail of notorious mobster
Bugsy Waftit. Hearing that Elmer is after him, Bugsy changes his appearance so radically that he feels
safe introducing hintself to Elmer still using the name 'Bugsy Wabbit'. Just as Bugsy intends, Elmer
fails to realise that his new friend Bugsy is the same Bugsy he is chasing. b this context, Elmer nw be
inclined to assent to an utterance of 'Bugsy Wathit is a dangerous criminal' produced while, for
instance, pointing at a pidure of Sugsy bi4ir the change of appearance, while at the same time being
inclined to dissent from an utterance of'Bugsy Wabbit is a dangerous criminal' produced while
pointing at his new friend. It thus seema that two co-referential utterances of the susse proper name can
have differing cognitive significance. I do not, of course, intend to offer this as evidence in favour of
my position: if you remain to be axivinced by my account of proper name I'm nire you will find
nothing to convince you in my analysis of this example. The point I wish to nale is merely that, if you
are inclined to ac*xll my acaxat of proper names, thai anch cases pmvide the proper-name
as.mterpurt of the indexical exaiçtes discussed alxwe.
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15)That doesn't exist.
It seems that (14) is fully meaningful, just as is (12), and (15) is true, just as is (13).
So once more we have the following problem: demonstratives seem paradigmaticaily
referential; yet the meaningfulness of(14) and the Iruth of(15) appear to demonstrate
that the meaning properties of demonstratives must go beyond their referents. If all
there was to the meaning of a demonstrative was its referent then, lacking a referent,
'that' in (14) and (15) should be meaningless.
So demonstratives have meaningful empty uses just as proper names do. What
of pure indexicals? Again it seems to be a considerably trickier matter setting up
empty uses of pure indexicals, but once more there are some candidates. Detective
Bert comes upon the body of Smith who has been foully murdered. Shocked by the
killing, and horrified at the brutality of whoever has done it, Bert shouts:
16)You are insane.
at the top of his lungs. Of course, unbeknown to Bert, Smith has just met with a
particularly unfortunate accident. It seems, once more, that Bert has expressed a
complete thought, a thought that would be true if whoever murdered Smith was
insane. Yet, since there is no murderer of Smith, his use of 'you' is empty. 'I' too
seems capable of meaningful empty uses. A poster appears on Bert and Ernie's street;
on it there is a photograph of a man, beneath which is written the legend:
17)I am your Labour candidate for the forthcoming local elections.
However, the photo is, in fuct, a mock-up produced on some prankster's computer it
does not depict any actual person. Nevertheless it seems plausible that the poster
legend is fully meaningful in just the same way as (12), (14) or (16); what it says
could, after all, be closely paraphrased by pointing at the picture while uttering 'that
man is your Labour candidate for the forthcoming local elections'. If this is Tight, then
'1' appears capable of being meaningful even when empty.
It seems therefore that emptiness threatens a referential semantics for
indexicals as it does a referential semantics for proper nanies the claim that the
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propositional contribution of an indexical is exhausted by its referent appears to be
incompatible with the meaningfulness of sentences containing non-referring
indexicals. There again, however, seems to be a disparity between the meaningfulness
of empty demonstratives and of empty pure indexicals, a disparity which should be
accounted for by our theory of the semantics of indexicals.
4.1.3 Indexicals and rigidity
As I discussed in the previous chapter, while data on co-reference and emptiness
appear to threaten a Millian analysis of the semantics of proper names, data on
rigidity threaten any non-Millian analysis. The same is true of indexicals, although,
given their context-sensitivity, issues surrounding rigidity are a degree more complex.
In the last chapter 1 asked you to compare the following sentences:
18)Louis Armstrong performed with Ella Fitzgerald.
19)The greatest jazz trumpeter performed with Ella Fitzgerald.
In particular I asked you to consider upon what the truth values of these sentences
would depend at a world at which Louis Armstrong was the greatest jazz trumpeter
and upon what they would depend at a world in which he was not the greatest jazz
trumpeter. The key intuition for Kripkean notions of rigidity is that sentences such as
(18) will depend for their truth values on how things are with the same individuals
across possible worlds, whereas sentences such as (19) will not; they will depend
instead upon how things are with whichever individual satisfies their descriptions at a
possible world. Consider, then, the following:
20)1 performed with Ella Fitzgerald (as uttered by Louis Armstrong).
21)You performed with Ella Fitzgerald (uttered while addressing Louis
Armstrong).
22)He performed with Ella Fitzgerald (uttered while pointing at Louis
Armstrong).
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Again we need to ask ourselves the following question: upon what will the truth
values of utterances of these sentences depend in counterlIictual circumstances? We
need to be slightly careflul what we are asking here. What we are not asking is: if these
sentences are uttered in counterfactual circumstances (or, rather, in circumstances
other than those supposed above) what will their truth values depend upon? As uttered
in other circumstances their truth values could, after all, depend on more or less
anything. What we are asking is: supposing that they are uttered in the imagined
circumstances, upon what will the truth values of the propositions thus expressed
depend in counterlhctual circumstances? To clarify matters, it might be worth
reminding ourselves of the distinction drawn by Kaplan (e.g. 1989a and 1989b)
between contexts ofutterance and circumstances ofevaluazion. A context of utterance
is taken to be that against which the values of indexicals are fixed, a circumstance of
evaluation is taken to be that against which the proposition expressed by an utterance
is evaluated for truth or falsity. Thus, if Bert says:
23)! live in Sesame Street.
then the value of 'I', in the particular context of utterance, is Beit Given this, Bert's
utterance will express the proposition that Bert lives in Sesame Street Now once we
have this proposition, we can hold it up to any number of possible circumstances of
evaluation and see whether it is true or thise in each. It will of course be true in all
those circumstances in which Bert lives in Sesame Street, and false in all those in
which he doesn't. With this tenninology in place, what we are asking is not what
propositions (20) to (22) might express in different contexts, but rather, taking (20) to
(22) to be uttered in the imagined contexts, upon what will their truth values depend
in different circumstances.
Intuitively it seems that indexicals pattern with proper names rather than with
definite descriptions; it seems, in other words, that each of the utterances of(20) to
(22) will be true, in a counterfactual circumstance, if Louis Armstrong performed
with Ella Fitzgerald in that circumstance. The apparent rigidity of indexicals is, then,
something which our semantic theory must be able to account for.
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4.1.4 Indexicals, answer machines and post-it notes
We have seen, then, that much of the data which motivated the theoiy of proper
names laid out in chapter 3 carries over to indexicals. There is one other type of
evidence which I wish to discuss before presenting the kind of story on indexicals
which I fhvour, a type of evidence which has received much attention in the recent
literature, and which we have already touched on above. As discussed in the
introduction to this chapter, Perry takes the view that the key to indexicality is token..
reflexivity. This analysis is very closely allied to that developed by Kaplan in his
series of seminal papers (Kaplan 1978, 1989a and 1989b among others). For Kaplan,
as mentioned in chapter 1, the phenomenon of indexicality forces upon us a
distinction between two types of meaning, labelled by Kaplan character and content.
The content of an expression is that which, in a particular context, the expression
contributes to the proposition expressed; the character of an expression is that which
determines the expression's content for any context. Thus for Kaplan the character of
'I' can be identified with the description 'the person who utters this token', that of
'now' with 'the time at which this token was uttered' and that of 'here' with 'the
location at which this token was uttered'. Given the distinction between character and
content this is not to say that '1' has the same meaning as 'the person who utters this
token' but rather that, in any particular context, 'I' will refer to whoever satisfies this
description.
Recently there has been much discussion of a class of uses of indexicats which
seem on the face of it to pose some serious problems for any analysis along these
lines'. One such problem is that raised by answering machine messages: we may
assume, as a starting point, that whoever produces an utterance u, and wherever and
whenever she produces it, it must be the case that the person who utters u is at the
place at which u is uttered at the time at which u is uttered. Now, given the semantics
for 'I', 'here' and 'now' proposed by Kaplan, this appears to force us to the
conclusion that (24) is valid, i.e. that no utterance of(24) could be thlse as evaluated
against its context of utterance9.
See, for instance, Sidelle (1991), Predelli (1998), Cora at 81(2002).
'This is not, of course, to say that any uttco of (24) is necessarily true, since it ny well be false in
circemstances of evaluation oth than the contact of uttorance.
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24)1 am here now.
In order for an utterance of(24) to be làlse, after all it would need to be the case that
the speaker was not at the place of utterance at the time of utterance. And, if (24)
cannot be false in any context of utterance, then the negation of(24), i.e. (25), cannot
be true in any context:
25)! am not here now.
But this is where the problem lies: there seem to be cases in which (24) is truly
uttered. Bert has an answering machine on which he has recorded (25) as his outgoing
message. While Bert is out one day, Ernie phones him and listens to this answering
machine message. Given that Bert is in fact out at the time Ernie calls, it seems that
the message Ernie has listened to is true. Thus it seems that we have a true utterance
of (25), contrary to the predictions forced on us by a Kaplanian semantics for pure
indexicals.
While the key to these answer machine puzzles seems to lie in the
interpretation of 'now', there are other much-discussed examples which hinge on the
interpretation of '1'. Bert and Ernie have spent a hard morning working in the office;
Bert decides to take his lunch break, but Ernie decides to slave on; as he works, Ernie
notices a series of people approaching Bert's desk and looking around for him; in
order to save them trouble, he writes the message in (26) on a post-it note and sticks it
on Bert's desic
26)! am not here now, I've gone to lunch, but I'll be back at 2.
The first thing to notice is that we have here another example of a true tokening of
(25). But this example also seems to show something else: although it is Ernie who is
the producer of this tokening, i.e. although it is Ernie who has written the message, 'I'
in (26) seems to refer not to Ernie but to Bert. Again this appears, on the face of it, to
be beyond the reach of a Kaplanian semantics for '1' given that, for Kaplan, 'I' is
semantically constrained to refer to the agent of its tokening.
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4.2 Indexicals and individual concepts
I have now laid out what I take to be the core data for an account of the semantics and
pragmatics of indexicals. Any such account must have a story to tell about the
cognitive significance of co-referring and empty indexicals'°, the apparent rigidity of
indexicals and also about a range of uses that do not seem to fit neatly within the
currently dominant theories. Following the pattern of the previous chapter, I now want
to lay out the bare bones of the account of indexicals which I favour. Once I have
done that shall I come on to examine what analyses this account offers of the core
data.
4.2.1 The bare bones
The account of indexicals I flivour has much in common with the account of proper
names laid out in the last chapter. There are, however, certain key respects in which
the two accounts diverge. I shall start by examining the common ground.
Firstly it will be my claim that indexicals, just as proper names, are tools for
explicitly communicating individual concepts. As discussed in the last chapter, this is
to say that a speaker uttering a sentence containing an indexical in an argument
position thereby indicates that the propositional mental representation which
constitutes the content of her informative intention contains an individual concept. As
with proper names (and all other individual concept communicators) the linguistic
meaning of an indexical is silent as to whether the corresponding individual concept is
de re or descriptive, although again this does not equate to the claim that establishing
whether the appropriate individual concept is de re or descriptive is not a necessary
condition on understanding. It may well be the case, and indeed I shall argue that it is
the case, that, just as with proper names, a bearer will not have understood an
indexical utterance unless he entertains an individual concept of the appropriate truth-
conditional type. The point here is that indexicals are not semantically constrained,
want to stress that I am ix* at this stage intending to presuppose any partioslar kind of analysis of
these data: it nssy turn out, onz we ha'v examined the facts amoaning cognitive signifiomcc in rather
more detail, that ow semantics fr indedcals need net be answerable to audi facts (from a pwdy truth-
conditional angle I have mudi sympathy with this view). My point is merely that, if our interest lies in
an analysis of the meaning properties of nataral language expressions, thai we nnzst have some stoy to
tell about the data concerning on-refinuice and emptiness.
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i.e. constrained by their encoded linguistic meaning, either to express de r concepts
or to express descriptive concepts: they can do either. Once more, then, the account I
lhvour runs foul of what appear to be robust intuitions concerning rigidity: it will be
my claim that indexicals are not rigid designators by dint of their linguistic meaning,
although they can be, and often are, used rigidly. 1 shall, therefore need to address
two questions below: firstly, what evidence is there that indexicals can be used to
express descriptive individual concepts, and secondly, if they can be so used, why are
intuitions on their rigidity so strong?
So fur, then, my analyses of the semantics of indexicals and proper names run
along much the same lines. To see where the accounts diverge we need to ask
ourselves what are the specific constraints that indexicals lay, by virtue of their
linguistic meaning, on the kinds of individual concepts that may constitute their
interpretations on occasions of use. The first point to observe is that, on more or less
any account of their semantics, members of the class of indexicals are taken to be
alike with regard to some of their meaning properties, but different with regard to
others; that is just to say that there are some semantic features which are common to
all indexicals, although all indexicals do not have the same meaning. From Kaplan's
perspective, all indexicals are alike in that their characters are not constant functions;
despite having a constant linguistic meaning, they can, that is, refer to different
objects in different contexts. They differ, on the other hand, in the specific characters
which they encode: as we have seen 'i' is taken to have as its character a firnction
from utterances to their uflerers 'here', a function from utterances to their locations
and 'now', a function from utterances to the times of their occurrence. Pure indexicals
thus seem to encode descriptive meaning, albeit descriptive meaning that, on Kaplan's
analysis, drops out of the picture before the level of propositional content And it is
hardly controversial to suggest that it is not just pure indexicals which encode
descriptive meaning. There in fact seems to be a continuum: at one end stand the pure
indexicals, which encode, at least according to Kaplan, Perry et aL, descriptive
meaning sufficiently rich to determine a content for any context; at the other end stand
what we might call the pure demonstratives, 'this' and 'that', which seem to encode at
most a minimal descriptive meaning: if'I' has descriptive meaning 'the utterer', then
we might identif the descriptive meaning of 'that' as 'some object' plus a distance
feature to distinguish 'that' from 'this'. Between these two extremes we find a range
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of indexicals which, while encoding richer descriptive meaning than the pure
demonstratives, still do not encode a sufficiently rich meaning to determine content as
(supposedly) do the pure indexicals. The most obvious members of this category are
'he' and 'she'.
The question then arises, what role do these descriptive features play in the
interpretation of indexicals? There is a range of possibilities: Bach (1987) takes the
view that they contribute to propositional content, or, more specifically, to what Lc
said. Thus, for Bach, what is said by an utterance of for instance, (27):
27)He is a fireman.
is the proposition that a certain male is a fireman. Given the framework within which
Bach is working, however, this does not amount to the claim that the descriptive
features of indexicals appear in asserted content, and thus quite how substantive the
disagreement between Bach and others really is seems unclear. The second option is
that adopted by Kaplan and others of a direct reference siripe: descriptive meaning
goes to determine the referent of an indexical in a context, but makes no appearance
in propositional content. Thus for Kaplan, 'he' in (27) will constrain reference to a
male entity, but will not appear in the proposition expressed. Finally there is a third
possibility: descriptive meaning might be taken to provide only pragmatic guidance to
the interpretation of indexicals. This amounts to the claim that such features serve
only to fheilitate interpretation, and play no semantic role whatsoever. As far as non-
pure indexicals go, this position has been championed by, for instance, Larson and
Segal (1995). They ask us to consider a speaker who, walking past King's College
London, points towards it and says:
28) She is going to be closed over the Christmas period.
While there is clearly something odd about this utterance, they argue, we would not
want to say that 'she' cannot refer to King's, and that this utterance therefore cannot
express a proposition that is true if King's is going to be closed over Christmas.
How convinced should we be by this claim, and therefore what place should
the descriptive meaning of indexicals hold hi our theory? I suspect that dyed-in-the-
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wool Kaplanians will not find much to convince them here. What is to stop them,
after all, from rolling out the familiar distinction between semantic reference and
speaker reference to account for intuitions on this example? It's certainly true, they
might say, that an utterance of (28) could succeed in communicating a proposition
about King's College London, but that is very far from showing that 'she', as used in
(28) has King's as its semantic reference. Given the intuitive strangeness of(28) we
would do well to locate reference to King's at the level of speaker rather than
semantic reference. It seems to me, however, that we should not let such a response
sway us. Firstly, there are, I shall claim, good reasons why (28) might seem
anomalous even i1 as Larson and Segal claim, the gender feature of 'she' plays no
more than a pragmatic role; and secondly, there are examples in which 'he' and 'she'
can be used to refer to individuals who do not satisfy their gender features and which
have none of the intuitive oddness of (28). Consider the story of Dr James Barry:
Barry was a prominent British doctor of the nineteenth century, one of the first to
perfonn a caesarean section in which both mother and baby survived. He appears to
have had many eccentricities, among them that he would never allow anyone to see
him undress. After his death the reason for this particular eccentricity became clear:
despite having lived his entire life as a man, it transpired, as he was being laid out for
burial, that Barry was a woman. Consider, then, a conversation between Bert and
Ernie about James Barry: Bert knows the truth about Barry's gender, but Ernie thinks
of Barry merely as an interesting (male) figure of nineteenth century medical history.
Given this, Bert says:
29) You know, when he was laid out for his funeral it turned out he was really a
woman.
Now there seems to me to be a robust intuition that Bert's utterance of(29) literally
expresses a proposition that is true if when Barry was laid out for his funeral, it
turned out that Barry was really a woman. Indeed (29) seems the natural way of
expressing such a proposition. Consider the alternative (30) as uttered in the imagined
contcxt
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30) You know, when she was laid out for her firneral it turned out she was really a
woman.
An utterance of(30) seems to me a markedly less natural way to express the intended
proposition than (29). Yet if the gender features of 'he' and 'she' did indeed play a
semantic role, things should be just the other way around. Since 'he' would thus be
constrained to refer to a male, we would have to say that (29) expressed no
proposition at all, although it might of course succeed in communicating a
proposition. Indeed we would have to say that a vast number of utterances that
purported to be about Bariy during his lifetime were, in fact, about no-one. This result
seems at best highly counterintuitive'1.
What should we conclude from this example? 1 think we should conclude that
Larson and Segal are right, that the gender features of 'he' and 'she' are merely
pragmatic. Indeed it is not just the gender fratures that are pragmatic; the animacy
feature is also pragmatic: it might, after all, have turned out at his/her death that Barry
was a remote-controlled robot, but we could still express this by saying 'he was a
robot'. But if this is so, why does the example in (28) seem so odd? I think that from a
relevance-theoretic perspective there is a straightforward answer to this question:
since the speaker of (28) has chosen to use 'she' to refer to King's College London,
and given the proposed semantics for 'she', the speaker has indicated that the property
of being female will assist her hearer in his interpretation process. Yet to reach the
intended interpretation, the hearer of (28) in fact has to bypass this indication. In
chapter 21 drew a distinction between two kinds of speaker intention: on the one hand
the speaker has an intention concerning which interpretation her hearer should arrive
at, while on the other she has an intention concerning the route via which he should
arrive at it. In these tenns the oddness of(28) becomes clear: the speaker's two sets
of intentions seem incompatible. On the one hand she intends her hearer to arrive at
an interpretation which will be true if King's is closed over Christmas, while on the
"You may be imonevinced by the example in (29) on the grounds that the imagined use of 'be' is
anaplioric on i antecedent use of 'James 13wiy'. Thae am t things to be said about this firstly,
since a propa thay o(inde,dcajs should, in my view, be able to amt *ir both anaphoric and non-
anaphoric uses within a single framework, this does i* rend (29) unintaesting bet, mere
significantly, ci if wo do taice this example an imvlving anaphora, it is entirely inessential to the
exançlc- we could, fir instant imagnie a discotse-initia1 uttamee o((29) produced while pointing
at a pwture of Bany.
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other she has indicated, via her choice of expression, that she intends her hearer to use
the property of being female as an aid to his interpretation strategy. It is from the
mismatch of these two intentions that the intuitive strangeness of(28) arises.
From a relevance-theoretic perspective, there is also a good story to be told
about why, despite the apparent tension between referring to an individual as 'he' and
predicating femaleness of that individual, an utterance of(29) is not only an entirely
legitimate way to express the intended proposition, but seems to be a more natural
way to do so than an utterance of (30). How might Ernie's interpretation of (29)
proceed on a relevance-theoretic analysis? Ernie is presented, as a constituent of the
utterance he must process, with a use of the indexical 'he'. Given the semantics of
'he', he will be able to conclude two things firstly, that Bert's mental representation
contains an individual concept, and secondly, that Bert intends hhn to use the property
of maleness in his search for an appropriate concept. Ernie will, presumably, have in
his conceptual repertoire a large number of individual concepts associated with the
infbrmation x L male, and the natural first strategy, thced with an utterance of'he', is
to narrow the search to this class of individual concepts. This first strategy will not
always pay dividends: it may be that Bert is using 'he' to refer to an individual who,
although salient in the mutual cognitive environment, has not yet come to Ernie's
attention, as when Bert points to a picture of Barry of whom Ernie has not previously
heard. In this case, trawling through pre-existing x-is-male concepts won't be of much
use. Either way, Ernie isjustilled in restricting his search to individual concepts, be
they pre-existing or formed on the hool which contain the information x L male. Why
is he justified hi doing this? For the following reason: if Bert intended Ernie to access
an individual concept which it is mutually manifest to both does not contain this
information, then to use 'he', encoding as it does the property of maleness, would be
to put Ernie to gratuitous processing effort. This is just what we saw with the example
in (28). Given the guarantee of optimal relevance communicated by all utterances,
Ernie is thus justified in restricting his search to, essentially, what he takes to be
concepts of males. One of these concepts will, ex hypothesi, be a concept of James
Barry, since, at the stage of the discourse at which he interprets 'he', Ernie believes
Barry to have been male. Moreover, given the context (previous discourse about
Barry, a demonstration of Barry's picture etc.), Ernie's concept of Barry should be the
most accessible x-is-male concept in his repertoire. He should therefore try out an
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interpretation on which 'he' refers to Barry, to see whether it satisfies his expectations
of relevance. If it does and in the imagined context it should, he should accept it as
the intended interpretation.
We can see, therefore, how, on a relevance-theoretic picture, the utterance in
(29) can express a proposition which is about James Barry. But why should (29) be a
more natural way of expressing this proposition than (30)? It seems at least strange
that there should be a preference in this case for talking about Barry by using an
expression whose descriptive meaning he does not satisfy, rather than by using an
expression whose descriptive meaning he does satisfy. But in the above analysis of
(29) we can see why (30) should be a less preferred option. A speaker who uses 'she'
offers up the property of femaleness as a guide to interpretation. Her hearer is thus
justified in trawling through concepts containing the information x is female. But ii
the imagined context, Ernie's concept of the intended referent, far from containing the
information x is female, contains the information x is male. This trawl through x-is-
female concepts will thus be a red herring, putting Ernie to gratuitous processing
effort once more. An utterance of(30) should not, therefore, be optimally relevant on
the intended interpretation.
There thus seems to be good reason to suppose that the descriptive
components of the meanings of indexicals such as 'he' and 'she' play a purely
pragmatic role in interpretation. What of pure indexicals? In order to show that the
descriptive components of pure indexicals are pragmatic just as those of non-pure
indexicals, we would minimally require cases in which occurrences of pure indexicals
take as their interpretation something other than the value of their Kaplanian character
(or something similar) in context. Smith (1989) points to a range of cases in which 'I'
can be used to talk about things other than the speaker. Consider a race-goer who,
having bet on a particular horse, finds that it is performing disappointingly. She may
utter (31):
31)1 am in last place.
in order to express the proposition that the horse she has backed is in last place.
Equally a baseball manager, asked where the team he manages is based, might say
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32) I'm in Chicago.
thus expressing the proposition that his team is based in Chicago. Finally, one may
utter (33) or (34):
33)I'm out of gas.
34)I'm out of ammunition.
and thereby express propositions that will be true if your car is out of gas and your
gun is out of ammunition. Smith's examples would seem, on the face of it, to suggest
that being the agent of the utterance, i.e. satisfying what, with Kaplan, we may take to
be the descriptive meaning of'!', is not a necessary condition for being the referent of
'I'. This in turn might suggest that the descriptive meaning of 'I', just as the
descriptive meaning of 'he' and 'she', plays a merely pragmatic role. But might there
be reason to doubt this conclusion? Nunberg (1993,1995) offers an alternative
analysis of examples such as (33) and (34) in terms of what he calls predicate
transfer. The broad idea is that the property of satisfying a particular predicate can be
transferred from one object to another appropriately related object. In terms of the
examples above, the property of being out of gas or out of ammunition might be seen
to transfer from a car or a gun to its owner, If Nunberg is right, then 'i' in these
examples may still refer, as it standardly does, to its tokener, since this tokener will
have inherited the properties of being out of gas or ammunition from his car or gun.
Nunberg's analysis, if correct, seems to extend straightforwardly to Smith's other
examples, (31) and (32) above.
Nunberg (1990, 1993) offers some other examples in which 'I' (or 'me')
supposedly receives an interpretation other than the speaker. He asks us to consider
(35) as spoken by the condemned man on death row:
35)! am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
(36) as spoken, by, for instance, George W. Bush:
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36)The founders invested me with sole responsibility for appointing Supreme
Court justices.
and (37) uttered in response to a confidence from an unknown interlocutor.
37)You should be more careflul. I might have been a communist.
Nunberg's claim is that, in each of these utterances, 'I' must receive a
descriptive interpretation, and thus cannot merely be interpreted as referring to the
utterer. There are two things to be said about this claim: firstly, as Recanati (1993) has
shown, not all of Nunberg's examples necessarily demonstrate quite what he takes
them to demonstrate. For Recanati, we may analyse 'I' in (37) as referring to the
speaker, just as a Kaplanian semantics demands, if we take (37) to be a statement not
about metaphysically possible worlds, but rather about epistemically possible worlds.
The proposition expressed by the imagined utterance of(37), therefore, will be true,
on Recanati's analysis, if there is a world which is epistemically possible for the
addressee at which the speaker himself is a communist; it will be true, in other words,
if for all the addressee knows the speaker himself might have been a communist.
Nunberg's example in (35) also seems at least questionable. Consider the following
paraphrase of(35):
38)By tradition, I'm allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
For (38) there seems no reason to suppose that 'I' is interpreted in anything other than
the standard Kaplanian way, i.e. as referring to the speaker. Given this, how can we be
sure that traditionally in (35) is not interpreted as equivalent to by tradition in (38)?
Nunberg himself seems to have doubts about the interpretation of traditionally in this
example: in a discussion of (38) he, apparently inadvertently, slips from using
traditionally to using usually, the semantics of which seem much clearer (see
Nunberg (1993, p 32)). It's interesting to note, however, that the reading he claims for
(35) becomes markedly less accessible when we replace traditionally with usualfr
39)Iam usually allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
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The second thing to note about Nunberg's examples is that, even if they do give rise
to descriptive interpretations, we cannot necessarily take this to show that the
descriptive dimension of the encoded linguistic meanings of pure indexicals plays a
merely pragmatic role, and indeed this is not what Nunberg himself takes them to
show. For Nunberg, the encoded meaning of a pure indexical such as '1' is indicative
in the sense that it simply takes one to a particular object; his claim is, however, that
identifying this object is not the end of the matter as far as interpretation is concerned,
that interpretation may, in other words, go beyond the object which satisfies the
descriptive meaning of the indexical used. Thus, even on Nunberg's analysis, the
descriptive meaning of an indexical plays a semantic role, in that it determines which
object in the context of utterance is to be the index, in Nunberg's terms, although,
since it does not determine the particular relation that holds in context between index
and interpretation, it will not determine the indexical's interpretation.
Might there be other examples for which the interpretation of a pure indexical
does not pass through, so to speak, the object which constitutes the value in context of
the relevant Kaplanian character? Smith (1989) shows that 'now' and 'here' can be
used to refer to entities other than the time and place of their tokening. So, for
instance, a lecturer talking about Napoleon's march on Moscow might say:
40) Winter was now closing in and, with his lines of supply cut, Napoleon had no
choice but to retreat.
The token of 'now' in (40) refers not to the time of its own tokening, but to a
particular time in the past. Moreover, the interpretation of 'now' does not pass
through its Kaplanian referent it is not by dint of some relation in which it stands to
the time of utterance that the referent of 'now' in (40) is secured. The same lecturer,
moving on to a discussion of Napoleon's arrival on St Helena, may then say:
41)Here he would die, some say at the hands of his British captors.
Again, the token of 'here' in (41) refers not to the place of its tokening, butto St
Helena, and again, not through any relation in which St Helena stands to the place of
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utterance. Later 1 shall come on to discuss what status, given the account I shall by
then have defended, we should accord Kaplan's distinction between pure indexicals
and demonstratives. I'd like, however, to flag up here a point that will be signilicant
in that discussion. It is worth noticing the semantic parallels between these
syntactically simple pure indexicals and certain complex demonslratives'2. Compare,
for instance, uses of 'here' and 'this place'. It seems that, in just the same way as we
have seen with 'here', 'this place' can be used either to pick out the place of its own
tokening, or to pick out another contextually salient place. Thus in (42) and (43)
'here' and 'this place' have token reflexive uses, while in (44) and (45) they both have
non-token reflexive uses:
42)1 have lived here for twenty years.
43)1 have lived in this place for twenty years.
44)Eventually the train reaches Vladivostok. Here the line ends.
45)Eventually the train reaches Vladivostok. At this place the line ends.
Certainly (45) seems less colloquial than (44), but it is nevertheless grammatical and
seems, on the face of it, to be truth-conditionally equivalent. I shall argue below that
evidence such as this should lead us to reconsider Kaplan's distinction.
We have seen, then, that many pure indexicals seem capable of giving rise to
interpretations that do not pass through what we may call their Kaplanian referentsil.
To put this another way, they can receive interpretations which neither are their
Kaplanian referents, nor are secured via some relation in which they stand to those
referents. What lesson should we learn from this? So far I have been suggesting that
we should learn the following lesson: that, for these pure indexicals, the descriptive
material which Kaplan identifies as character plays a merely pragmatic role in
interpretation. But this is not the only lesson available to us here. There is a more
radical conclusion we could come to: that these indexicals simply do not encode what
Kaplan identifies as their character. Such a conclusion seems supported by (42)-(45):
' I shall be saying a great desi mere about conplex desnoustratives in chapter 6.
'3 Kaplan does not intend his aoouw* to co such uses of pure indexicals, uses of which he is filly
aware. If, however, we are interested in providing a sanantica ir natural language expressions, thai
the broader the range of uses of an expression a partionlar aouount can satisfectorily ac*xiunt fer, the
more well-disposed we should feel towards that aocounL I shall discuss this point in greeter detall
bdow
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as these examples show, we can achieve those interpretations which are at the core of
Kaplan's account, those interpretations which are token reflexive, using expressions
which surely do not encode such token reflexivity, i.e. using complex demonstratives.
Given this, what is to stop us identifvirig the encoded descriptive dimension of 'here'
simply with the property of being a place, and that of 'now' with the property of being
a time? Once 1 have outlined the account of complex demonstratives which 1 favour, a
task which 1 shall undertake in chapter 6, it will become clear that, as far as I am
concerned, the idea under discussion just is the idea that 'here' and 'now' are
semantically equivalent to 'this place' and 'this time" 4. This is not, of course, to say
that they are syntactically equivalent: the former are clearly syntactically simple,
whereas the latter are syntactically complex. It seems plausible that the differences in
distribution demonstrated by, for instance, 'here' and 'this place' may be a result of
the combination of their syntactic difference and the constraints laid on interpretation
by the nature of pragmatic inference. I shall come back to this once I have laid out my
account of complex demonstratives. For the time being, I shall simply say that I
believe this idea to be basically right: the descriptive dimension of the encoded
meaning of 'here' goes no further than the property of being a place and that of 'now'
no further than the property of being a time.
This still leaves us, however, with the question of what roles these properties
play in interpretation. Do they directly constrain interpretation, or is the role they play
pragmatic? Smith (1989) claims that 'here' can refer to non-spatial entities, and 'now'
to non-temporal entities. Thus he asks us to consider a lecturer who, reaching a
natural pause, says:
46)1 will stop here.
and the author of an academic paper who, at a certain point in that paper, writes:
47) Now I am going to prove the bundle theory of objects is false.
" I am setting to one side the ct that uttaancas of 'h' and 'now' can cwy a ran of implicit
prepositions; that is to say, 'here' can, on this story, equate sementically to 'this place' (as in an
utterance of; kr instance, 'here looks like a good place for the piaiic'), but it om also equate to 'at this
place' ('Fve bought my newspaper here for fiwty years'), 'to this place' ('come here') and no doubt
other
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I'm not sure that these examples are overly convincing as evidence for the pragmatic
status of the place and time features of 'here' and 'now': there may well be plausthie
analyses on which 'here' in (46) receives as its interpretation an individual concept of
a place, and 'now' in (47) an individual concept of a time. There are, however, other
examples which seem more promising. Bert has discovered the secret of time travel.
Travelling back to the 1 970s, he finds that everyone's wearing crocheted tank-tops
and flares. He contacts Ernie and says:
48)Here in 1976, no-one has any fashion sense.
There is what seems to me to be a robust intuition that Bert's utterance of 'here' refers
not to the place he is in but rather to the time he is in. Convincing examples with
'now' seem a little harder to come by, but again there are candidates. Bert is giving
Ernie directions to his new house. At one point he says
49)Now the road takes a sharp turn to the left.
Firstly it seems clear that the interpretation of the token of 'now' in (49) is entirely
independent of the time of it tokening. But secondly it seems at least plausthie that
'now' receives no time as an interpretation, but rather a place: Bert is not saying, on
this analysis, that the road turns at a particular time (it presumably takes just this turn
at all times), but rather that it turns at a particular place. We seem thus to have
evidence that the place and time features encoded by 'here' and 'now' cannot be
semantic; it cannot be the case, that is, that 'here' and 'now' are consirained, by dint
of their linguistic meaning, to receive as their interpretations places and times
respectively.
Before we return to the case of'!', let me summarise the conclusions we have
reached so far. The encoded meaning of indexicals can be analysed along two
dimensions on the one hand they encode their status as individual concept
communicators, on the other they encode a more or less specific property. What are
these properties?! have identified them as follows: 'he' encodes the property of being
male, 'she' the property of being lëmale, 'here' the property of being a proximal place
and 'now' the property of being a proximal time. On the analysis I wish to defend,
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these properties play a purely pragmatic role in interpretation: they do not constrain
reference other then in tandem with our pragmatic machinery.
On this picture, as should by now be clear, the Kaplanian distinction between
pure indexicals and demonstratives becomes somewhat blurred: all the indexicals so
far discussed encode an element of descriptive meaning, although none encode
uniquely identi1'ing descriptions. Such a blurring seems desirable independently of
the arguments I have given: in particular, as has been widely appreciated, the meaning
of most supposedly-pure indexicals underdetermines reference in any context even on
token-reflexive uses. Thus, on a standard direct-reference view, 'here' and 'now' are
seen as constraining reference to the place of utterance and the time of utterance, but
are silent as to the extent of this place or time. If Bert says:
50)1 live here.
while standing by Oscar's garbage can on Sesame Street, he can have different
intentions concerning the interpretation of his utterance of 'here': he may, for
instance, intend 'here' to be interpreted as referring narrowly to this particular spot
next to Oscar's garbage can, in which case what he has said will be false, or he may
intend 'here' to refer broadly to Sesame Street, in which case what he has said will be
true. Equally, discussing his favourite baseball team, Bert may say-i
51)The Giants are now playing at Pacific Bell Park.
Again he may have diflrent intentions concerning the interpretation of his utterance
of 'now'; he may, for instance, intend it to refer broadly to the 2002 season, or
narrowly to the very moment of his utterance.
What status does the Kaplanian distinction between pure and non-pure
indexicals have on my analysis? The answer seems to be that I becomes a distinction
of use rather than of meaning. Recall that, for Perry (1997a, 199Th etc) the key to
indexicality is token-reflexivity: while there may be many expressions which are
broadly speaking context-sensitive, what is special about indexicals is that they are
sensitive to certain features of their own utterance. Now on the above analysis, as we
have seen, token-reflexivity is a matter not of encoded linguistic meaning, but of use:
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pure indexicals and certain complex demonstratives are both open to token-reflexive
use and are also both open to non-token-reflexive use. In chapter 2 1 discussed the
distinction between two different types of de re individual concept, types that
Recanati (1993) labels encyclopedic and egocentric concepts. I have as yet not asked
which of these types of concept the indexicals discussed correspond to. I shall
therefore now suggest an answec these expressions do not correspond to one or other
of these types of concept as a matter of meaning. What we have seen in (42) to (45) is
that they may be used to express either encyclopedic or egoceniric concepts. What I
am clahxing, therefore, is that token-reflexive uses of these indexicals correspond to
egocentric concepts, while non-token-reflexive uses correspond to encyclopedic
concepts. This in fact seems to me to be at the heart of the notion of token-reflexivity.
Consider a speaker whose informative intention contains a mental representation a
constituent of which is an egocentric concept of the place where she is, what Recanati
calls her hic concept. In order to communicate this constituent of her mental
representation she utters 'here'. As part of his interpretive task, her hearer must infer,
on the basis ofpragmatics and context, whether the speaker's concept is egocentric or
encyclopedic. Let's assume that he infers it to be egocentric; he must then establish
which place it is a concept of How will be undertake this task? He will do so via the
following inferential route: the speaker intends to communicate a propositional
representation containing her hic concept; one's hic concept is an egocentric concept
of the place where one is; the speaker's hic concept must therefore be an egocentric
concept of the place where the speaker is; she must be talking about the place where
she Is'5. We can see here that what Kaplan identifies as the character of 'here' can in
fact be derived as an element of interpretive strategy via an inferential chain starting
from the premise that the speaker wishes to communicate an egocentric concept. It
thus seems that, whereas non-token-reflexive uses are out of reach for the
KaplaiilPeny picture (they must be somehow hived off from token-reflexive uses) the
account I have proposed not only can handle such uses, but can show why the token-
reflexive uses on which Kaplan and Perry focus receive, on their accounts, the
analyses they do.
Finally we come on to 'I'. What meaning does '1' encode and what status does
this meaning have? Recall that, in examples (31) to (37), repeated here as (52) to (58):
I n hcrç should be clew, abstracting away from thc pragntic ststus of 'hcre"s pla ksturc.
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52)1 am in last place.
53)!'m in Chicago.
54)I'm out of gas.
55)I'm out of ammunition.
56)1 am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
57)The founders invested me with sole responsibility for appointing Supreme
Court justices.
58)You should be more carefuL I might have been a communist
we saw that there are cases in which 'I' and 'me' appear to receive an liteipretation
other than the speaker. In the discussion above I pointed out, however, that, even if
we take these examples at face value, the interpretations in (52) to (58) may pass
through the Kaplanian referent, i.e. to pass through the actual speaker. As far as I can
see, there are no entirely impure uses of'!', i.e. uses which equate to, for instance, the
use of 'now' in (40) and the use of 'here' in (41). On many accounts (Peacocke 1983,
Wettstein 1984 etc), the meaning of'!' is taken to be exhausted by its use as a tool for
self-reference; all one can say about the meaning of'!', in other words, is that it is an
expression used by speakers to refer to themselves.! think there is much that is right
in this sort of account: whereas it seems plausible, given the evidence adduced above,
that indexicals such as 'he' and 'here' encode properties as part of their linguistic
meanings, there seems to be good reason to suppose that'!' encodes no such property.
Consider mental tokenings of indexicals, for instance: if! think to myself 'abe is vety
tall' it seems plausible that I am thinking of whichever individual my thougk is about
as female (although I may of course be mistaken); it seems far less plausible,
however, that when I think to myself '1 would like another cup of coe' I am
thinking of myself as the agent of my own thought This mental tokening of '1' is
surely just a direct way of thinking about mysell it directly equates, in other words, to
my Ego concept Given this picture we can derive a Kaplanian semantics for 'I' just
as we did for 'here' above: a speaker who uses'!' is thereby indicating that the mental
representation which constitutes the content of her informative intention contains her
Ego concept; one's Ego concept is a concept of oneself therefore the speaker's Ego
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concept is a concept of the speaker, thus in order to understand the speaker's
utterance, the hearer must entertain a concept of the speaker.
This analysis sets '1' apart from the indexicals discussed above, in that '1' is
taken to be marked as token-reflexive by dint of its linguistic meaning. Given this we
are justified, if we so wish, in identi1mg the linguistic meaning of'!' with something
like its Kaplanian character, since the inferential chain leading from 'I' to speaker of
this utterance will apply on all uses of'r, although we should bear in mind, I believe,
that this meaning is derived from more basic facts about the use of'!'. If we do forge
such an identification, however, what status should we accord the descriptive content
thus attributed to 'I'? Should we, in other words, take it that 'i' is semantically
constrained to refer to its actual speaker or to something which stands in a particular
relation to that speaker, or should we rather take the view that the property of being
the tokener plays the same role in the interpretation of a tokening of 'I' as do the
properties encoded by other indexicals? I believe we should take the latter view: that
this derived property of being the tokener plays an essentially pragmatic role in
interpretation. I shall, however, delay further discussion of this point until we come to
examine the data from answering machine messages and post-it notes later in this
chapter.
I have now laid out the bare bones of the account of indexicals which I wish to
defend: indexicals arc marked as individual-concept communicators by their linguistic
meaning. Beyond this they encode properties, although these properties play only a
pragmatic role in interpretation. Most indexicals are not semantically marked as
token-reflexive, although 'I' is an exception. it is now time to see how this account
canbeputtouse intacklingthedata laidout insection4. 1.
4.2.2 Indexicals, individual concepts and the core data
Recall from section 4.1 that! laid out four types of data which I intend to use as a
litmus test for the account of indexicals which I have proposed: data concerning co-
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reference, emptiness, rigidity and what we might broadly call deferred uses' 6. I shall
address these types of data in turn.
4.2.2.1 Indexicals, individual concepts and co-reference
As I showed in 4.1, the semantic puzzles surrounding co-referential indexicals are of a
slightly different sort from those surrounding co-referential proper names. Whereas
the classic formulation of Frege's puzzle using proper names requires two distinct
names, similar puzzles can arise with two distinct co-referential uses of one and the
same indexical expression. Thus, when Bert utters (6), repeated here as (59):
59) But that is that.
pointing once directly at his garden ornament and once at the reflection of the
ornament in his French windows, he has said something that is informative to Ernie.
The puzzle we need to address is how this can be so, given that all the meaning
properties of his two utterances of 'that' appear to be the same: they must,
presumably, have the same linguistic meaning, since they are tokens of the same
expression, and, ex hypothesi, they share the same referent.
What conclusions should we draw from the sort of puzzle raised by (59)? The
most obvious conclusion seems to be that, contrary to appearances, the two tokens of
'that' in (59) do not in fact share all their meaning properties. But how can this be so,
given that we have same expression-same reference? According to one response, that
broadly advocated by, for instance, Kaplan (1989a) and Braun (1996), we are missing
a very obvious fact about the two tokenings of 'that' in (59). Look at the example a bit
more carefully and you see that the two 'that's differ in one key respect: they are
associated with distinct demonstrations. If we take this feature away, then the puzzle
vanishes: if Bert keeps pointing in just the same direction during both his utterances
of 'that', then his utterance will be uninfurmative, and necessarily so, according to the
Kaplan/Braun position.
16 Thi is perhaps wt as entirely felicitous use of terminology, since I do not intend to talk about just
those uses which Nasbezg (e.g. 1993) labels 'deferred'. As long as this is borne in mind, however, I do
not think this taminology should cause too rmny difficulties.
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How might this sort of story be spelled out? For Braun (1996) (as for many
others) the cognitive significance of an utterance of an indexical depends not on that
indexical's content in the context of utterance, but on its character. Thus the cognitive
significance of an utterance of 'here', for instance, derives not from the place it refers
to, but from thinking of that place under the character encoded by 'here', i.e. thinking
of it as the location of this utterance of 'here'. Character, as we have already
discussed, is that dimension of meaning which determines content in context. While
'I' and 'here' seem to encode such a meaning dhnension", 'that' and 'this' do not.
For Kaplan (1 989b), as I mentioned at the end of the previous chapter, the proper
object of semantic evaluation is not an utterance but a sentence in context. To say that
pure denionstratives seem not to encode a (complete) character is just to say that
placing them in a Kaplanian context without any more ado fails to deliver a content. It
seems, however, that utterances of pure demonstratives do, in fact, receive referents;
Bert's first utterance of 'that' in (59), for instance, receives his garden ornament as its
referent (as does his second 'that'). Since it is character that determines content,
Braun takes this to indicate that, while a demonstrative by itself lacks a complete
character, a demonstrative in a context does not. Where, then, does this complete
character come from? it is here that demonstrations enter Braun's picture: on his
analysis, it is the demonstration which accompanies the utterance of a demonstrative
which supplies that demonstrative with a complete character. Thus, for Braun, the
meaning properties of(an utterance of) a demonstrative expression must be analysed
along three dimensions: linguistic meaning, i.e. that dimension which remains
constant across contexts; character, which is determined by an associated
demonstration, and content, which is determined in context by the combination of the
demonstrative expression and its associated demonstration.
Any account along these lines is, however, going to thee two major
difficulties: firstly, there are uses of demonstrative expressions which, although
intuitively not associated with any demonstration, nevertheless succeed in securing a
referent; and secondly such an account depends on the claim that, where an utterance
of a demonstrative is associated with a demonstration, it is that demonstration which
'7 Although lam of course defonding a position on whidi this is a sc.i.c. on which the aicoded
meaning of no mdexical eqression determines contont in context.
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determines its reference, a claim which, once we examine it in any detail, begins to
look less than robust. I shall address these problems in order.
Consider two contexts in which Bert might utter the following sentence:
60) That is my favourite painting.
In the first context, Bert and Ernie are standing hi a room which is entirely empty
except for the Mona Lisa hanging on one wall. In the second context they are in a
room lull of paintings, one of which is the Mona Lisa, and Bert utters (60) while
pointing at the Mona Lisa. In both contexts it seems that Bert's tokening of 'that'
refers to the Mona Lisa. But why does Bert use a demonstration in the second context
and not in the first? On an intuitive level the answer would seem to be that, while the
first context is such that Bert's utterance of 'that' secures a reference without extra
help, this is not the case in the second context: in this context, since there is more than
one potential candidate for 'that' to refer to, Bert has to provide Ernie with extra
clues. Thus, in the first context it seems that an utterance of 'that' has secured a
reference without the aid of any associated demonstration. What might Braun say
about such a use? Given that, in line with Kaplan, he has identified the character of an
expression with that which determines reference, and that he would presumably
accept that the utterance of 'that' in context one does secure a referent, he can say two
things: either he can say that 'that', as uttered in context one, has a character without
having an associated demonstration, or he can say that, contrary to pre-theoretic
intuition, there is an associated demonstration in context two. If he adopts the former
strategy, he is accepting that such uses of 'that' are beyond the scope of his theory.
This seems a highly undesirable result firstly, a recourse to intuition shows up no
significant semantic difference between the utterances of (60) hi the two imagined
contexts, but perhaps more significantly, if he has no story to tell about the
interpretation of (60) in context one, he has no way of showing that the particular
route via which (60) is interpreted in context two is not smiply an instantiation of a
more general schema fbr the interpretation of demonstratives. If this is so, then
Braun's analis is missing a significant generalisation. Either way, we should prefer
an analysis of the semantics and pragmatics of demonstratives which can account for
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the interpretations of(60) in both contexts to one that accounts for one at the expense
of the other. Braun would be well advised, therefore, not to adopt this first strategy.
What of the second strategy, to claim that the reference of 'that' is secured, in
the first context, by an associated demonstration? This seems closer to Braun's
intention: in his tenninology, 'demonstration' is defined as 'the "extra" something
beyond utterance that a demonstrative needs in order to secure a reference' (Braun
1996, P. 146). Braun fails, however, to tell us what this extra something is. Wettstein
(1984) offers a suggestion: what determines reference is a set of contextual cues,
those cues which the speaker relies on to convey his intended reference. I believe that
Wettstein's account contains much that is right and indeed shares much with the
analysis I shall outline below he accepts that we must adopt a very broad notion of
context if we are to account for the reference of demonstratives, and that the cues on
which reference may depend are not limited by type. There is, however, a key
problem with this account, a problem that goes to the heart of demonstrative
reference: contextual cues, if we take them to be objective physical features of the
context of utterance, will not, by themselves, do the job we want of them. It is
possible for just the same utterance in just the same context, physically defined, to
express different propositions. Let's imagine a third physical context in which Bert
might utter (60): this time there are two paintings on the wall, one by Monet and one
by Dali, and Bert utters (60) without any accompanying demonstration. Now let's
place this utterance within two diflrent backgrounds: in the first, it is mutually highly
manifest to Bert and Ernie, given the knowledge about each other which they bring to
the discourse context, that Bert hates impressionism; hi the second it is mutually
highly manifest that Bert hates surrealism. It seems intuitively clear that, set against
the first background, Bert's utterance will be true if the Dali is his favourite painting,
whereas set against the second it will be true if the Monet is his favourite painting.
Thus the utterance may express two different propositions despite the fact that there
are, ex hypothesi, no objective physical differences between the two contexts of
utterance. How might Wettstein respond to this objection? So long as he accepts that
different propositions are expressed in the example above, there seems only one way
for him to go: he must accept that the cues which determine reference may include
mental facts about speaker and hearer which are not objectively observable in the
context. This sort of account is thus not amenable to incorporation into a theory such
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as Braun's: for Braun, whatever a demonstration is, it must be an independently
identifiable feature of context which, along with the demonstrative expression itself;
determines a sense. Were Braun to identif3, his demonstrations with Wettstein's
contextual cues, then a demonstration would simply be whatever detennines
reference; in which case Braun's theory will be reduced to the claim that whatever
determines the reference of a demonstrative determines its reference.
What of the second difficulty tiding a Braun-type account? If; as I have
argued above, we cannot define the notion of demonstration so broadly that it takes in
whatever determines demonsirative reference in context on pain of rendering our
analysis in terms of demonstrations vacuous, then we need to have some independent
criterion via which to identi1' what counts as a demonstration. On the view adopted
by many (see, for instance, Berckmans (1990), Reimer (1991, 1992), Bach (1992)
etc.), demonstrations are seen as intentional ostensive acts. If we take this view of
demonstrations, then it seems we can hope to give some substance to claims such as
Braun's: on this view, Braun's claim would be that what gives uses of demonstrative
expressions complete character, ie. what enables them to secure a referent, is an
associated ostensive act'5. Such a development of Braun's theory would, of course,
fill foul of the objection above: uses such as the first utterance of (60) would be
beyond its grasp. But there is another problem: this version of a Braun-type view
depends on the claim that, where utterances of demonstrative expressions are
associated with demonstrations, it is those demonstrations that are criterial to
determining reference. This view has met with resistance from a number of different
quarters: for Kaplan (1989b) and Bach (1992), it is speaker intention rather than
demonstration that determines demonstrative reference; for McCiinn (1981) it is
spatio-temporal location. As Reimer (1991, 1992) shows, however, there are some
apparently robust intuitions underlying the claim that demonstrations are semantically
criterial. Consider a well known example used (in a slightly different form) by Kaplan
(1978): the speaker, sitting at a desk, believes that on the wall behind him there is a
picture of Rudolf Carnap; he wishes to say of this picture that it is a picture of one of
the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century; thus, without turning round, he
points to the place he believes Carnap's picture to be and says:
In light of the discussion thot it should be de that I n not mtaidlng to attribute this view to
Rraun my aim is to explore bow Braun might mcapc the vacuity to which his acrnt is oondcznned
by his failure to provide an independent aiterion of identification for demonstrations.
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61)That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth centwy.
Unbeknownst to him, however, the picture of Carnap has been replaced with one of
Spiro Agnew. There seems a clear intuition that, contrary to his intentions, the speaker
in this case has said something faLse of the picture of Agnew, rather than something
true of the picture of Carnap. Given this, it seems that the speaker's ostensive act has
trumped his referential intention: he intended to refer to the picture of Camap, his
ostensive act picked out the picture of Agnew, the picture of Agnew is secured as the
referent of 'that"9. Renner (1992) offers a similar example: the speaker has left her
keys on her desk; next to the speaker's keys are her colleague's keys; the speaker goes
to grab her own keys, while uttering:
62)These are mine.
Unfortunately, however, she misses her own keys and grabs her colleague's keys
instead. Once more it seems that, despite her intention to refer to her own keys, and
say truly of them that they are hers, she has in fact referred to her colleague's keys
and said falsely of them that they are hers. Again, demonstration seems top
intention.
What reason might there be to question this analysis? As Reimer herself
concedes (Reimer 1992), intentions do play at least some role in determining
reference. If! point vaguely in the direction of a terrace of houses, for instance, and
say:
63)That is my house.
it seems plausible to hold that I have succeeded in saying something about the house I
intended to refer to. Yet, given the vagueness of my demonstration, it cannot be this
that is entirely responsible for securing reference; rather, it seems, it is my intention to
refer to one of the things within the range of my demonstration that secures this as the
'9 McGinn's aunt is still in the nmning l The gumaits that I shall go on to outline, howcva,
should aççty to this acunt just to the aitaial-deinonstration aount.
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referent of my use of 'that'. Indeed, as Kaplan (1978) points out, all demonstrations
are to a lesser of greater degree vague: while pointing at the object I intend to refer to,
I am inevitably pointing at a range of other things as well. Thus when I point at my
house while uttering (63), I also point at, say, the front of my house, some of the
bricks in the front of my house etc. Yet it is my intention to say something about my
house, not about some of the bricks which go to make up its facade; and it seems that
this intention wins out sure enough, it is the house itself rather than some of its
bricks to which my use of 'that' refers. This kind of observation offers us a prima
fhcie reason to question the kind of analysis Reimer favours, on which demonstrations
are criterial to demonstrative reference: we have shown that speaker intention plays at
least some role in determining reference; on Reimer's picture, therefore, reference is
determined partly by demonstration and partly by intention; given this, an account on
which the whole job is done by speaker intention should be preferred to Reimer's on
grounds of parsimony. It; moreover, such an account could encompass those uses of
demonstratives which secure reference without the aid of an accompanying
demonstration, uses which, as I have already mentioned, seem beyond the grasp of
Reimer's account, then this should be taken as further reason to prefer such an
account over Reimer's.
Let's take a step back and see where all this leaves us. Presented with the data
on co-reference and cognitive significance, there seems reason to believe that the
meaning properties of uses of indexicals are not exhausted by the combination of their
linguistic meaning and their referents. In response to this, theorists such as Braun
have defended a position on which the extra meaning properties that indexicals
receive in context derive from associated demonstrations. We have seen, however,
that such an analysis fhces two problems, or maybe one problem which presents itself
in two guises: on the one hand, if we draw our criteria for demonstration-hood
sufficiently widely then we can hope to account for all uses of demonstratives, but
only at the cost of rendering our account vacuous, since it will end up explaining
reference in terms of reference; on the other hand, if we set our criteria for
demonstration-hood sufficiently narrowly to render our claims substantive, then we
put a large class of uses of demonstratives beyond our reach.
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How might we find our way out of this dilemma? I believe the account of the
semantics of indexicals in terms of individual concepts laid out above offers just such
a way out. Consider once more Bert's utterance in (6), repeated here as (64):
64)But that is that.
How is it, on an individual-concept analysis, that, despite Bert's two utterances of
'that' sharing both linguistic meaning and referent, his utterance is nonetheless
informative to Ernie? The key to the answer I wish to give is that it is informative for
this simple reason: any two utterances of 'that' may potentially correspond to distinct
individual concepts, albeit that these distinct concepts may be concepts of the same
entity. How might Ernie's interpretation of(64) proceed? As a part of his interpretive
process, he must interpret Bert's first utterance of 'that'. Given the encoded meaning
of 'that' he will know that to interpret this token he must access an individual concept.
This will essentially be all the linguistic meaning of 'that' tells him; 'that' can, after
all, be used, given an appropriate context, to talk about anything of which we can
have an individual concept. Ernie's next task, then, is to work out which individual
concept corresponds to Bert's first utterance of 'that'. He has a certain amount of
information to go on: in particular he knows that Bert is performing an intentional
ostensive act. Given this ostensive act (and I shall have more to say about what role
demonstrations play in interpretation below), the most accessible candidate-concept
should be a concept of Bert's garden ornament. Not just any concept of the garden
ornament will do however. Given the previous discourse, Bert knows something
about Ernie's conceptual repertoire: he knows that Ernie has one concept of the
garden ornament presented in one way and a distinct concept of the garden ornament
presented in another way. His ostensive act thus has the following effect it
manipulates the accessibility hierarchy of Ernie's concepts in such a way that one of
these two concepts becomes the most accessible candidate for the interpretation of the
first 'that'. Much the same can be said about Ernie's interpretation of the second
'that': he must, again, search for an individual concept, and, giveii Bert's ostensive
gesture on this occasion, the most accessible concept should be his other concept of
the garden ornament, i.e. the concept which contains information like x Lv inside
Bert's house, x Lv Iovey etc. He will thus build a mental representation which contains
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both of these concepts, flanking whatever the conceptual counterpart of the identity
predicate may be. Given that, in the context, the two individual concepts which appear
in this representation will be de ,, Ernie's interpretation of Bert's utterance will be
necessarily true. Since, however, on the conceptual picture I painted in chapter 2, the
internal and external dimensions of de , concepts are independent in that neither
determines the other, this does not have any effect on the cognitive significance of the
utterance. From the mental representation which he has built as an interpretation of
Bert's utterance, Ernie will be able to glean all sorts of new information: he will, for
instance, be able to establish that the garden statue he dislikes is the ornament he
like; that the ornament which appears to be inside is the statue which appears to be
outside and so on. Thus, as soon as we appreciate that grasping a proposition
containing an indexical expression (or any other singular expression) involves
accessing an individual concept which corresponds, on the occasion of use, to that
expression, the puzzles raised by co-reference 1111 away.
What role, on this picture, do demonstrations play in interpretation? Recall
that, for Kaplan (1989a) and forReimer (1991, 1992) demonstrationsare semantically
significant in that they directly constrain reference. I suggested above, however, that
we have good reasons for looking for an alternative account: any account on which
we define demonstrations narrowly enough to render our claims substantive will be
unable to account for a wide range of uses of indexicals, those uses on which an
indexical secures reference without the aid of an accompanying demonstration. The
approach of those, such as Braun, who wish to see demonstrations as bridging the gap
between the linguistic meaning of demonstratives and whatever they refer to on an
occasion of use, has been, as we have seen, to assimilate those uses on which
reference is secured without a demonstration to those on which it appears to be
secured via a demonstration. Given the difficulties facing such an account, however, I
suggest that we should adopt precisely the opposite strategy: we should assimilate
those uses with demonstrations to those uses without. What migtd such a strategy
mountto? Let us return to the example in (60), repeated here as (65):
65) That is my favourite painting.
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Recall that we considered two contexts in which (65) might be uttered, one in which it
secured reference without a demonstration and one in which it required a
demonstration to secure reference. How is reference secured in the first context?
Intuitively there is a straightforward answer: the Mona Lisa is secured as the referent
of 'that' because it is the only potential candidate in the context of utterance. Things
are of course not quite as simple as this. In any real world context, there will be a
multitude of candidate referents: Bert might, for instance, use 'that' to refer to the
wall upon which the Mona Lisa is hangin the frame in which the painting is
mounted, or the top right hand corner of the painting itself. So what is really going on
in this case? Looking at it from a relevance-theoretic perspective, we might say
something along these lines: the combination of the context of utterance and the
utterance itself are such, in this case, that one candidate referent for 'that' is
significantly more salient than any other: Ernie is after all in a room with one and only
one painting in it, trying to interpret an utterance in which Bert has indicated that the
referent of his use of 'that' is a painting. In this case, therefore, Bert can rely on the
context of utterance, as it is, plus the utterance itself; to get Ernie to his intended
referent. This is not so, however, in the second case: here the context, as it is
presented prior to Bert's utterance, is not such that Ernie can work out which object
Bert is talking about What can Bert do about this? He can manipulate the context so
that it does lead Ernie to the intended referent, i.e. so that an interpretation on which
the utterance of 'that' refers to the Mona Lisa will be optimally relevant to Ernie.
What effect must the appropriate manipulation have? It must rearrange the saliency of
the objects in the context of utterance so that the most accessible interpretation of
Bert's utterance of 'that' which satisfies Ernie's expectations of relevance is the
intended interpretation. it is only under these circumstances that Bert's utterance will
be optimally relevant to Ernie on the intended interpretation. It is to effect this
contextual manipulation that Bert produces a demonstration. As an intentional act, a
demonstration has just this effect it raises the saliency of one particular object in the
context of utterance, thus making a concept of this object highly accessible to the
hearer.
it is worth noting that this sort of manipulation of relative contextual saliency
can be put to a number of different uses. it is not, for instance, the case that a speaker
will always make a particular object more salient in order to talk about that object
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itself in some circumstances, raising the saliency of one object will so rearrange the
context that, along with the utterance itself; another object becomes the optimally
relevant interpretation of an indexical (or any other singular expression). Bert and
Ernie are again in a room surrounded by paintings, one of which is the Mona Lisa,
but, instead of uttering (65), Bert points towards the Mona Lisa and says:
66)He is my favourite painter.
Bert, it would seem, has succeeded in saying something which is true if Leonardo is
Bert's favourite painter. He has done so not by demonstrating the object he wishes to
talk about, i.e. not by demonstrating Leonardo himself, but by demonstrating
something which is sufficiently closely associated with Leonardo that it raises the
salience of Leonardo in the context of utterance. Along with the gender and animacy
features of 'he', discussed above, and the particular predication of (66), this
demonstration of the Mona Lisa should have the effect of making a concept of
Leonardo the optimally relevant interpretation of Bert's utterance of'he'.
On my analysis, then, demonstrations serve to manipulate context: they make
particular features of the context more salient and thus particular individual concepts
more accessible. This story has much in common with that proposed by Bach (1992):
The fact that a certain dog is being demonstrated is no different in kind
from the fact that a certain dog is barking raucously, is much larger
than the others, or was just mentioned.
Bach (1992, p. 144)
As I have already mentioned, however, there are examples which seem to suggest that
demonstrations play a greater role than this: that they determine reference. Recall
examples (61) and (62), repeated here as (67) and (68):
67)That is a picture of one of the greatest philosophers of the twentieth century.
68) These are mine.
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We will have to rethink the claim that demonstrations determine reference in light of
examples such as (66), which show that what is demonstrated is not always what is
referred to. Examples such as (67) and (68) may still, however, be taken to show that
demonstrations are semantically significant in that they either determine reference or
they determine an object via which reference is secured, an index in the terms used by
Nunberg (1993). Bach, however, as the above passage indicates, wants to claim that
demonstrations do not even have this degree of significance; for him, as for others
including Kaplan (1989b), what is criterial in determining demonstrative reference is
not an associated demonstration but the speaker's intention to refer. But how, in that
case, can he account for cases such as (67) and (68) in which it seems that the speaker
intends to refer to one thing but actually refers to another? His answer is that when we
take the view that the speaker of for instance, (67) refers to an object other that which
she intends to refer to, we are looking at the wrong speaker intention. It Is certainly
the case that she has an intention to refer to the picture of Carnap, an intention which
goes unfulfilled, but this is not the semantically significant intention. Her semantically
significant intention, what Bach calls the 'specifically referential' intention, is to refer
to the picture on the wall behind her, and in this she succeeds. I believe that Bach's
account is on very much the right lines. I think however he is wrong to identi1' the
key intention as specffically referentiaL Given that, as illustrated by examples such as
(66), demonstrations can be used as part of the fulfillment of an intention to refer to
something other than the demonstratum, I think we would do better to think of the
intention which Bach focuses on as a demonstrative intention.
Consider how we might analyse Reimer's central examples, (67) and (68), on
the kind of picture I have drawn. The speaker of (68), for instance, produces her
utterance with the intention that her hearer should come to entertain a mental
representation which is true if her keys are hers. Prior to her utterance, however, she
is presented with a context in which an utterance of(68) will not be optimally relevant
on the intended interpretation, since there are two potential candidates for 'these' to
refer to. She thus needs to do something to manipulate the contextual salience
hierarchy. With this in mind, she forms the demonstrative intention to produce an
ostensive gesture which will make one of the potential candidates more salient than
the other, and thus make a concept of this candidate more accessible for her hearer.
She does this because, as discussed in chapter 2, she has an intention not just
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concerning which propositional representation her hearer ends up entertaining but also
concerning which route he should follow in order to reach this propositional
representation; she has, that is, both infonnative and derivational intentions. In this
case, therefore, she has the intention that her hearer should recognise her ostensive
gesture as ostensive, that, on the strength of that recognition, he should access a
concept of the keys which her ostensive act is aimed at, and that he should try this
concept out for relevance as an interpretation of her utterance of 'these'. What has
happened in this case, however, as in the other cases Reimer focuses on, is that the
path via which the speaker intends her hearer's Interpretation to proceed does not lead
to the interpretation she intends him to access. That is to say that in this example she
has so manipulated the context of utterance that the optimally relevant interpretation
of her utterance will not be the intended interpretation. On this analysis the speaker
need have no intention, as she must on Bach's account, to say something which is true
1ff the keys in her hand are hers; the ostensive gesture of grabbing the keys is simply a
strategy for making her own keys more salient, a strategy that, as it turns out, misfires.
Let me briefly summarise, then, the solution to the puzzles posed by co-
referring uses of indexical expression suggested by the account I have proposed.
Given that indexicals are individual concept communicators, any use of an indexical
will correspond to an individual concept. Since there is no reason to suppose that,
merely because two utterances of the same indexical expression pick out the same
object, they must therefore correspond to the same individual concept (we are, after
all, entirely capable, as all the puzzles concerning co-reference attest, of failing to
realise the identity between something presented to us in one way and the same thing
presented to us in another way) there is thus no reason to suppose that two co-
referring utterances of the same indexical expression need have the same cognitive
significance. Given this, we need posit no extra level of meaning which is constant as
between speaker and hearer: it is the fact of there being discrete concepts, rather than
any particular feature of their content, which lies at the heart of this puzzle.
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4.2.2.2 Indexicals, individual concepts and emptiness
Having said a great deal about co-referring uses of indexicals, there will not be a great
deal to say about empty uses of indexicals. Recall that we're thinking of examples
such as(14) and (15), repeated here as(69) and (70):
69)That is horrible.
70)That doesn't exist.
uttered by Bert to talk about the slavering monster that appears to be charging towards
hhn and Ernie as part of the virtual reality game they are playing. I propose to say
very little more about such examples than that I believe the analysis of empty uses of
proper names outlined in the previous chapter can naturally be extended to account
for empty uses of indexicals. This is to say the following: utterances such as (69) are
meaningful, in the sense that they are every bit as cognitively significant as utterances
containing denoting indexicals, for the reason that, as the above discussion should
have made clear, the cognitive significance of indexicals is a function of the internal
dimensions of individual concepts. Given this, and given our cognitive ability to
gather together information into individual concepts in the absence of any actual
individuals for those concepts to pick out, the meaningflulness of (69) will be
unaffected by the fuilure of it's token of 'that' to refer. The proposed analysis in terms
of individual concepts thus offers a straightforward account of how utterances
containing uses of empty indexicals can be cognitively significant.
It seems, however, that (70) (and maybe (69)) is not only cognitively
significant, but is also true. In the last chapter 1 proposed an analysis of empty uses of
proper names in terms of intentions to talk about entities in and makes statements
about information sources other than the actual world. Again I believe this analysis
carries over to empty uses of indexicals. Thus, if we are inclined to say that (69) is an
some sense true, that will be, on my account, because (69) is taken to be a statement
not about how things are in the actual world, but rather about how things arc in the
non-actual world of the virtual reality game, and the game constitutes an information
sourcewhich verifies (69). (70)wlllbetrue,byconlrast, notbecause ftistakentobea
statement about a non-actual world, but because it is, in essence, a trans-world
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statement (70) will be true 1ff the slavermg monster of the virtual reality game has no
existence in the actual world; ifl m other words, the x-is-a-monster concept deriving
from the game information source picks out nothing in the actual world.
Such an analysis can also be applied to examples (16) and (17), repeated here
as (71) and (72), in which we find empty uses of Kaplanian pure indexkals:
71)You are insane.
72)! am your Labour candidate for the forthcoming local elections.
Recall that (71) is detective Bert's response to finding the body of Smith, who he
wrongly believes to have been the victim of a brutal murder, and (72) is the legend
found beneath the mock-up photograph of a non-existent candidate. Again it seems
that the cognitive significance of these utterances is unaffected by the emptiness of
their indexicals. And again this is down to the relation between the cognitive
significance of an utterance of an indexical and the internal dimension of the
individual concept which constitutes its interpretation on that utterance. Thus we can
see that, for both demonsiratives and pure indexicals, cognitive significance,
determined as it is by internal rather than external aspects of individual concepts, is
unaffected by emptiness.
4.2.2.3 Indexicals, individual concepts and rigidity
In section 4.131 showed that indexicals appear to pattern with proper names in terms
of rigidity. That is to say, there is a robust intuition that an utterance with an indexical
in subject position will be true in any counterfactual circumstance depending on how
things are in that circumstance with the actual referent of the indexicaL In that section
we considered examples (20) to (22), repeated here as (73) to (75):
73)! performed with Ella Filzgerald (as uttered by Louis Armstrong).
74)You performed with Ella Fitzgerald (uttered while addressing Louis
Armstrong).
75)He performed with Ella Fitzgerald (uttered while pohüig at Louis
Armstrong).
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What we found was that, from an intuitive standpoint, it seems as leach of(73) to
(75) will be true against a circumstance of evaluation 1ff Louis Armstrong performed
with Ella Fitzgerald in that circumstance. Now it seems on the face of it as if the
account of indexicals I have outlined above may be unable to accommodate this
intuition. On my account, after all, indexicals may be used referentially, i.e. they may
be used to express de , individual concepts, but they are not marked so to do by their
linguistic meaning: they may also be used to express descriptive concepts. In order to
defend my position against this apparent objection I want to show two things: firstly,!
want to show that indexicals genuinely are capable of giving rise to descriptive
interpretations and secondly I want to show that, even if I am right, there are good
reasons why our intuitions concerning the rigidity of indexicals are so robust.
What evidence is there, then, that indexicals can give rise to descriptive
interpretations? Nunberg (1993) discusses a wide range of uses in which this appears
to be the case, uses which involve what he calls deferral. I have akeady introduced
some of Nunberg's examples, examples such as (35) to (37), repeated here as (76) to
(78):
76)1 am traditionally allowed to order whatever I like for my last meal.
77)The founders invested me with sole responsibility for appointing Supreme
Court justices.
78)You should be more careful I might have been a communist.
As discussed above, however, I am not sure we should read too much into these
examples: there seem to me to be analyses for each on which they may be viewed as
referring to the speaker. Nunberg does, however, offer some other examples which
seem more promising. Consider (79), which appeared in the University of Arizona
newspaper the Friday before classes began:
79)Tomorrow is always the biggest paity night of the year.
It seems that 'tomorrow' in (79) is not interpreted as referring to the day after the
tokening of(79), as it should on a Kaplanian semantics, but is rather interpreted as
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equivalent to 'the Saturday before classes begin'. There are two things to be said
about this example however: firstly, I am not sure that one couldn't run an analysis on
which tomorrow is taken to be acting as a bound variable, in which case the
interpretation will not be descriptive as Nunberg claims; but secondly, even if we
accept that Nunberg is right and that the interpretation of 'tomorrow' genuinely is
descriptive, this does not necessarily undermine the claim that indexicals are
semantically rigid designators. We have come across examples such as this before, on
which interpretation passes via an indexical's Kaplanian referent to something which
is appropriately related to that referent. Recanati (1993) runs a defence of the direct
reference picture against such uses along the following lines: what Nunberg's
examples, such as (79) show is that the propositions expressed by indexical sentences
are not always singular. They do not, however, threaten the claim which is at the heart
of direct reference, that there is a fundamental semantic difference between
descriptions and directly referential expressions such as indexicals. To maintain this
claim we need to distinguish between two distinct levels of content, the proposition
ultimately expressed, and what Recanati terms the basic level of interpretation. The
direct referentialist's claim then becomes that at the basic level indexicals and other
directly referential expressions are semantically marked to give rise to singular
interpretations. The fuct that they can be interpreted descriptively at the level of
ultimate propositional content presents no problems for this claim. Nunberg attempts
to undermine this argument on the grounds that, were the interpretation of indexical
sentences to have to pass through a fully propositional basic level, that basic level
would end up in many cases being incoherent. Thus the basic level interpretation of
(79) would be true if September 3.d 1987, for instance, were always the biggest party
night of the year. Given that it only comes around once, Nunberg would claim,
September 3 1987 can't always be anything. While this objection may stand up
against the letter of Recanati's analysis, it does not, as far as I can see, have much
impact on the spirit of that analysis. It seems clear that in cases such as (79),
interpretation of 'tomorrow' does proceed via its Kaplanian referent, i.e. via
September 3fh 1987. It is because it is instantiated by this referent that the property of
being the Saturday before classes begin ends up as the interpretation of 'tomorrow' in
(79). So long as Recanati does not require that a global basic level interpretation be
entertained as part of the interpretation process, but rather restricts himself to the
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claim that the local interpretation of 'tomorrow' passes through a basic level,
Nunberg's objection would seem to have no force.
My interest however, is in showing that Recanati's fundamental claim, that
there is a semantic asymmetry between one class of singular expressions which are
marked as descriptive and another class which are marked as referential, is wrong. To
do so, I will need to show that there are cases in which hidexicals can give rise to
descriptive interpretations without passing through any basic level object along the
interpretive path. In the case of demonstratives there seem to be some plausible
candidates. Schiffer (1981) asks us to consider Ralph, who, coming across what looks
like a big footprint in the sand, says:
80) He must be a giant.
Since Ralph has no idea whose footprint it is, his utterance cannot correspond to a de
re individual concept of his own. Intuitively, moreover, Ralph's addressee can filly
grasp the meaning of Ralph's utterance without herself knowing who produced the
footprint. It seems therefore that Ralph's utterance will be true if whoever produced
the footprint must be a giant; it seems, in other words, as if the interpretation of
Ralph's utterance of 'he' will be descriptive. There is also, in this case, no temptation
to believe that the interpretation of 'he' passes through any intermediate referential
stage: there is, after all, no candidate for this role unless one wishes to make the
highly dubious claim that the interpretation of 'he' passes through the footprint.
To see another example of the descriptive use of demonstratives, we can
return to the case which was central to my claims about the descriptive use of proper
names. Bert and Ernie are at Scotland Yard's Black Museum when they come across
a painting of a cloaked figure prowling the streets of London, a painting which is
supposed to be of Jack the Ripper. Bert points at the picture and says:
81)He was a Liverpool businessman.
Here it seems that 'he' will receive much the same interpretation as would 'Jack the
Ripper' in the same context. If this is the case, and given the arguments I deployed to
show that 'Jack the Ripper' can be used descriptively in the last chapter, we should be
165
inclined to accept that 'he' in (81) receives a descriptive interpretation. Assume that
Bert is right, that Jack the Ripper was indeed Liverpool businessman James Maybrick.
On a standard direct-refrrence picture, 'he' should therefore receive (a non-truth
conditional mode of presentation of) Maybrick as its interpretation, albeit via a
rigidifled description that Maybrick satisfies. It should thus be the case that, as
evaluated against any counterflctuaI circumstance, the proposition expressed by (81)
will be true if Maybrick is a Liverpool businessman in that circumstance. But this
does not seem to tally with intuition. Imagine a counterfictual circumstance in which
Maybnck was indeed a Liverpool businessman, but in which he murdered no-one;
now imagine that the same murders which Maybrick committed in the actual
circumstance, or so we are assuming, were committed in this circumstance by London
painter Walter Sickert There is a robust intuition that in this circumstance Sickert is
Jack the Ripper. Furthermore, it seems reasonably clear that, as evaluated against this
circumstance, Bert's utterance in (81) will be false, since in that circumstance Jack the
Ripper is not a Liverpool businessman but a London painter. If this is right, then it
forces us to the conclusion that 'he' in (81) receives a descriptive interpretation; its
interpretation, that is, corresponds to an individual concept the external dimension of
which is descriptive. And again there is surely no temptation to think that
interpretation passes via a particular individual as Recanati would have it: Bert's
demonstration of the picture does not make Maybrick salient, after all, it makes Jack
the Ripper salient; and, although Maybrick is Jack the Ripper in the actual world,
there are countless possible worlds in which he is not
Thus there seems good reason to believe that demonstratives can receive
descriptive interpretations. What of pure indexicals? Given the analysis presented
above, the interesting cases are going to be 'I' and possibly 'you'. Cases on which
these indexicals are used descriptively are inevitably going to be hard to come by. The
semantic properties of 'I' derive, I claimed above, from its use as a tool of self-
reference. To find a descriptive use, it seems, we will thus need to find a case in
which the speaker is thinking of herself descriptively, hardly a common state of
affairs. I claimed above, however, that the property of being the speaker plays only a
pragmatic role in the interpretation of 'I'. We might thus do better, in the hunt for
descriptive uses of 'I', to look for a case in which 'I' does not pick out the actual
agent of the utterance. These cases will be discussed at greater length in the next
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section. I shall, however, present one example here. Back in Victorian London, the
painting of Jack the Ripper which Bert and Ernie are to see in the Black Museum over
a century later has become the best-known image of the Ripper, adorning the cover of
every newspaper. Oscar, who has been following the events in Whitcchapel, has
become convinced that James Maybrick is responsible. He does not, however, want to
get involved. He thus tears the front cover, bearing the picture of the Ripper, from his
daily paper, scrawls the words:
82)! am James Maybrick.
across the picture, and, in the dead of night, attaches it to the gates of Scotland Yard.
What proposition is expressed by Oscar's message? It seems to be a proposition
which is true if Jack the Ripper is James Maybrick. Much the same analysis can be
given, then, for the use of 'I' in (82) as for the use of 'he' in (81): the proposition
expressed by (82) will be true in all cfrcum stances in which Jack is Maybrick and
false in all circumstances in which he is not. And once more, there is no inptation to
claim that interpretation passes through the Kaplanian referent we would presumably
want to say that, coming to work the next morning, the officers of the Yard will
understand the scrawled message, yet they will have no idea who has lelt it there. As
mentioned above, a more detailed analysis of such examples must wait until the next
section. Utterances such as (82) do however, seem to suggest that even the purest of
pure indexicals can receive descriptive interpretations, even at Recanati's basic level
of interpretation. This result is to be expected given the analysis of such expressions
outlined above. What I have suggested is that the encoded meaning of 'i' is token
reflexive in a way that the encoded meanings of (most) other indexicats are not. On
the face of it this analysis is closely related to Kaplan's semantics for 'I' which can be
viewed as claiming that '1' encodes the property of being the speaker of this token. If
Kaplan were right, however, and the linguistic meaning of 'I' did so constrain the
interpretation of'!' that tokens could only pick out their own agents, we should not
expect to find descriptive uses, evea if'!' were not semantically marked referential:
as mentioned above, it is hard to imagine cases in which speakers think of themselves
descriptively and thus on which understanding a token of 'I' would require
entertaining a descriptive individual concept It is because this token-reflexive
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property, the property of being the speaker, plays a pragmatic role in interpretation
that we do come across cases such as (82).
I hope that I have met the first of my two aims: to demonstrate that there are
descriptive uses of indexicals. What of the second aim, to explain why, if such uses
are available, intuitions concerning the rigidity of indexicals seem so robust? This is
not of course a semantic issue, and is thus not essential to the current discussion: so
long as I have convinced you that there are genuinely descriptive uses of both
demonstratives and pure indexicals, it is in some sense neither here nor there why
speaker intuitions on this matter are as they are. The question seems, nonetheless, to
throw interesting light on flicts about our use of indexicals and thus I want to pursue it
briefly here. The first point to note is that, even though there are, as I have shown
above, genuinely descriptive uses of indexicals, they are heavily outnumbered by
referential uses. Why should this be? I discussed similar issues concerning proper
names in the last chapter. The points I made then, however, do not straightforwardly
carry over to indexicals. What I suggested was that the heavy preponderance of
referential uses of proper names may have something to do with the nature of naming
practices, essentially that we tend to name things demonstratively rather than
descriptively. it is essential to indexicals, however, that the relation between an
expression and its interpretation on an occasion of use is not a once-and-for-all matter
as it is with proper names: whereas a specific convention links me to 'George' and
thus allows uses of 'George' to refer to me (roughly speaking), there is no convention
linking me to 'he' which allows uses of 'he' to refer to me. Since, therefore, the link
between indexicals and their referents is so context-specific, !cts about naming
practices are not going to provide us with an explanation for the predominance of
referential uses of indexicals. Underlying my account of the bias towards referential
uses of names, however, were some foundational claims about the nature of cognition
which may be carried over to the case of indexicals. In the last chapter 1 suggested
that we are cognitively designed primarily to track physical objects rather than
properties. There are, however, exceptions to this general rule, where a property is
significant enough hi its own right that we have an interest in thinking about whoever
bears that property. Thus we may have an interest in talking about whoever
committed the Whitechapel murders, whoever left a particular footprint in the sand
and so on. it seems that this underlying fact about human cognition, the bias towards
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discriminating individuals on a physical basis rather than according to theirproperties,
may offer us an explanation for the predominance of referential uses of lidexicals.
Why, then, are intuitions on the rigidity of indexicals so strong? Because, given the
facts about human cognition, most uses of indexicals are referentiaL This does not
entail, however, that all uses of indexicals are referential. If the story I have told is
along more or less the right lines, then we can account for the prefrrence for
referential uses of indexicals without having to locate any specifically referential
features in the linguistic meaning of indexicals. Putting the same point another way,
we should expect to see a bias towards referential uses of indexicals even if they are
not semantically referential, i.e. even if they are not marked as referential by their
encoded meaning.
4.2.2.4 Indexicals, individual concepts, answer machines and post-it notes
In the last three sections 1 have shown how the account I favour can handle data
concerning the cognitive significance of indexicals, as well as data concerning their
apparent rigidity. I want now to come on to the last type of data discussed above.
Kaplan (1989a) draws attention to a particular type of use of indexicals:
There are certain uses of pure indexicals that might be called
'messages recorded for later broadcast', which exhibit a special
uncertainty as to the referent of 'here' and 'now'.
Kaplan (1989a, fn.12)
Kaplan makes it clear that he does not believe such uses pose any threat to his
semantic system. There is however, as discussed in section 4.1.4, a prima fàcie
problem. Consider again sentence (25), repeated here as (83):
83)1 am not here now.
it seems that Bert can record (83) as his outgoing answer-machine message, and
thereby use 'now' to refer to a time other than that at which he produces his utterance
of(83), i.e. to refer to the time at which the message is played back, rather than the
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time at which it is recorded. There has been a series of attempts in the literature to
reconcile this kind of data with a Kaplanian semantics for pure indexicals Sidelle
(1991) draws a distinction between the context of encoding and the context of
decoding. At each of these times, for Sidelle, there will be a distinct utterance with a
distinct set of parameters. When Bert records his answer-machine message he is, on
Sidelle's analysis, setting things up in such a way that he can produce an wtterance at
a later time. The idea is, then, that utterances can, in certain circumstances, be
deferred. If this is right, then we can still hold that 'now' refers to the time of
utterance, since there is an utterance at the time at which the message is played back
and it is to the time of this utterance that 'now' refers in (83). Predl1i (1998),
however, raises an objection to Sidelle's account. He asks us to consider Jones who,
expecting his wi1 to return home at 6pm and expecting not to be at home himself at
that time, writes a note at 4pm, just before walking out the door, which says 'I am not
here now'. As things turn out, however, Mrs Jones does not get home and therefore
does not read the message until 10pm. On Sidelle's account there are two possible
time parameters which could determine the referent of Jones' use of 'now': the time
of encoding, i.e. 4pm, or the time of decoding, i.e. 10pm. However, neither of these
seems, to Predelli, to give the right result: regardless of when Mrs Jones actually
returned home, Jones intended the message to be read at 6pm and it is thus 6pm to
which his use of 'now' refers. If Predelli is right, then Sidelle cannot be. Fm not sure,
however, that Predelli's claims concerning his example are entirely convincing:
imagine that Jones has returned home before his wife, say at 8pm, but has lbrgotten to
retrieve his message from the prominent position where he left it; Mrs Jones then
returns home at 10, reads the message and is thus surprised to find her husband
already in bed; it seems at least plausIl)le that, given these circumstances, she would
be right to think that the message was not true, if this is so, however, Predelli's
example does not stand as a counterexample to Sidelle's claims. Corazza et aL (2002)
offer a more convincing counterexample however. They ask us to consider Ben and
Joe who work together in an academic department One day Joe is off sick and Ben
notices a number of students approaching the door of his office and looking bemused.
To help them out he writes:
84)! am not here today.
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on a post-it note which he sticks to the door of Joe's office. It seems that the message
wilieiffJoeisnotheretoday,yet,onSidelle'sanalysis,itishardtoseehow
this can be so. Sidelle would, presumably, have to say that Joe was the agent of the
utterance which takes place when his students read the message, yet Joe is not even
aware that the message exists. An account which requires that someone can be the
agent of an utterance he has no pail in producing and is not aware of seems
questionable. It seems then that, whether or not the example he uses is a hefiul one,
Predelli is right to challenge Sidelle's position. Having done so, he offers an
alternative analysis of such examples. What we need to distinguish, for Predelli, is not
the context of encoding and the context of decoding, but the actual context of
utterance and the intended context of utterance. So what is going on in examples such
as (83) and (84) is that the context against which the speaker intends his utterance to
be interpreted differs from the actual context in respect of the values assigned to some
of the indexical parameters. Thus when Bert leaves (83) as his answer message he
intends it to be interpreted against a context in which the time parameter is riot that of
the context of utterance, but that of the context in which it is played back; and when
Ben leaves the message in (84) on Joe's door, he intends it to be interpreted against a
context in which the value of the agent parameter is not Ben himsdll as is in the
actual context, but is Joe. There are, however, two key problems with Predeffi's
account as it stands. Firstly, as Corazza ci al. point out, it massively overgenerates:
since Predelli has nothing to say on the question of what constraints there might be on
which contexts a speaker may legitimately intend her utterance to be interpreted
against, there is no clear constraint on what she may use an indexical to refer to.
Consider (83) again: on Predelli's stoiy there is nothing to stop Bert leaving (83) on
the answering machine at his home in Sesame Street and thereby saying something
thtistnieiffheisnotinLasVegasaflthatisrequiredforhhntodosoisthathe
should intend his utterance to be interpreted against a context in which the value of
the location parameter is Las Vegas. Yet this seems highly counterintuitive. The
second problem with Predelli's account is related to the first: since he provides no
independent criterion for what can count as an intended context, his attempt to save a
Kaplanian semantics renders that semantics essentiaHy vacuous. Predelli's sategy for
saving the Kaplaman picture is to say that 'I', for instance, does indeed refer to the
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agent but that the context against which the values of indexicals are fixed may not be
the actual context of utterance. But how are we to determine which context an
utterance is to be interpreted against? Essentially the only answer that Predelli gives is
that we should interpret an utterance against that context for which the location
parameter is wherever the speaker intends to refer to as 'here', the time parameter is
whenever the speaker intends to refer to as 'now' and the agent parameter is whoever
the agent intends to refer to as 'r. But then what does his analysis amount to? No
more than the claim that we can save the Kaplanian semantics for 'here', fbr instance,
by the simple move of saying that wherever a use of 'here' refers to is the place of
utterance (in the intended context). This looks to be a defrnce of Kaplan by sleight of
pen.
In response to the problems fced by Predelli's account, Corazza et al offer an
alternative based not on intentional contexts but on conventional contextual
parameters. Their idea is that, for any potential context, there are conventions
governing which entities serve as values of the contextual parameters:
For any use of the personal indexical, the contextual parameter of the
agent is conventionally given - given by the social or conventional
setting in which the utterance takes place. For instance, with 'now', the
setting or context in which it is used changes the time that the tenn
refers to: if 'now' is heard on an answering machine, we take the
relevant time to be the time at which it is heard ... In contrast, if we
read 'now' on a postcard ... we take the relevant time to be the time at
which the words were written.
Corazza et al. (2002, p. 11)
Thus we can again salvage a Kaplanian semantics, but this time by invoking
conventions rather than intentions: 'now' in Bert's answer machine message refers to
the time of playback because convention determines that 'now' in an answer-machine
message refers to the time of playback. Again there are two key problems with this
analysis. Firstly, the sort of individuation of contexts upon which this account relies
will not do the work required of it. Imagine that you phone a friend and hear the
following answer machine message:
In
85)Hl, I'm not here now (pause with knocking sound in the background) OK,
someone's at the door now, I've got to go.
Here it seems that the two token of 'now' will refer to different times: the first token
will refer to the time of playback, the second to the time of utterance. 1f however, as
Corazza et al. would have it, the convention governing what is taken to be the time
parameter in context is determined by the social or conventional setting, then the two
utterance of 'now' should not be able to differ in interpretation in this way.1 suspect
this is not a knock-down argument against the position of Corazza et aL More
worrying for them is the interpretability of utterances of indexicals in contexts in
which there is no pre-existing convention. Bert and Ernie are examining Bert's
collection of fossils; Bert points to one of the fossils and says:
86) There were so many fossils here that we couldn't fit them all in the car.
Now it seems plausible that Bert has said something that is true iff there were so many
fossils at the place where he found that fossil that he couldn't fit them all in the car.
However there is surely no temptation to think that there is a convention to the effect
that in contexts in which someone is pointing at a fossil, the location parameter is the
place where the fossil was found.
What might we learn from this objection to the account of Corazza Ct al.? The
lesson I believe we should learn is that we can achieve with pragmatics what they
want to do with conventions. The only sacrifice we have to make, and I imagine that
all those discussed above might regard it as quite a large sacrifice, is to accept that the
role of the encoded meaning of indexicals is pragmatic. How might this help us? The
key to the idea I want to explore is that 'I', for instance, is not semantically
constrained to refer to the utterer but is pragmatically constrained to pick out
something which it is relevant to think of as the utterer. Consider Ben's note hi (84).
In the scenario envisaged, Ben has done two things: firstly he has written 'I am not in
today' on a post-it note and secondly he has attached that post-it note to Joe's door.
Coming across the note attached to Joe's door, how is one of Joe's students, let's call
him Elmo, going to interpret it? As part of his interpretation process, Elmo must ask
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himself which concept he is intended to entertain as his interpretation of'1'; since this
token is, presumably, intended to be referential, this comes down to the question of
who 'I' refers to. Given that 'F, by dint of its linguistic meaning, raises the contextual
salience of the property of being the agent, and that contexts in which it is relevant to
think of someone other than the actual agent as the agent will be rare, Elmo is
justified in starting his search for a referent with the actual agent. Now Ehno may or
may not know who the actual agent is, but, whoever he is, Elmo knows that he has
attached the message to Joe's door. The effect of this, as an intentional element of the
act of communication, is to raise the salience of Joe in the context. Now the agent
may or may not be Joe himself. If Joe is the agent, and he wishes 'I' to refer to
himselt; then raising his own salience and thus raising the accessibility of a concept of
himself for his addressee, will increase the relevance of his utterance byminimising
the processing efibrt required to interpret it. It; on the other hand, the agent is not Joe
and he wished 'I' to refer to himselt; then the reverse is the case: by raising Joe to
salience he will have reduced the relevance of his own utterance by putting his
addressee to gratuitous processing effort. It is thus the case that an agent other than
Joe who wished the token of'!' in (84) to refer to himself would be reneging on the
presumption of optimal relevance communicated by his own utterance by placing the
message on Joe's door. Given that, as part of his interpretation strategy, Elmo is
justified in trusting that the message will be optimally relevant on the intended
interpretation, he can therefore exclude the possibility that an agent other than Joe
could intend 'I' in (84) to refer to himself. in this case, i.e. if the agent is not Joe, then
who might that agent intend to refer to with his use of 'F? In other words, and given
the encoded meaning of'!', who might it be relevant to think of as the agent of this
message? The answer would seem to be that, since the message has been left on his
door, it might be relevant to think of Joe as the agent. Elmo should thus try out a
concept of Joe for relevance and, if it satisfies his expectation of relevance as it
should, he must accept it. Although I do not propose to go through them one by one, I
believe that the answering machine examples are susceptible to much the same sort of
pragmatic analysis.
What might it mean to say, as I have above, that it may be relevant to think of
someone other than the agent as the agent? I suspect that it comes down to something
like asking: who might the actual agent be pretending is the agent for communicative
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purposes? If this is so, then my account looks like it has much in common with
Predelli's we could, after all, look at Predelli's intended non-actual contexts as
pretend contexts. However I believe that my account faces neither of the problems to
trouble Predelli's: firstly it does not overgenerate, since, as illustrated by the example
above, the ability of an agent to use 'I' to refer to an individual other than himself is
tightly constrained by context and pragmatic inference; and secondly it does not
salvage a Kaplanian account at the cost of making that account vacuous, since it does
not attempt to salvage a Kaplanian account at all: on my story, indexicak are not
semantically constrained by their linguistic meaning.
4.3 Conclusion
I have now laid out the account of the semantics and pragmatics of indexicals which I
favour, an account on which indexicals are marked as individual concept
communicators by their linguistic meaning, and on which the elements of descriptive
meaning which they encode play a pragmatic role in interpretation. I have also shown
how this account handles what I have taken to be the core data on indexicals. In
conclusion I want to say a couple of words about how this account compares with the
other main positions currently on the market. In particular I want to stress a couple of
observations made in the course of this chapter concerning comparisons between my
account and the mainstream direct-reference flavoured accounts of Kap Ian, Perry etc.
What is the direct-reference sty on indexicals, as originally formulated by
Kaplan (I 989a, I 989b in particular), a story of? Kaplan is essentially concerned with
logical properties; he is in other words concerned with truth. Given this, there is good
reason to think that the account he proposes should not be answerable to data
concerning cognitive significance20. Moreover he is not, apparently, concerned with
the logical properties of linguistic expressions, but rather with the logical properties of
certain uses of those expressions:
What is common tothe wordsorusages inwhich lam interested isthat
the referent is dependent on the context of use and that the meaning of
For a particularly influuitial defaicc of the clam th it should not, see Wettstein (1986).
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the word provides a rule which determines the referent in terms of
certain aspects of the context.
Kaplan (1989a)
As Kaplan himself accepts, this narrows his area of interest to classes of use rather
than classes of expression. Given these facts, Kaplan's position and the position 1
have defended above may not be quite as antithetical as they might at first seem. In
particular, given the limits of his interest, Kaplan need not deny that two co-referring
uses of an indexical expression may differ in cognitive significance, nor that the very
expressions in which he is interested may have uses other than those he is concerned
with, uses on which they give rise to descriptive rather than singular truth conditions.
In doing so, however, he must accept that his account is not an account of the uses of
natural language indexical expressions but rather an account of the logical properties
of some uses of those expressions. His theory and my own are, therefore, theories of
different things, since what I am interested in is the semantics and interpretation of a
class of linguistic expressions.
Not all direct-referentialists are willing, however, to swallow this pill; to
accept that a full account of the meaning properties of natural language indexicals lies
beyond the scope of their theories. For Perry (e.g. 1997a, 199Th), for instance, facts
concerning cognitive significance can be accommodated within a direct-reference
framework by the simple move of identi1ing cognitive significance with referent-role
pairings (or, in Kaplan's terms, with character-content pairings). The idea, very
briefly, is that the cognitive significance of; for instance, my own mental tokenings of
'I' derives not from the fact that they refer to me, nor from the fact that I am
entertaining the character of'!', but from the fact that lam thinking of me under the
character of'!'. Such accounts are more clearly in conflict with my own and, although
I do not intend to go into any detail on the question here, they seem to come off
worse: as, for instance, Recanati (1993) has shown, there are good reasons why we
would not want to identify the cognitive significance of an indexical with its linguistic
meaning, or indeed with the pairing of its referent and linguistic meaning
What does all this show usthen? What Ibeieve it shows us is that the direct
reference picture of indexicals may well offer a satisfactory account of the logical
properties of some types of use to which indexicals may be put. What it cannot, by
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itself achieve, is an account of the meaning properties of a class of natural language
expressions. If natural language is what we are interested in, therefore, we should
prefer the sort of account which I have defended above.
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Chapter five
Definite descriptions
5.0
In this chapter I want to turn my attention towards definite descriptions, and, in
particular, to the debate over descriptions initiated by Donnellan (1966). Donnellan
points out that there are two apparently different ways in which definite descriptions
(expressions typically of the form 'the F') can be used. On the one hand they can be used
to talk about whoever or whatever satisfies their descriptive content, and on the other
they can be used to pick out a particular individual Take, for instance, the sentence in
(1):
I) The Ferrari driver has an unfair advantage
Now imagine two contexts in which this sentence might be uttered. In the frst context,
speaker and hearer are discussing a forthcoming motor race; neither of them knows who
will be driving any given car but they both know that the Ferrari is going to be allowed
to start the race in front of all the other cars. The speaker then utters (1). In this context
the speaker would, on Donnellan's analysis, mean something like (2):
2) The Ferrari driver, whoever he is, has an unfair advantage
Now consider another situation. This time hearer and speaker are wandering around the
p1 lane before the race when they overhear a conversation between the race organiser
and one of the drivers, Jones, who they take to be the Ferrari driver. The race organiser
is telling Jones that he will do all he can to help him wm. The speaker then utters (1). In
this context Donnellan's analysis would suggest that the speaker will mean something
like (3):
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3) Jones has an unfair advantage
It; ng(1),thekrmeans(2),thensheisusingthedescription'theFerrari
driver' attributively, in Donnellan's terminology; if she means (3) she is using the
description referentially. This, then, in pee-theoretical terms, is Donnellan's referential-
attributive distinction. In this chapter I want to reverse the order of pmceedings of the
last two chapters; I shall, that is, start by examining some of the dominant posdions on
descriptions to be found hi the literature, and only once an outline of those positions is in
place shall I develop the account of descriptions which I favour.
5.1 The debate on descriptions
There are certain key questions that have guided the debate on referential and attributive
uses of definite descriptions. The central question, as commonly formulated, ia whether
the referential-attributive distinction is semantically significant. But what does this mean?
There are two ways that it is commonly cashed out in the literature on descriptions:
a) Does the referential-attributive distinction equate to a diflrence in truth
conditions? In other words, are two utterances which differ only in that one
contains a definite description referentially used and the other contains the
same description attributively used truth-conditionally distinct?
b) Is 'the' lexically ambiguous? (or, sometimes, is the definite description as a
whole ambiguous?)
Given the type of theoretical presuppositions discussed hi chapter 2, many coniributions
to the referential-attributive debate have assumed a particular relation between these two
formulations to hold: they have assumed, in essence, that ifvu answer 'yes' to (a), you
are thereby committed to answering 'yes' to (b), and if you answer 'no' to (a you are
committed to answering 'no' to (b). it should be clear, however, that such an asaumption
is unwarranted from the perspective of the framework within which I have been workin&
a framework based on the theoretical underpinnings developed in chapter 2. Once it's
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appreciated that this assumption is unwarranted, I shall argu; a great nwnber of the
apparently thorny issues which have surrounded descriptions dissolve.
The other question central to the debate on descriptions is, whether they're
ambiguous or not, what semantics do we want to give fbr definite descriptions? Again
there are two possible ways of cashing this out, parallel to those for the last question:
c) What contnl,ution do definite descriptions make to the propositions expressed
by utterances in which they appear?
d) What is the encoded meaning of definite descriptions?
I want to taclde these two questions in much the same way as the two above: again it
seems to me that a relation that has been taken to hold between the answers to these two
questions does not necessarily hold. It will be my claim that a particular univocal
semantics can lead to two different types of proposition expressed.
Those, then, are the central questions that any contribution to the debate on
descriptions must aim to answer. I next want to look at some of the answers that have
been given to these questions, in particularly drawing out two main strands in the debate.
But, since the referential-attributive distinction derives from Donnellan (1966), 1 will
start by taking a brief look at Donnellan's own analysis. In particular, I want to show that
the answers Donnellan gives to these questions Ibreshadow much of the most recent
research in the area, and point in what I see as the right direction.
5.1.1 Donnellan's position
What is Donnellan's answer to question (a)? It seems clear to me (although not to
Kripke (1977)) that for Donnellan there is a truth-conditional difference in the
proposition expressed between referential and attributive uses. An utterance of a
sentence containing an attributively-used definite description in subject position
expresses an object-independent proposition: in Donnellan's terms the description occurs
essentially, in that is descriptive content appears in a specification of the truth
conditions of this proposition. An utterance of a sentence containing a referentially-used
definite description in subject position, by contrast, expresses an object-dependent
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proposition: the descriptive content of the description plays no part in a specification of
truth conditions, serving mere!y to guide the hearer towards a particular individual, and
then falling out of the picture.
This truth-conditional difference is, in fact, at the heart of Donnellan's account.
Donnellan sees the referential-attributive distinction as a challenge to Russell's semantics
for definite descriptions (see, fbr instance, Russell (1905)), on which any utterance
containing a definite description has object-independent truth conditions; 'the F is G', for
instance, is true 1ff there is exactly one F and that one is 0. Donnellan is pieparedto
concede that Russell's semantics may provide an adequate account of attributive uses,
but his claim is that it fails to account for referential uses. Now if the distinction is to
stand as a challenge to Russell, it must afThct the truth conditions of utterances in which
descriptions appear. It seems that Donnellan must, therefore, be taking the position that
the referential-attributive distinction corresponds to a diflrence in the truth conditions of
the proposition expressed or, in his terms, of the 'statement made".
There is, however, an obvious difficulty in deciding whether different
propositions really are expressed on referential and attributive uses: in most contexts, the
truth values of the two interpretations will covary. Taking (I) again, if the Ferrari driver,
whoever he is, has an unfair advantage and Jones is the Ferrari driver, then Jones has an
unfair advantage; and equally, if the Ferrari driver doesn't have an unfair advantage and
Jones is the Ferrari driver, then Jones doesn't have an unfair advantage. This difficulty
has, it seems to me, led to a great deal of the confusion that surrounds the discussion of
referential and attributive uses.
In an attempt to demonstrate that propositions with diflerent truth conditions
really are expressed on referential and attributive uses, Donnellan turns to contexts in
which truth values fur the different uses do not coincide; in other words, he turns to
cases of misdescription. To see how this works, consider (1) again but, this time, imagine
that the speaker and hearer have made a mistake: Jones is not, in fact, the Ferrari driver
'Ifyou are still not convinced that Donndlan is in direct opposition to Russell, you need only consida
his views on the stateeait made whai the existential presupposition of a definite desaiption fails. Fos
Russell, if the existential presupposition fails then the statnent made must be falsç fir Donnellan it
may still be this. This is closely linked to the issue of misdescription discussed in the next section.
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at all; he drives lbr McLaren. Brown, the real Ferrari driver, far from havhig an unfair
advantage is being schemed against by the race organisers. What is the truth value of(l)
now? For Donnellan, in this context the proposition expressed, or 'statement made', by
an utterance of(I) in which the description is referentially used is true although Jones is
not, in fact, the Ferrari driver, the proposition expressed makes no reference to the
property of being the Ferrari driver, it is a singular proposition about Jones himsell and,
since Jones does have an unfair advantage, it is true. On the other hand, an utterance of
(1) in which the description is attributively used would clearly be false in this context: the
utterance predicates the property of having an unfair advantage of whoever happens to
be the Ferrari driver, and Brown, who is the Ferrari driver, does not have an unfair
advantage. Donnellan's argument, then, runs like this: in cases of misdescription,
referential and attributive uses can have different truth values in the same context; any
two utterances which can have diflërent truth values hi the same context must have
different truth conditions; therefore re1lrential and attributive uses must be truth-
conditionally distinct.
This reliance on cases of misdescription has opened Doimellan to some of the
more forceful criticism of his account, in particular that of Kripke (1977). The central
problem is that this phenomenon seems not to be specific to definite descriptions. It is,
for instance, possible, hi an appropriate context, to achieve reference to Jones by using
the proper name 'Smith'. This should not lead us, so the argument goes, to posit an
ambiguity in proper names. Many of those who argue hi favour of a I)onnellan-type
position now accept that, at the very least, the referentialfattributive distinction is not
best Illustrated by recourse to misdescription (see, for instance, Recanati (1993) and
Wettstein (1981)).
So Donnellan answers 'yes' to question (a); how about question (b)? As I
mentioned earlier, there has been a default assumption in much of the literature on
descriptions which has Ibliowed Donnellan's paper that answering 'yes' to (a) commits
you to answering 'yes' to (b). Donneflan himself however, makes no such asswnption, in
a much-quoted passage he says
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[It does not] seem at all attractive to suppose an ambiguity in the meaning
of the words; it does not appear to be semantically ambiguous. (Perhaps
we could say that the sentence is pragmatically ambiguous: the distinction
between roles that the description plays is a function of the speaker's
intentions.)
Donnellan (1966 p. 59)
It's clear that Doimellan does not see an ambiguity in the encoded meaning of 'the'; what
is not so clear, however, is what he might mean by 'pragmatically ambiguous'. It seems
to me (as it does to Recanati (1993)) that an appropriate cashing out of this claim may
well point m the right direction.
As for questions (c) and (d), I have already, in laying out Donnellan's answer to
(a), pointed towards his view on (c): an attributively used deseription contributes some
kind of Russellian complex to the proposition expressed by an utterance ii which it
appears, something like the property of being a unique F; a referenthily used description
simply contributes an individual On question (d) Donnellan remains silent: the above
comment shows him to believe that descriptions are univocal in that they encode only
one semantics, but what that semantic encoding may be he does not make clear.
5.1.2 Yes-theory vs no-theory
On, then, to the two main strands in the debate lbllowmg from Donnellan's paper. I will
start with a few general introductory comments. It seems to mc that these strands are
based on two good insights and one bad assumption: the one bad assumption, as I have
already mentioned, is that answering 'yes to question (a) above commits you to
answering 'yes' to question (b); the two good insights arc that, on the one hand,
descriptions are univocal and, on the other, that the referential-attributive distinction
corresponds to a difference hi truth conditions. Anyone who relies on the bad
assumption, however, cannot consistently maintain both the good hisights if you answer
'yes' to both questions (a) and (b), then you are denying the univocality of descriptions,
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ifu answer 'no' to both (a) and (b) then you are denying that the referential-attnl,utive
distinction is tnith-conditionaL And these are just the positions that the two main strands
take.
The second of these positions, that the answer to both (a) and (b) is 'no', that the
referential-attributive distinction s not truth-conditional and that descriptions are not
ambiguous, is adopted by a group of theorists including Once (e.g. (1969)), Neale (e.g.
(1990)), Kripke and others who I shall call no-theorLrts. For the no-theorist the picture
looks something like this2: descriptions encode a Russellian semantics; on the basis of the
subsidiary bad assumption that, with slight caveats, the same answer must be given to
question (c) as to question (d), the no-theorist therefore holds that the proposition
expressed by any utterance containing a description must have Russellian truth
conditions; in other words, for the no-theorist, even where 'the F' is used referentially,
thepropositionexpressedby'theFisG'willbetheffthereisexactlyoneFandthat
one is 0.
How, then, can the no-theorist accommodate intuitions about the reality of the
referential-attributive distinction? Typically he splits them into two: he separates the
general intuition that there is some significant diflèrence between referential and
attributive uses from the specific intuition that the truth conditions of an utterance
containing a definite description will vary according to whether the description is used
referentially or attributively. He then accepts the first intuition and rejects the second.
The second intuition is the one that lies behind Dormellan's claims about misdescription
that an utterance containing a referentially used definite description will be true so long
as the predication is true of the intended referent, although that intended referent does
not, in fact, fall within the denotation of the description. This intuition has come under
heavy fire from no-theorists; Wiggins (1975), for instance5 san:
2 Oey than are significant diffuics between the acouimts that I am grouping togethee hcç I
believe, hovcr, that than are sufficient shnilaritics fir it to be valid r my purposes to discass than
together.
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Donnellan's [account] ... depends on the for me, incredible idea that if!
say 'The man drinking champagne is P and the man I mean, although
drinking water, is F, then what Isay is true.
But if the relèrential-attnl,utive distinction makes no difference at the level of truth
conditions, how does the no-theorist accommodate the first intuition: that there really is
some significant distinction to be accounted for here? He turns to the distinction, Ilimiliar
within the Gricean pragmatic tradition, between what is said and what is communicated
(or meant). The former equates to something like the proposition 'literally' expressed by
an utterance, the latter includes propositions which are not 'literally' expressed but arise
as implicatures. So, for instance, to repeat a well-worn (iricean example:
klamoutofpetrol
B: There is a garage round the corner
Grice (1967, p. 32)
What B says, in this example, is just that there is a garage around the corner from where
the conversational exchange is taking place; what B communicates includes, according to
Grice, a proposition to the effect that 'the garage is, or at least may be open'.
It is this distinction between what is said and what is communicated that the no-
theorist uses as his main weapon against a Donnellan-type position. Sure enough, he may
concede, a speaker who uses a definite description referentially conveys an object-
dependent proposition, and that accounts for intuitions about the diflërence between
referential and attributive uses. But that's no reason to believe that the referential-
attributive distinction corresponds to a difference in the truth conditions of the
proposition expressed. The object-dependent proposition conveyed by a referential use,
sotheno-.theoristargues, arisesnotatthekvelofwhat issaid(i.e.notatthelevelofthe
proposition expressed by an utte1nce), but at the level of what is communicated.
What evidence is there for this clain beyond the Wiggins-type intuition on cases
of misdescription? The most heavily-used weapon in the no-theorist's armowy is
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methodological rather than empirical: the no-theorist argues that his account is more
parsimonious than the alternative; he need only posit one semantically encoded meaning
for 'the' and the rest of the work is done by independently motivated pragmatic
machinery. Of course any account which argues for a truth-conditional difference
between referential and attributive uses must, so long as it's based on the bad
assumption, posit two semantically encoded meanings for 'the' if it's going to maintain
that the referential-attributive distinction corresponds to a difference lithe truth
conditions of the proposition expressed. And that, so the no-theorist argnes violates
Modified Occam's Razor, Grice's principle that 'senses are not to be multiplied bend
necessity' (Grice (1967)). As Recanati (1993) points out, however, this argument only
carries any weight so long as the bad assumption is maintained; so long, in other words,
as you equate pragmatically derived meaning and implicated meaning. Given a view of
meaning along relevance-theoretic lines, however, there is no temptation to equate these
two. On such a view, therefore, the no-theorist's methodological argument has no force3.
The no-theorist is left, then, with the 'Wiggins-type intuition as the bedrock of his
claim that referential interpretations are communicated as implicatures; this intuition is
the heart of his answer to (a) and, as I shall argue later, it seems to me that this intuition
is not the evidence for the no-theorist's claims that it has been taken to be. The no-
theorist has rather more arguments at his disposal when it comes to answering (b), the
question of whether 'the' is lexically ambiguous or not (and remember that, for the no-
theorist who holds to the bad assumption, a 'no' answer to (b) is every bit as good as a
'no' answer to (a), since the one is supposed to Ibilow from the other). Kripke (1977 lh
28), for instance shows that in some perfectly intelligible cases it is hard to say whether
a description is being used referentially or attributively, an unlikely state of affairs for a
true lexical ambiguity.
Rouchota (1994) points out that the referential-attributive distinction far from
exhausts the possible uses of definite descriptions. Consider, for instance sentences (4) -
(6):
I shall have more to say about ambiguity whai I cume on to discuss possible ote1ioas to my overall
view of singular cxprsssions in diapter 7.
186
4) The man I live next door to has some veiy strange habits
5) The president of the United States changes evely four years
6) The koala is a native of Australia
Imagine (4) uttered in a context in which the speaker has a particular person in mind and
yet has no intention that, in understanding her utterance the hearer should think of that
particular person. Such a use seems neither truly referential nor truly attributive; Ludlow
and Neale (1991) call such uses specfic. Again, in so-called firnct,onal uses such as (5),
the definite description seems to fimction neither to pick out a particular individual nor to
talk about whichever individual happens to satis1y the description; in this case it seems to
be used to tall about the role of president independently of any of the individuals who
have filled that role. And finally in (6) the definite description is used generically, as
equivalent to the bare plural 'koalas' (with appropriate syntactic tinkering). As Rouchota
argues, anyone who wanted to claim that the referential-attributive distinction derives
from a lexical ambiguity would have to posit a many-more-then-Iwo-way ambiguity;
from the above examples alone, plus the original referential and attributive uses, it
would, presumably, have to be at least a five-way ambiguity.
Another argument against the ambiguity thesis produced by many no-theorists
goes something like this: referential uses do not just arise for definite descriptions, but
for most quantified phrases. Consider sentence (7):
7) Every student currently in my office did well on the test
A speaker uttering (7) could certainly intend to convey an object-independent quantified
proposition. But she could also intend to convey an object-dependent proposition about
the particular students in her office. Given that referential and attributive uses can be
shown to arise with quantified expressions generally, it becomes a very unattractive
option, so the no-theorist argues, to claim that each of these expressions is lexically
ambiguous. And for the no-theorist, holding as he does to the bad assunçtion, that's
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strong evidence in favour of the claim that the relèrential-attnl,utive distinction is not
truth-conditionaL
The no-theorist, then, believes the following: the referential-attributive distinction
is non-truth-conditional, and all utterances with a definite description in subject position,
however that description is used, have Russellian troth conditions; the referential use of
descriptions arises not at the level of what is said but at the level of what is
communicated, i.e. it arises as an implicature. And I have pointed towards a few of the
stronger arguments that the no-theorist relies on in support of his claim. I next want to
turn to the other major strand in the debate over definite descriptions: the yes-theoretic
position4. At the heart of this position are the claims that the referential-attributive
distinction does correspond to a difference hi truth conditions and, therefore, on the basis
of the bad assumption, that 'the' is lexically ambiguous5.
Again I want to look at some of the main arguments used in defence of the yes-
theoretic position. The most familiar (see, for instance, Wettstein (1981)) concerns the
use of incomplete descriptions, descriptions that fail to pick out any single individual in
the workL The argument goes like this: most descriptions, as commonly used in everyday
speech, are incomplete; consider the following sentence:
8) Thepolicemanispullingcarsover
In the appropriate context, for instance, if speaker and hearer are driving along and see a
policeman ahead, an utterance of(8) may be used to convey a determinate proposition. It
is, however, so the yes-theorist argues, ludicrous to believe that that proposition has
Russellian truth conditions; if that were the case it would be true if there were exactly
one policeman and that one was pulling cars over. Since there exists more than one
policeman, such a proposition would be false, whereas we may easily imagine a situation
hi which what is conveyed by (8) is true. There have been various attempts by neo-
4 Vezsions ofthis position arc takesi by Wettstein (1951) and Peacocke (1975), among othas.
i suspe that I am doing many of those who might think o(themselvcs as yes-theorists a disservior
their thesis is, in most cases, based cxdusively on the first ci these tv claims, with little or no mesition
of whethor 'the' is ambiguous or ntt
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Russellian no-theorists to defend their position against this objection. Generally speaking,
there are two possible approaches: on one approach, the incomplete descriptive content
of a definite description is supplemented at some syntactic level with contextually
available information so as to make it uniquely denoting; on the other, the domain of the
definite description is constrained, on the basis of context, so as to allow only one
interpretation6. However, both of these approaches ce apparent difilculties. The key
problem for the first is that there is no principled way to decide which uniquely denoting
description appears in the proposition expressed, given that there will standardly be more
than one available. The second solution is challenged by cases in which there is no
satisfactory way to restrict the domain so as to give rise to the right interpretation (for a
discussion of the shortcomings of these approaches see Breheny (1999)). I shall
however have more to say about this second strategy below.
Ramachandran (1996) raises another interesting argument in favour of the yes-
theoretic position. He attacks the claim, outlined above, that referential uses arise for
other quantified expressions jest as they do for definite descriptions suggesting that all
such uses are non-truth-conditional Consider, Ramachandran asks the following
sentences:
9) The table is broken
10) There is exactly one table in this room and it is broken
(9) is, obviously enough, an incomplete description sentence, (10) its supposed
contextually-completed Russellian paraphrase. Imagine now that a speaker utters each of
(9) and (10) while gesturing at a particular table; in both cases she may succeed in
communicating an object-dependent proposition, a proposition which could equally well
have been communicated, speaking roughly, by an utterance of(I I):
'Whetha these two approaches really are distin* is not entirdy dear. Neale (1990) suggests that 'when
all is said and donç the explicit [contextual su pleznadationj and implicit [domain re*iotionj methods
might turn out to be notational variants of one anotha' (Neale (1990, p115, fri 48).
7 Brehaiy (1999) proposes an intaresting alternative to these approaches to incompleteness, an approach
on which the determiner itself is marked as requiring contextual supplementation in line with the
descriptive content of the description.
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11) Thattableisbroken
However there is, so Ramachandran argues, a tension in the interpretation of (10)
between what is 'literally asserted' and what is 'conveyed', a tension which is lacking in
the interpretation of (9): it is quite natural to interpret (9) as conveying an object-
dependent proposition, whereas in the interpretation of (10) there appears to be a gap
between what is said and what is communicated. Ramachandran calls this, 'the
prevalence of intuitively correct and wholly proper uses of incomplete descriptions'
(Ramachandran (1996, p379), the KosherRef phenomenon. It seems to me that the
KosherRef phenomenon, while providing no evidence lbr a lexical ambiguity in 'the'
(Rainachandran does not intend it to be so taken), does offer some evidence that the
referential use of definite descriptions affects proposlional content, rather than just
arising at the level of what is communicated, as the referential interpretation of
uncontroversially quantified expressions appears to.
These, then, are a couple of arguments in flivour of a 'yes' answer to question
(a). How about question (b)? What arguments does the yes-theorist have to support a
lexical ambiguity for 'the'? Rouchota (1994) points to some of the better-known
arguments, of which I will look briefly at just one: the argument from anaphora. The
argument looks like this: indexicals can operate either as genuine referring expressions or
as bound variables; consider, then, an example such as (12), taken from Rouchota (1994,
p.195):
12) The girl in the pink suit is one of my students. She is clever
in which the indexical 'she' is not syntactically bound by a quantified antecedent; if 'she'
is not acting as a bound variable then it must be acting as a genuine relbrring expression;
'she' receives its interpretation from the definite description 'the girl in the pink suit';
therelbre 'the girl in the pink suit' must be a genuine re!rring expression; so definite
descriptions must be ambiguous as between quantified and referential senses. However,
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as Neale (1990) points out, free indexicals can receive their interpretation from definite
descriptions which are clearly bemg used attributively. Consider (13), taken from Neale
(1990, p.175):
13) The inventor of the wheel was a genius. I suspect (s)he ate fish on a daily basis
Evidence such as this appears to rob the argwnent from anaphora of its force. It seems to
me that all other such attempts to employ syntactic tools to prise apart two encoded
senses for definite descriptions fall at the same hurdle: what holds for referential uses
holds just as well for attributive uses.
The two main positions on definite descriptions should now be clear: yes-
theorists believe that the referential-attributive distinction is truth-conditional (and maybe
that 'the' is lexically ambiguous); no-theorists believe that 'the' is univocal and that the
referential-attributive distinction is non-truth-conditional I hope however, that in
outlining some of the arguments used on both sides of this debate, I have suggested that
each camp has better arguments in favour of one of its two claims than it does for the
other. The yes-theorist seems to have good arguments in favour of the claim that the
referential-attributive distinction is truth-conditional; he seems rather less well equipped
with argwnents to support the view that 'the' is lexically ambiguous to the extent that
many yes-theorists simply do not address the issue. The no-theorist, on the other hand,
has some very good arguments to show that 'the' is univocal; whereas his arguments for
referential uses arising as implicatures are more or less entirely theory driven: for the no-
theorist the proposition expressed by an utterance is essentially defined as the product of
semantic decoding (with a certain amount of give and take to allow indexicals and
ambiguity into the picture); pragmatic inference occurs, for the no-theorist, as indeed for
the yes-theorist, only in the retrieval of implicated meaning. Since the only way to get
from a univocal semantics to two distinct interpretations is via pragmatic inference, one
of the interpretations of descriptions must, for the no-theorist, arise as an hiiplicature1.
Neale (1990), m particular, seems firmly committed to this assumption as it applies to
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definite descriptions. In a discussion of the account of Recanati (1989), on which a
univocal semantics leads in some contexts to an object-dependent proposition and in
other contexts to an object-independent proposition, Neale remarks;
Since two utterly distinct types of proposition may be expressed, I làil to
see bow a theory with such flexibility can il to be a theory that is
postulating a semantic ambiguity.
Neale (1990, p. 112, lh 36)
Neale seems to be rejecting out of hand the possilility that the gap between semantically
encoded meaning and propositional content can, here be filled by pragmatic inference.
This is particularly puzzling in the light of his willingness to accept the proposals of
Carston (1988), who argues that the temporal and causal implications associated with
certain uses of 'and' are, while not the product of a lexical ambiguity, nevertheless part
of the meaning explicitly communicated by an utterance (see Neale (1990, p 108,11127)).
Why Neale should be prepared to accept the one proposal while rejecting the other is
unclear9.
The difference between these Iwo camps is, then, as much a matter of the
theoretical machinery with which they approach the question as of the substantive claims
they are making about the meaning and interpretation of descriptions. Each starts from
one good insight into the workings of descriptions and is then forced, by an
unwillingness to reject the bad assumption, to deny the other good insight.
5.2 The semantics and pragmatics of definite descriptions
Beibre getting into the details of my account I want to draw out the general
considerations which will guide it. As I have already made clear, it seems to me that both
of the strands of thought above capture certain key facts about the interpretation of
This is really no more than a rekwmulation of the bed assumption.
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definite descriptions. In particular, the no-theorist is right to claim that definite
descriptions are univocal and the yes-theorist is right to claim that the referential
attributive distinction is truth-conditional (1 am, of course, not the first to make this
claim; see lbr instance, Recanati (1993), Rouchota (1992, 1994), Bezuidenhout (1997)).
By taking this position, I am committing myself to a further claim: that the bad
assumption is wrong; that it is consistent to give different answers to questions (a) and
(b) (and also to questions (c) and (d)). Once we accept this claim, the need to give the
same answers to (a) and (b) (or (c) and (d)) evaporates. it is now possible to answer
'yes' to (a) and 'no' to (b): referentially and attributively used definite descriptions may
well make different contnl,utions to propositional content, but that is no longer any
reason to suppose that 'the' is ambiguous; the truth-conditional diflrence may be the
result not of semantic encoding, but of pragmatic processes operating in the retrieval of
the proposition expressed. And it is, essentially, a version of this view that I shall
advocate.
Probably the clearest way to present my account is by answering the four
questions set out earlier. I therefore intend to answer first questions (b) and (d) together
and then questions (a) and (c) together. The answer I propose to (b) and (d) is this:
definite descriptions are univocal and encode particular constraints on the hearer's
interpretation, constraints that may be viewed as procedural hi the terms of Blakemore
(1987). Looking at this from the other end, a definite description 'the F' provides the
hearer with certain information about the propositional representation which constitutes
the content of the speaker's inlbrmative intention. It tells the hearer firstly that the
proposition the speaker wishes to explicate contains an individual concept, be it de re or
descriptive, and secondly that this individual concept is associated by the speaker with
the inlbrmation x L F. This stands in contrast to indefinite descriptions which, speaking
very roughly, do not indicate that the speaker is entertaining an individual concept.
Is this, however, enough to do thejob we want? Is it sufficient for 'the F' to
guide the hearer to an individual concept which the speaker associates with the
'More itIy, Neale does sean to have accq,ted a tnith-ounditional distinctios bween refaailial
and attributhe uses although nct the distincticm proposed m this thapt (see Neale (1999)).
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infonnation x is F? It seems that it is not. Conskler Beit and Ernie who are standing in a
furniture warehouse full of tables. A particularly lovely table catches Bert's eye, and,
wanting to share this aesthetic pleasure, Bert says to Ernie:
14) The table is very beautiful
There seems to be something at least infelicitous about Bert's utterance in (14): putting
things in pre-theoretic terms, there seems to be something unhappy about using a definite
description in a context in which there is more than one entity satis!jing its nominaL But
maybe this is not a semantic flict, i.e. a lhct concerning encoded meaning, but a
pragmatic Ihet; maybe the infelicity of (14) derives from Ernie's inability, given the
context of utterance, to reach Bert's intended interpretation. There seems to be good
evidence to suggest that this cannot be right. Compare (14) with (15):
15) That table is very beautiful
as uttered in the same context. While it still seems that, without any further contextual
cues, Ernie will be unable to establish which table Bert is intending to talk about, and
thus to reach Bert's intended interpretation, just as with (14), (15) nevertheless seems to
lack the infelicity of (14). What does this tell us about the semantics of definite
descriptions? It seems to tell us that their nominal elements must be uniquely denoting
just as per Russell's semantics. As discussed above, however, many uses of definite
descriptions are incomplete; their nominal elements are anything but uniquely denoting.
Howmighttheseusesfltintothepictureso lhrsketched?Ibeievethataversionofthe
contextual restriction story mentioned above is likely to do the job for us. That is to say,
the nominal elements of definite descriptions are not uniquely denoting simpliciter, but
against a pragmatically restricted context. The example in (14) is infelicitous, on this sort
of story, due to the lack of any available context in which the nominal 'table' is uniquely
denoting. But there are well-known objections to stories along these lines. Although I do
not want to go into a detailed defence here, I do want to suggest the outline of a
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response. The standard objections involve utterances lbr which the use of a definite
description seems felicitous despite the apparent unavailability of a context m which the
description's nominal is uniquely denoting. Thus, for instance, Imay have two workmen
working on my house, both of whom are qualified electricians, but only one of whom is
actually at work on my electrics (say the other is helping him out by doing some
plumbing). In this context it seems that I can felicitously utter (16):
16) The electrician arrived late this morning
ahhough there seems to be no available context which includes the electrician I intend to
tail about but excludes the other electrician who is currently at work on the plumbing. It
seems to me, however, that such examples cast light not on the semantics of definite
descriptions but on another dimension of the fimctioning of lexical semantic&
Within the relevance-theoretic framework there has been much research
conducted recently into concept narrowing and loosening (see, fur instance, Carston
(1996/97, 2002a etc)). The idea is this: the concept expressed by a predicate on an
occasion of use may not be identical with the lull concept that that predicate lexicalises;
the expressed concept may be logically stronger or weaker than the lexicalised predicate.
Thus, to take an example much discussed in the literature, the lexical item 'bachelor'
presumably encodes a concept which looks something like unmarried male hwnan'°.
Consider, however, an utterance of(1 7):
17) Mary is bored of being single and wants to meet a bachelor
The relevance-theoretic claim is that 'bachelor', as used in (17), expresses not the full
BACHELOR concept, but something logically stronger, something which narrows the
concept's denotation down to bachelors who are young, straight etc. What I want to
suggest is that examples such as (16) hinge not on the semantics of definite descriptions
I don't wish to presuppose any partionl& take on the anatomy ofincepts suda as BACHELOR.
Fr the time being, howeser, this approximation will, I hope, suffice.
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but on concept narrowing. In an utterance of (16), 'electrician' will express not a
concept which denotes anyvne qualified as an electrician, but rather a concept which
denotes only individuals who perform the functions of an electrician. If this suggestion s
on the right lines, then the apparent problem which examples such as (16) pose fur a
semantics on which the nominal of a definite description expresses a uniquely denoting
property relative to a pragmatically-retrieved context evaporates 'Electrician', as it
appears in the nominal of 'the electrician' in (16) does, on this construal, express a
uniquely-identifying property, since there is only one individual in the context who is
performing the functions of an electrician.
My answers to questions (b) and (d), then, are that definite descriptions are
univocal, with 'the F' providing the hearer with the information that the proposition the
speaker wishes to explicate contains an individual concept associated with the
information Lc a unique F (in apragmaticaly-retrievable context). How about questions
(a) and (c)? As I hope I have made clear, it seems to me that the arguments put forward
by the ambiguity theorist in favour of his contention that the referential-attnl,utive
distinction corresponds to a diflërence in tnith conditions are veiy convincing. There is,
however, still the issue of the Wiggins-type intuition to deal with, the intuition that in
cases of misdescription, even if the predicate is true of the intended referent, so long it is
false of the actual denotation of the description used, the proposition expressed by an
utterance containing a referentially-used definite description will be false. I intend to
address this issue once I have laid out my proposal a bit more fltlly it's my belief that a
reasonable explanation for this intuition should fall naturally from the account. My
answer to (a), then, is that there is a truth-conditional distinction between referential and
attributive uses.
How about question (c), the question of what contribution definite descriptions
make to the propositions expressed by utterances in which they appear? I believe, along
with Donnellan and Recanati, among others, that the proposition expressed by an
utterance containing an attributively-used definite description is object-independent,
whereas the proposition expressed by an utterance containing a refentially-used definite
description is object-dependent. How, then, do these different interpretations arise? I
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want first to give the outline of an answer before working briefly through a couple of
examples to show how the whole thing might go in practice. In outline the answer looks
like this: as I've already suggested, what is semantically encoded by definite descriptions
does no more than constrain the hearer's search for an interpretation to an individual
concept containing the information x uniquely s€#Lfles the descrqtion's nominal
p?vperty. The gap between this encoded meaning and the propositional constituent
corresponding to the description is filled by inferential pragmatic processes guided by
considerations of relevance. The difference between referential and attril,utive
interpretations of definite descriptions amounts to no more than this: in some contexts
the optimally relevant interpretation of a description will be a de re individual concept, in
other contexts it will be a descriptive individual concept.
As Isuggested, this might all be a bit clearer iflwork briefly througha couple of
examples. Let me remind vu of sentence (1) and its two proposed interpretations,
repeated here as (18), (19) and (20):
18) The Ferrari driver has an unfair advantage
19) The Ferrari driver, whoever he is, has an unfair advantage
20) Jones has an unfair advantage
Let's deal with the referential interpretation, (20), first. Remember that, in the imagined
context for (20), speaker and hearer are standing in the pit lane looking at a driver,
Jones, who they believe to be the Ferrari driver and who is scheming with the race
organiser. In that context it is mutually manifest to speaker and hearer that both have (or
are capable of acquiring) a de re concept of Jones, since, however we define the
epistemic relationship requisite for de re thought, we're going to want to say that the
speaker and hearer in this case both have sufficiently close epistemic contact with Jones
to be able to entertain a de re concept of him. The speaker then utters (18) and sets the
hearer on a hunt for an individual concept which includes the information xis a unique
Ferrari driver. There seem to be two obvious candidates, one a descriptive concept
something which denotes whoever is the Ferrari driver in this race and the other a de re
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concept of Jones, standing in front of him. The question is, which one does he accept?
And the answer to this, on a relevance theoretic picture, is going to depend on which
concept offers him more contextual eflëcts. It's not hard to see, then, which this will be
in the proposed context: since the hearer believes Jones to be the Ferrari driver, any
contextual effects carried by the descriptive interpretation come along lbr free with the
de re interpretation. However, the de re interpretation also has additional contextual
effects: it might, for instance, contain the information that Jones s wearing a red helmet,
in which case the hearer could inlër that the driver with a red helmet has an unfair
advantage and so on. In this context, then, the de re interpretation is going to be
optimally relevant since it oilers the hearer more contextual effects for no extra
processing effort; the description will, therefore, be interpreted referentially.
Now let's consider (19), the attributive interpretation. Remember that in the
imagined context for (19), speaker and hearer are discussing a race; they do not know
who the Ferrari driver is, they merely know that whoever he is, he has an unfair
advantage since he will be allowed to start the race in front of the other cars. Again the
speaker utters (18) and the hearer starts his hunt for an individual concept. What options
are open to him this time? Notice that the hearer, in this context, has no de rr concept of
the Ferrari driver in question: that is simply what is meant by saying that he doesn't
know who the Ferrari driver Lr. So the first individual concept he will access will be the
descriptive concept of the Ferrari driver in the race under discussion, i.e. a satisfactional
concept containing information such as 'is a racing driver', 'drives a Ferrari', 'is driving a
Ferrari in this race' and so on. He will then, as ever, assess this interpretation for optimal
relevance and, given that it will have enough contextual effects - the race is unfair, the
Ferrari driver is likely to be the winner, the other drivers may complain - for no undue
processing effort, he should accept it as the intended interpretation.
Does this entail that wherever a referential interpretation is available, a hearer
should accept it as the intended interpretation? Although this wil standardfy be the case,
for reasons along the lines presented above, there are certain situations in which,
although speaker and hearer are both capable of entertaining de e representations of the
individual which uniquely falls within the denotation of a descrqt.on, nevertheless an
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attributive interpretation of that description will be optimally relevant. The clearest
examples are those in which, by using a definite description, a speaker who intended her
utterance to express a singular proposition would be putting her hearer to gratuitous
processing effort. Consider the following situation: Wimbledon fortnight has just ended
and Lleyton Hewitt has won the men's singles title, a fact that is mutually manliest to A
and B. A then utters (21):
21) 1 bet the winner of this year's Wimbledon men's singles title also wins the US
open
How is B going to interpret the definite description 'the winner of this year's Wimbledon
men's singles title'? As with all definite descriptions, the hearer's task is to find the
optimally relevant individual concept containing the descriptive content of the
description. But will this be a de re concept or a descriptive concept in the given
context? The de reinterpretation is eliminated on the grounds that, had that been A's
intended interpretation, there is at least one alternative utterance available to her which
would have put her hearer to less effort for the same contextual effects, namely (22):
22) I bet Lleyton Hewitt also wins the US open
The optimally relevant interpretation must, therefore, be the attributive one, on which A
wins the bet if whoever won 'Wimbledon also wins the US open. 11 for instance, Hewitt
is stripped of his Wimbledon title and David Nalbandian is awarded the title in his stead,
A's bet will depend on whether Nalbandian wins the US open or not. it is thus the case
that, although an available referential interpretation will normally be optimally relevant,
this will not always be so.
This, then, is the outline of my proposaL definite descriptions encode procedures
instncting the hearer to access an individual concept associated with the information x
uniquely satLrfles the description's nominal. The rest is left to pragmatic inlbrence
guided by considerations of relevance. The distinction between referential ami attributive
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interpretations arises, on this picture, not as a product of the encoded meaning of
descriptions, nor, indeed, in some sense, as a product of the interpretation pmcess in all
cases the interpretation of definite descriptions proceeds along the same lines, leading the
hearer from encoded meaning to the optinially relevant individual concept in the context.
The referential-attnlxitive distinction lies, rather, at the level of the mud-world
relationship: although all definite descriptions lead to individual concepts, some of those
concepts, those which are de ,, are anchored in a particular way to objects in the world,
and thus give rise to singular truth conditions, whereas others, those which are
descriptive, are not so anchored and give rise to general truth conditions.
As I have already mentioned, however, I am fir from being the &st to argue that
the referential-attributive distinction is truth-conditional at the same time as advocating a
univocal semantics for definite descriptions. How, then, does the account proposed
above differ from others within this 'yes-no' tradition, and why? What we might call the
'standard' account within this tradition takes the attributive reading as prior, Ic. as the
lexically encoded meaning of descriptions. The referential reading is then accessed in the
appropriate context via an extra interpretive step. Recanati (1993), for example,
proposes a synecdochic step from the descriptive concept encoded by tthe description to
a de re concept of which the encoded concept is a part. Within the framework I have
adopted, however, there is a problem fbr any account of this type. If we are to take the
central role played by relevance seriously, then we must accept, with Sperber and Wilson
(1986/95) that each utterance communicates a guarantee of its own optimal relevance.
One aspect of this guarantee is that there should be no alternative utterance (compatible
with the speaker's abilities and preferences) which would have allowed the bearer to
access the same interpretation for less processing effort. On any 'attributive-encoding'
account, however, there will always be an utterance available to the speaker which would
satisfy precisely this condition: the equivalent complex demonstrative. In other words, if
attributive encoding is right, a speaker who intends her hearer to aecess a referential
interpretation of 'the F' could have achieved the same result while putting her hearer to
less effort by uttering 'that F'. There is, of course, no current consensus on the precise
encoding and interpretation of complex demonstratives and I shall come on to discuss
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this question at some length in the next chapter. On most analyses, however, the
proposition expressed by an utterance containing a complex demonstrative in subject
position is singular; lbr many this is the key distinction between definite and complex
demonstratives. If this is the case, then I seems clear that the one-step interpretive
procedure from demonstrative utterances to singular propositions will put the hearer to
less processing effort than the two-step procedure from 'the F' to singular proposition
proposed on the 'attributive-encoding' account. This leaves us with the worrying result
that referential interpretations of definite description sentences should never achieve
optimal relevance and shouki, there1bre never be accepted.
The analysis I have proposed above, however, avoids this unwanted conclusion.
On this account, the encoded meaning and interpretation of definite descriptions is
essentially blind to the referential-attributive distinction: the optimally relevant
interpretation of a particular utterance of a description will simply be the most accessible
concept containing the information x L uniquey F to offer enough contextual effects !br
no undue processing eflbrt, whether that concept is descriptive or de i. In contrast to
the 'attributive-encoding'-type account, the interpretative path from definite description
to referential reading involves just one step. It should, thus, put the hearer to no more
processing effort than the equivalent complex demonstrative and so can achieve optimal
relevance.
A further advantage ofthe account proposed is that it can deal with the data
upon which the main alternative to a Russellian semantics relies. While Russell's account
focuses on the uniqueness implication apparently carried by definite descriptions, a
parallel tradition, advocated, in one Ibmi or another, by, lbr instance, Helm (1988) and
Kempson (1986), lbcuses on the familiarity or accessibility associated with definite
descriptions. Consider the Ibilowing sentence:
23) Acatandamouseareinthehall;thecatisabouttoeatthemouse
For Helm (1988), such examples suggest that what definite descriptions encode is not
uniqueness but familiarity. Building this into her overall file change semantics
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programme, definite descriptions instruct a hearer to update an existing file, whereas
indefinite descriptions instruct the bearer to initiate a new file. This view has come under
attack on the basis that, although definite descriptions are standardly used to talk about
the familiar, they can be used to introduce new referents. Consider, for instance, (24):
24) The oldest panda in China is coming to London Zoo
An utterance of(24) can clearly be understood by a hearer who had no pre-existing file
on the oldest panda in China. Helm has mounted a defence against this objection on
which there are mechanisms which link such descriptions to existing files. It seems to me,
however, that a more natural explanation of this data falls from the account proposed
above, along with standard communicative principles. There seems to me to be no need
to propose that definite descriptions encode anything like familiarity. Remember that, on
the account I propose, what a definite description does encode is an instruction to access
an individual concept. What, then, if the hearer does not have, or is not able to acquire,
the intended individual concept? In this case the speaker would be putting her hearer to
gratuitous (indeed fruitless) processing effort, thus guaranteeing that her utterance will
fail to be optimally relevant. In order to comply with the presumption of optimal
relevance, a speaker who uses a definite description must have reason to believe that the
individual concept which is the intended interpretation of the description is either already
in the hearer's conceptual repertoire (i.e. is familiar), or is accessible to the bearer. The
familiarity or accessibility standardly associated with definite descriptions therefore fail
out naturally from the semantics proposed, ii tandem with the presumption of optimal
relevance.
At this stage I should tidy up a couple of loose ends. I suggested earlier that my
account would be able to handle the Wiggins-type intuition that, in cases of
misdescription, the truth value of an utterance will depend on whoever the description
denotes, not on the individual the speaker is intending to reflr to. There are two things I
would like toy on this point. Firstly, I agree with Reimer (1998), who argues that the
supposedly pre-theoretical intuitions of the opposing camps in this debate are, in reality,
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anything but pre-theoreticaL They are, rather, heavily influenced by the theoretical
preconceptions that each camp brings to the debate. But secondly, it does not seem to
me to be necessary to oppose Wiggins' intuition in order to maintain a truth-
conditionally significant referentiallattril,utive distinction. Recall the distinction that I
drew in chapter 2 between two types of speaker intention, informative and derivationaL
What seems to be going on in cases of misdescription is that these intentions are in some
sense conflicting. Of course it may be that speaker and hearer are entirely unaware of any
conflict, since they are both labouring under the same misapprehensioat Nevertheless, in
the sort of cases under discussion it is part of the speaker's derivational intention to use
her intended referent's unique F-ness to guide her hearer towards a particular
interpretation. From the omniscient perspective adopted by the meaning theorist, there
are therefore two clear and conflicting intentions, one to refer to a particular object and
the other to guide the hearer to that object via its unique F-ness. As discussed in chapter
2, intuitions may be weighted towards either of these intentions, thus giving rise to the
split intuitions so commonly found hi discussions of the semantics of definite
descriptions.
Finally, I want briefly to examine a couple of other uses of definite descriptions
mentioned earlier: generic and functional uses. On generic uses I have no more to say
than that, so long as one is prepared to accept types as well as tokens into one's
ontology, generic uses of definite descriptions are only to be expected on the above
account: generic interpretations merely involve retrieving individual concepts which
represent type-level individuals. Functional uses, such as (5), repeated here as (25):
25) The president of the United States changes every four years
raise rather more complex issues and have recently received much attention in the
literature on descriptions. Recanati (1993), for instance, abandons an earlier account (see
Recanati (1989)) partly due to what he perceives as is inability to handle such uses. I
wouki like tentatively to suggest that flmctional uses may, in fact, be something of a red
herring. There are, alter all, certain features which distinguish functional from other uses
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of definite descriptwns: most notably, unless one wishes to introduce individuals
comprising sequences of individuals into one's ontology, functional uses do not denote
individuals. It seems to me that this might support an account of functional uses along
somewhat different lines from those proposed for, among others referential and
attributive uses. One attractive possibility is that functional uses may be metalinguistic; in
concrete terms, an utterance of (25) may express a proposition to the effect that the
denotation of the descriptive individual concept correspondmg to 'the President of the
United States' changes every four years. But how might a hearer reach this
interpretation? As ever, his first step must be to search for an optimally relevant
individual concept. So what candidate concepts could there be? There might be a
candidate de re concept of George W. Bush, giving the overall utterance interpretation in
(26):
26) George W. Bush changes every four years
But this interpretation will, under most circumstances, làil to achieve optimal relevance:
finding a context in which (26) offers sufficient contextual effects to be relevant will put
the hearer to a great deal of processing effort". This interpretation will therefore be
rejected and another accessed, maybe a descriptive concept of whoever happens to be
the president. But again, under most circumstances, such an interpretation will full to
achieve optimal relevance for much the same reasons as above. Having fulled to find an
optimally relevant individual concept, the hearer will, on the strength of the
communicated presumption of optimal relevance, be justified in searching for an
interpretation beyond those immediately made available by the semantic encoding of the
definite description. A metalinguistic interpretation will yield sufficient contextual effects
to be relevant - such as, fur instance, that Presidential elections must take place every
Ibur years, the current President has nearly four years of his term left - with minimal
processing effort and should thus be accepted as optimally relevant. I admit that this is a
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speculative story on functional uses, but it seems to me that it opens up a possibility that
might well bear further investigatkrn. The key point is that, if something along these lines
is right, flmctional uses should receive a different kind of analysis from those given fur
referential and attributive (etc.) uses.
53 Conclusion
In this chapter I have undertaken two more or less separate tasks: firstly I have
attempted to lay out the main strands in the ongoing debate on the semantics and
pragmatics of definite descriptions, strands that I have labelled the yes- and no-theoretic
positions. In the process I hope I have convinced you of the following: what separates
the two positions is the product of a theoretical error, more than of any fundamental
dispute over the data. Given that the two good insights discussed above are incompatible
if one accepts the bad assumption, each camp has taken one of the insights and built it
into a theory which excludes the other. Having shown this, I then set about putting
forward a proposal on definite descriptions which allows both good insights to be
accommodated within one theory. The key to this proposal is abandoning the bad
assumption, i.e. accepting that pragmatic inference has a central role to play in the
retrieval of propositional content. Once this is accepted an account on which a univocal
semantics for definite descriptions leads to diflrent truth conditions becomes available.
The account I have proposed posits a univocal semantics for definite descriptions
which is indeterminate between referential and attributive readings (among others). One
upshot of the particular account I have proposed is that the distiactk)n between
referential and attributive interpretations of descriptions is the product not of the
relationship between language and mind, but of the relationship between mind and world:
it arises because of a distinction between the kind of link that exists between de ,
concepts and the world and the kind of link that exists between descriptive concepts and
the world This seems to me to be yet more evidence if evidence is needed, that the real
Of oourse that's rn* to say that thae arm't some amtexts in s4iich this mtprctatiim would athieve
optimal relevance and vuId thus be aceepted - imagine, r instance, (26) as a axitribition to a
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domain of truth-conditionai semantics is not sentences of natural language but
propositions, i.e. sentences in the language of thought.
conversation about how often cdebrities thange their clothes.
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Chapter 6
Complex demonstratives
6.0
Over the last few years, the philosophical debate on the referring-denoting distinction
has shifted its focus. Donnellan (1966) placed definite descriptions at the heart of the
debate, and for three decades or so, they stayed there. Recently, however, definite
descriptions have been usurped by what have variously been called demonstrative
descriptions, complex 'that '-phrases and complex demonstratives (I shall stick to this
last throughout). Complex demonstratives, which at a first pass we can think of as any
expression of the form 'that F', pose a particular problem for the truth-conditional
semanticist toiling on the border between referring and denoting: on the one hand it
would seem that they are semantically closely linked to simple dernonstratives,
standardly taken to be the prototypical referring expressions, but on the other they
display the kind of syntactic complexity associated with definite descriptions and,
more broadly, with the class of quantifiers. For the standard truth-conditionalist, who
either overtly or tacitly accepts the hypothesis that all noun phrases must either be
referential or quantificational', this is an alarming state of affairs, and much ink has
been spilled in the effort to show that these apparently anomalous expressions do,
after all, behave in familiar ways. None of the stories currently on offer, however,
embodies the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth: some, while offering
nuggets of truth, are empirically inadequate; others offer much of the truth as far as
they go, but seek to delimit their field of inquhy in ways that, under scrutiny, reveal
themselves as unprincipled; and yet others offer what seem to me to be profound
insights into the workings of complex demonstratives, but fill at least at the hurdle of
theoretical parsimony.
I shall structure this chapter as I did the last: first I shall examine a cross
section of accounts from along the theoretical spectrum. My aim will be to unearth the
nuggets hidden within these analyses at the same time as demonstrating the
shortcomings of each. In the second part of the chapter, I want to take the insights
For overt fomilatioiis of this assuniption, see, for instance, Nee (1993) and Dover (2001).
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offered by these accounts and, with the help of a type of evidence used by none of
them, approach complex demonstratives from within the relevance-theoretic
framework..
6.1 Referentialism
It is more or less a gwen of philosophical semantics that if any expressions are
referential then simple demonstratives are. They seem to display more clearly than
any other expression-type what have been taken to be the two key features of
referentiality: they track individuals across possible worlds and their empty uses lead
to propositional thilure. ff1 utter (I):
1) Thatisfilthy
then the truth of my utterance will depend, in any possible world, on the object I have
referred to in the actual world; if say, I have pointed at a whiteboard while uttering
(1), then my utterance will be true at a possible world if that very whiteboard is filthy
at that world2. 1f on the other hand, I utter (1) without intending to refer to anything
by my use of 'that', then intuitively it seems that my utterance falls to express any
proposition; what would have to be the case, after all, for my utterance to be true?
If one accepts that simple demonstratives are referential, there would seem to
be at least a strong pull towards extending this story to complex demonstratives3.
Simple demonstratives, after all, form a syntactic part of their complex brethren and
furthennore their uses seem semantically very closely allied, if I utter (1) while
pointing at a particular whiteboard, then it would seem that what I have said is much
the same as what I would have said by pointing at the same whiteboard while uttering
(2):
2) That whiteboard is filthy
21 don't intend to suggest here that the denionstratwn is itself semantically significant, 1*4 rather that it
pen the hearer a way in to the speaker's intentions, whidi are semantically significant
I hope it gnca without saying that I am not myself supporting the j,iew that sinq,le danonstratives are
referaitial; I sin merely frying to represent a pertioulsi view c4demonstratives, a view which diflins
fimdamaitally from my own.
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It also seems that our use of a complex demonstrative in (2) passes the tests for
referentiality mentioned above: the truth of the proposition expressed by an utterance
of (2) wIll depend on the veiy same object across possible worlds and if in uttering
(2), I fail to pick out a particular object by my use of 'that whiteboard', then again it
seems that my utterance fails to express any proposition. Given this evidence, an
entirely straightforward account of complex demonstratives seems to present itself.
they are referential, just as are simple demonstratives; their contribution to
propositional content goes no further than their referent
But what role will be played on such a story by the nominal element of the
complex demonstrative (the 'F' in 'that F')? Maybe, on the model of simple
demonstratives, they play no more role than the contextual cues that guide us toward
the object a speaker intends to refer to as 'that'; they may, in other words, merely play
a pragmatic role in helping the hearer assign reference. This proposal, advocated by,
for instance, Larson and Segal (1995), has at least one immediate implication that has
seemed unpalatable to many: the nominal element of a complex demonstrative
comprises a meaningful NP, so why should the meaning of this NP simply disappear
from utterance content? For the compositional semanticist, and for some who are not
so wedded to compositionality, disappearing meanings have been seen as very
unwelcome theoretical artefhcts. But there are other problems beyond this for the
simple referential thesis. Utterances with complex demonstratives in subject position
(henceforth complex demonstrative utterances) seem to give rise to entaihnents which
are incompatible with simple referentiality. Consider (3) and (4):
3) Thatgreen car isvery old
4) Some green car is very old
There does on the face of it seem to be an entailment from (3) to (4), yet the simple
refereiialist has no story to tell about this: for her, sentence (3) expresses the same
proposition as would (5), uttered while pointing at the appropriate green cac
5) Thatisveiyold
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and there is surely no temptation to think that (5) entails (4) (there may, of course, be
an entailment once we add the extra premise that that is a green car, but this is not
what's at issue here). How might the referentialist try to rescue her story, which after
all seems to be firmly rooted in intuition, from this challenge? One strategy, adopted
in differing forms by Kaplan (1978, 1 989a, I 989b), Braun (1994) and Borg (2000), is
to locate the contribution of the nominal not in utterance content but in Kaplanian
character. On this kind of story, the nominal 'green car' in (4) would constrain the
reference of 'that green car' to something that is, in flict, a green car, and then drop
out of the picture. How does this help with the difficulties fliced by our initial story?
Firstly, on this type of account the nominal does make a semantic contribution, albeit
not a contribution to propositional content. Secondly, although it still sees no actual
entaihnent between, for instance, the propositions expressed by utterances of(3) and
(4), it does at least have a story to tell about why there should appear to be an
entailment: since the complex demonstrative 'that green car' can only be used to refer
to something that is, in füct, a green car, an utterance of (3) cannot express a true
proposition unless some green car is very old. In other words, although the
proposition expressed by (3) does not entail the proposition expressed by (4), (6) is
valid in the sense of Kaplan (e.g. 1989b):
6) If that green car is very old, then some green car is very old.
which is, for the character-theorist, close enough to explain the illusion of entailment.
For Dever (2001), however, these solutions tail to do the work we want of
them: firstly, what we're trying to explain about (3) and (4) is not the illusion of an
entailment but an actual entailment, and secondly, a story on which the nominal
element of a complex demonstrative contributes merely to character and not to
content violates semantic innocence, the principle that the same expression should
display the same semantic behaviour regardless of the linguistic context in which it
appears. Dever himself proposes a story which, although closely affied to Braun's
character-theoretic analysis, can cope with these supposed problems. His story falls
within what seems to be a growing trend in philosophical semantics for multiple-
proposition analyses, ie. analyses on which single utterances standardly express more
than one proposition. Abstracting away from the stactic minutiae, Dever's story
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amounts to the proposal that 'that F is (3' expresses a sequence of two propositions:
the primary proposition that that is G, i.e. the referential proposition expressed on all
the accounts we've looked at so far, and the secondary proposition that that is F.
I am unsure as to how impressed we should be by the purported problems with
the character-theoretic account which motivate Dever's story. Firstly, as Dever
himself points out, there's little evidence to support the view that there is an actual,
rather than merely apparent, entailment between, for instance, (3) and (4); and
secondly, as I have argued in Powell (2002), there are good reasons why we should
not expect semantic innocence to hold at the level of propositional content, but rather
should relegate it to the lower level of linguistic meaning. Whether or not you are
inclined to agree with me on this, there is a rather more fundamental problem facing
Dever's account, and indeed facing all of the referentialist accounts we have so far
looked at: as King (1999, 2001) shows, complex demonstratives seem to have non-
referential uses. In particular, King points to three different types of uses of complex
demonstratives which, he argues, present the referentialist with difficulties. Firstly
there are what he terms no demonstration no speaker reference (NDNS) uses. He asks
us to consider Scott who, in the course of a lecture on hominid history, utters (7):
7) That hominid who discovered how to start fires was a genius.
Here Scott has no particular individual in mind to whom he intends to refer by his use
of 'that hominid' and equally, it seems, his hearer need not think of any particular
individual as 'that hominid' in order to understand Scott's utterance.
Secondly King points to quantifying in (QI) uses, uses on which a quantifier
outside the complex demonsirative binds an anaphoric element inside:
8) Eveiy father dreads that moment when his eldest child leaves home.
And finally there are narrow scope (NS) uses, on which complex demonstratives seem
to occur within the scope of other quantifiers:
9) That professor who brought in the biggest grant in each division will be
honored
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There seem to be two possible interpretations of(9), one on which one and the same
professor brought in the biggest grant in each division mid 'that professor' refers to
her, and one on which 'that professor' occurs within the ope of 'each division' and
thus picks out, for each division, the unique professor who brought in the biggest
grant in that division. On the latter interpretation, the complex demonstrative has an
NS occurrence.
On none of these types of use does the complex demonstrative appear to be
functioning referentially: NDNS uses pattern with Donnellan (1966)'s attributive uses
of definite descriptions in allowing 'whoever he is/was' to be inserted after the NP:
1O)That hominid who discovered how to start fires, whoever he was, was a
genius.
which at least strongly suggests that they should receive a non-referential analysis. As
for QI and NS uses, there seems little temptation to analyse them referentially: what
could possibly count as the referent of 'that moment when his eldest child leaves
home' in (8) or 'that professor who brought in the biggest grant in each division' in
(9)?
On the f1ce of it, the existence of such non-referential uses of complex
demonstratives seems to rule out any straighfforwardly referential account. Many
referentialists, however, have recognised such uses (in particular QI uses) without
apparently feeling the need to abandon their accounts and start again. The approach of
Lepore and Ludwig (2000) is typical:
Sometimes, of course, "that" is pressed into seivice as a variant of
"the", and one could imagine someone uttering (21) ['Eveiy man loves
that woman who is his mother'] with that in mind. We are not
concerned with such uses of "that", but rather with demonstrative uses.
Lepore and Ludwig (200, p.219 lh.28)
We can take this exclusion in two ways: either Lepore and Ludwig (and others who
support this approach to non-referential uses) are not ii the business of studying
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language itself but are, rather, concerned with pinning down the truth-conditions of
particular uses of language, or there is an implicit assumption in the passage above
that there are two different 'that's in play, one referential and one non-referential. If
we are to take the first reading then Lepore and Ludwig are simply not engaged in the
same enquiry as, for instance, King Dever and myselt lIZ however, we are to take the
second reading, explicitly advocated by Dever, then the referentialist may still have a
claim to provide a complete account of the expression-type he has in his sights, i.e.
referential complex demonstratives.
The burden of proof is, here, on the referentialist All things being equal, and
with our lesson on parsimony lean* from Grice and modified Occani's razor, we
should be ready to reject a story which posits an ambiguity hi 'that' for one that posits
none. Presuming we can tell a story about 'that' which doesn't require us to posit an
ambiguity (and I aim to do just this in the latter part of this chapter), the referentialist
must therefore convince us that there really is an ambiguity if he is to overcome the
methodological bias against his story. Dever attempts to give at least some evidence
to show that 'that' is ambiguous (apart from his observation that the Oxford English
Dictionary supports this view, which I don't intend to worry about too much). His key
evidence is that, in examples such as (8), substituting 'this' for 'that' leads to
infeliity
11) Every father dreads this moment when his eldest child leaves home.
Given that, for referential uses of 'that', this substitution is unproblematic, Dever
concludes that the 'that' in, for instance, (8) is simply a diftrent kxemc from the
'that' in, for instance, (2). There is, however, an undefended assumption in Dever's
argument that seems to be at least questionable: that because 'this' and 'that' are
substitutable in referential contexts, their semantics must be such that they are
substitutable hi all contexts. But there is a clear and familiar difference between the
semantics of 'this' and the semantics of 'that': 'this' is used to pick out objects which
arebysomestandardneartothespeaker,while'that' isusedtopickoutobjects
which arenotnearthespeaker.Thereisalsosomeevidencetosuggestthat'that' is,in
some sense, a default, whereas 'this' is marked consider, for instance, that, however
close something is to the speaker, so long as there is not another further object which
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she might be taken to be referring to, she may refer to it as 'that'; whereas a speaker
who refers to something distant as 'this', whether or not there is a candidate nearer
object, is at least speaking infelicitously. It seems to me that it may be just this
dimension of the semantics of 'this' and 'that' that is responsible for the infelicity of
(11): on the one hand the speaker's use of the complex demomstrative is descriptive,
thus picking out no particular individual, but on the other the is indicating, by her use
of 'this' rather than 'that', that what she is talking about is relatively near to her. It
may well be the incompatibility between these two that leads to infelicity.
Whether or not you accept this argument, the point I want to stress is that the
infelicity of utterances like (11) may well be explicable in terms other than the
ambiguity of 'that'. Until we have stronger empirical evidence to support the view
that 'that' is ambiguous, therefore, we should, on methodological grounds, prefer a
univocal semantics for 'that'. In the next section I shall look at some accounts of this
type.
6.2 Quantificationalism
The point we seem to have reached is this: given the lack of evidence for an
ambiguity, we are on the hunt for a univocal semantics for cemplex demonstratives,
but one that allows for both referential and non-referential ises. Where might this
hunt lead us? On the assumption that all NPs are either referential or quantificational,
there seems only one direction open to us: complex demonstratives are
quantificationaL But what might a quantificational semantics for complex
demonstratives look like? Neale (1993) outlines a story on which 'that F is G' is
equivalent to 'the actual F I am demonstrating is G' a*l on which complex
demonstratives take mandatory wide scope. The advantage of this account, fbr Neale,
is that it gives the content of the nominal a role to play in utterance content, thus
fitting with the intuition mentioned earlier that meanings shouldn't simply vanish. It
is, however, as Lepore and Ludwig (2000) point out, not only ad hoc in that there is
no clear reason why the complex demonstrative should always take wide scope, but
also empirically inadequate: it has no story to tell about why die failure of a complex
demonstrative to designate should result hi the failure of the utterance in which it
appears to express a proposition (this is not, after all, a property of definite
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descriptions); and it predicts, wrongly, that an utterance by s of 'that F is (3' entails
that s exists. We thus need something rather more subtle if we are to place complex
dcmonstratives within the class of quantifiers.
Two recent accounts, those of King (2001) and Lepore and Ludwig (2000),
attempt to provide just that something. Lepore and Ludwig's account is based on the
premise that, contrary to superficial appearance, complex demonstratives are not
syntactically formed by the concatenation of a quantifier 'that' and a nominal. Instead
they are restricted quantifiers with the quantifier element suppressed and both 'that'
and the nominal contributing to the restrictor. In essence, as Lepore and Ludwig make
clear, their story treats 'that F is (3' as equivalent to [The x: xthat and x is F](x is
(3)4• I suspect that, as far as it goes, this story may have a certain amount to
recommend it. But, as mentioned earlier, Lepore and Ludwig are only in the business
of accounting for referential uses of complex demonstratives. 1f therefore, we accept,
as I have argued we should, that there are truly non-referential uses of complex
demonstratives, then our hunt for a satisfactory account continues.
King (2001) offers a story which is specifically tailored to account for both
referential and non-referential uses of complex demonstratives. On his analysis,
complex demonstratives are profoundly context-sensitive quantifiers, depending on
context not just for which properties are to be taken as determining the intended
referent, but also for whether that referent is to be tracked across possible worlds or
not. For King, the lexical meaning of 'that' (as it appears in complex demonstrative
constructions; he only tentatively suggests that the outline of his account might be
extended to simple demonstratives) is a four-place relation:
____ and ____ areuniquely____ inanobjectxandxis
King (2000, p.13)
The first argument place, on this story, isto be filled bythepropertyexpressed by the
nominal, the second by a property determined by speaker intention, the third either by
jointly instantiated or jointly instantiated in <w, 1> and the fourth by whatever
property is expressed by the predicate. There are for King two fundamentally different
kinds of intention that can determine the property to saturate the second argument
4 Lq,orc and Ludwig (2000, p.215)
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place: either the speaker may have a perceptual intention, which may inchide both
intentions towards objects of immediate perception and towards remembered objects
of past perception, or she may have a descriptive Intention, i.e. am intention towards
whatever satisfies some descriptive condition. Which of these two kinds of intention
she has will make a difference not only to the first-order property that saturates the
second argument position but also to the second-order property that saturates the third
argument position. lithe speaker has a perceptual intention, towards the object a say,
then the second argument position will be saturated by the property of being identical
to a and the third by the property of being jointly Instantiated in <w, I>, where w and t
are to be taken rigidly to designate the world and time of utterance. it: however, the
speaker's intention is descriptive, then the second argument position will be saturated
by whatever property her intention determines, and the third by the property of being
jointly instantiated.
Let me work through a couple of examples to illustrate how this story is
supposed to go. Consider first a classic referential use of a complex demonstrative:
Janet and John are at a party and, seeing a man across the room, Janet says:
12)That man wearing a kipper tie has no dress sense.
What proposition will Janet's utterance have expressed on King's story? The first
parameter wifi be saturated with the property of being a man weaiing a kipper tie, the
second, since Janet has a perceptual intention concerning the mam in the kipper tie,
with the property of being (identical to) , where is the very individual In question,
and the third, again because Janet's intention is perceptual, with wiiq uely jointly
instantiated in <vi, p. Finally, the fourth parameter will be saturated with the
property of having no dress sense. What, then, will this amount to? It amounts to the
claim that Janet's utterance will be true in any circumstance of evaluation 1ff there is,
in the context of Janet's utterance, one and only one thing which is both a man
wearing a kipper tie and also , and that thing has no dress sense in the circumstance.
Next let's take a non-referential use, say an utterance of the sentence in (7).
What truth conditions will King's account predict for this? Here the first parameter
will be filled with the property of being a hominid who discovered fire the second
with the same property, since the speaker's intention Is simply to talk about whoever
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satisfies the nominal, and the third, since the speaker's intention is descriptive, with
are uniquely jointly instantiated. Finally again the fourth parameter will be filled by
the property of being a genius. King's prediction here, then, is that an utterance of(7)
will be true in a circumstance if there is one and only one hominid who invented fire
in that circumstance and he is a genius in that circumstance5.
What advantages does this complex semantics have over the simpler story told
by Neale (1993)? One clear advantage is that it falls at neither of the two hurdles
mentioned above: firstly, the proposition expressed by an utterance of 'that F is G'
will not include any mode of presentation of the speaker, and thus will not entail that
the speaker exists. Secondly, where there is nothing which the speaker refers to with a
perceptual use of 'that F' (the use that referentialists are worried about), there is no
property of being identical to the object of the speaker's perceptual intention to
saturate the second argument position, and thus no complete proposition expressed. It
also satisfies the referentialist's other intuition about referential uses: that in such uses
the referent of the complex demonstrative is tracked across possible worlds. On
King's story, the truth value of a complex demonstrative utterance backed by a
perceptual intention will, in any possible world, depend on the object of the speaker's
intention ii the context of utterance.
That it can handle non-referential uses at the same time as accommodating the
fundamental intuitions upon which the referentialist bases his story seems to be strong
evidence in favour of King's account. Unfortunately, not only is King's account a
paradigmatic example of Ptolemaic semantics, it is also empirically inadequate. Any
story on which complex demonstratives are quantificational is going to have to show
that they enter into scopal interactions with other quantifiers, modal operators etc.
Views in the literature are radically divided on this, with the dividing line not
surprisingly running between referentialists and quantificationalists. For Dever
(2001), for instance, complex demonstratives cannot enter into scopal relations,
whereas %r King (2001) they can. Dever of course excludes King's QI and NS uses
from the class of complex demonstratives, and with NS uses in particular, we've
already seen what seems to be a scope ambiguity involving a complex demonstrative:
(9) has two readings, one on which the complex demonstrative falls within the scope
of the quantifier 'each division', and one on which the scopal relation is reversed. But
5 1'm ionng the past tcnse hae siny r case of presadation.
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what of those uses of complex demonstratives which are supported by perceptual
intentions, i.e. those uses at the heart of the referentialist's story? As Dever points out,
cases in which complex demonstratives occur in sentences with uncontroversial
quantifiers are not going to be of much help herc. To see why, consider (13):
13)Eveiy woman in the room likes that man over there.
On King's story, this sentence should equate to two sets of truth conditions which will
look roughly like (14) and (15):
14)For all x such that x is a woman in the room the properties of being a man over
there and being identical to are uniquely jointly instantiated in <w, t> by y
and x likes y.
15)The properties of being a man over there and being identical to are uniquely
jointlyinstantiatedin<w,t>byyandlbrallxsuchthatxisawomaninthe
room x likes y.
But, although these sets of truth conditions may differ in their scope relations, their
truth values will covary across contexts. There is thus no way to establish whether
(13) really does equate to (14) and (15). Sentences in which complex demonstratives
co-occur with verbs of propositional attitude, however, are a diflrent matter. Dever
asks usto consider the example in (16):
16)Albert believes that upright citizen is a spy.
For King these should be a reading of (16) on which Albeit holds a contradictory
beiet i.e. the belief that the property of being an upright citizen and being are
uniquely jointly instantiated in <w, t> byx andx isa spy. But there just doesn't seem
to be any such reading.
For both King and Lepore and Ludwig it is inportant that such readings should be
available, and both offer examples in which such narrow scope readings of
perceptually-used complex demonstratives relktive to verbs of propositional attitude
are supposedly available. Both, however, seen. to me to be examples of something
218
else. King asks us to imagine a party at which Alan has just been named CEO of
Chanticleer. Sherry, a Chanticleer employee who believes Alan hates her, arrives at
the party to hear the bad news. Two other party-goers are in conversation, when one
looks over to Sherry and, seeing that she is looking very glum, asks why. The other,
pointing at Alan, replies:
17) Sherry believes that guy who was just named CEO of Chanticleer hates her.
King then mounts an argument that runs like this: the utterance of (17) is an
explanation of Sherry's behaviour, if the complex demonstrative in (17) were
interpreted referentially (or as taking wide scope) (17) would not be an explanation of
Sherry's behaviour, since she has long believed that Alan hates her without wasting
any time moping about it; it must therefore be the case that the complex
demonstrative is interpreted as taking narrow scope with respect to the be lief operator,
thus placing the property of being just named CEO of Chanticleer within Sherry's
belief.
But this cannot be the reason that (17) is taken as an explanation of Sheny's
behaviour. Consider a slight variant on the context above: imagine that both speaker
and bearer know that Alan has not been appointed CEO of Chanticleer, but that
Sherry misguidedly believes he has. In this situation the reading that King takes to be
our natural interpretation of (17) will be plainly and straightforwardly true, since
Sherry does hold the belief that the properties of being just named CEO of Chanticleer
and being Alan are uniquely instantiated in x and x hates her. Yet an utterance of(1 7)
in such a context seems at best highly infelicitous. Given this, we would do well to
look elsewhere for a story on why an utterance of (17) acts as an explanation of
Sherry's behaviour, and we don't have far to look. Let's assume that, on the evidence
above, (17) expresses a singular proposition about Alan. Since it appears at a point in
the conversation at which the hearer is expecting an answer to his question, he will
interpret the utterance of(17) in that light; in other words, he will ask himself why
Sherry's belief that Alan hates her is making her glum. Now there is one property of
Alan that the speaker has made contextually highly salient by his choice of singular
expression: the property of being the newly-appointed CEO of Chanticleer. Putting
together the premise that Sherry believes that Alan hates her and the premise that
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Alan is the newly-appointed CEO of Chanticleer, along with various other premises
such as that Sherry works for Chanticleer, it shouldn't lake the hearer long to reach a
conclusion about the causes of Sherry's glumness. (17) can thus act as an explanation
of Sherry's behaviour without any need for a narrow scope interpretation.
Lepore and Ludwig tiy another tack. They ask us to consider Tom, Mary and
Maiy's companion in a restaurant Tom leans over to Mary and, pointing at a waiter
in white sneakers, says 'that man wearing white sneakers is a good waiter'. Mary,
who has fiiled to hear a part of Tom's utterance but who sees that the waiter Tom is
talking about is wearing Nike sneakers, turns to her companion and says 'Tom
believes that man wearing Nike sneakers is a good waiter', to which her companion,
who has better hearing, replies:
18) No, he thinks that man wearing white sneakers is a good waiter.
Lepore and Ludwig's argument then runs like this: lithe complex demonstrative in
(18) is analysed referentially (or as taking wide scope), Mary and her companion are
both attributing the same belief to Tom, i.e. the belief of the man in question that he is
a good waiter, since they are in disagreement, this cannot be the intended
interpretation; the complex demonstrative in (18) must therefore be interpreted as
taking narrow scope in relation to the belief operator, thus placing the property of
being a man wearing white sneakers within Tom's belief. But this argument is based
on a false assumption: that, if there is a disagreement between Mary and her
companion, it must be a disagreement on the content of Tom's belief. Consider the
following example, adapted from Carston and Noh (1995):
19)A: We went to the zoo and saw the hippopotamuses.
B: No, we went to the zoo and saw the hippopotami.
In (19) B is disagreeing with A, but her disagreement is not with the content of A's
utterance, it is, rather, with the linguistic form A has used to express that content: the
negation in (19) is metalinguistic. This type of analysis would seem to extend very
naturally to (18): what Mary is taking issue with is not the content of her companion's
utterance, which is simply the attribution of a singular belief to Tom, but the linguistic
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form her companion has used to express that content, which inaccurately mirrors the
linguistic form used by Tom to express his own beIief Gwen the availability of such
an analysis, this example seems to offer no finn evidence of scope interaction
between a complex demonstrative and a verb of propositional attitude.
Even clearer than propositional attitude contexts are sentences in which
complex demonstratives, used perceptually, co-occur with negation. Consider (20):
20) That policeman is not John's brother.
uttered while pointing, say, at a particular policeman. On any quantificational
account, (20) should admit of two interpretations. Sticking with King's story, those
two interpretations will look something like:
21)The properties of being and being a policeman are uniquely jointly
instantiated in <w, V by x, and it is not the case that x is John's brother.
22) It is not the case that the properties of being and being a policeman are
uniquely jointly instantiated in <w, P by x, and x is John's brother.
In other words, there should be a reading of(20) on which it will be true just in case
there is nothing which is a unique policeman who is here and now and which is
John's brother. But there doesn't seem to be any such reading: this is, after all, a
reading which would be true in the circumstance that the individual who is the object
of the speaker's intention is John's brother, just so long as he is not a policeman. King
mounts a defence against this kind of argument by invokuig pragmatic processes: in
perception-based cases, speakers are interested in getting their hearers to pick out the
objects of their perceptual intentions; to this end, they wiil pick, as the nominal, a
predicate which they believe their intended referent to satisf', and which will thus
help their hearers towards identil3,ing the intended referent; given this, they are not
going to want their utterances to be interpreted in such a way that they are true merely
by virtue of their referents not satis1'ing the nominal predicate. The key point of this
argument is that, with perceptual uses, narrow scope readings of complex
demonstratives relative to negation are pragmatically blocked. It seems to me,
however, that such readings are not so much blocked as absent. Consider (23):
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23) There is a flag hanging out of every window.
The sentence in (23) clearly has two scopal readings, one of which, the reading on
which 'a flag' takes scope over 'every window', is pragmatically blocked in most
contexts. But there are two things to note about (23): firstly, although this reading is
blocked, we can nevertheless make it out, and secondly, it is possible to manipulate
the context so that this reading becomes the natural one: suppose we are discussing a
factory across the road which prints huge flags and dries them after printing by
hanging them out of the window; the flags are often so large that, when drying, they
hang out of four of five windows, but this time they've excelled themselves; wanting
you to come and have a look, I utter (23). In such a context, the wide-scope existential
reading will be at least much less strongly suppressed than in a neutral context. These
two properties, the properties of being discernible and de-suppressible by contextual
manipulation, are typical of pragmatically suppressed scopal readings. Yet the
supposed suppressed reading of(20) has neither of these properties. Given this, the
only reason to suppose that there is such a reading is if one's theory requires it.
So where does our discussion of the referentialist and quantificationalist
strategies leave us? The referentialist seems to have a lot that is right to say about
referential uses of complex demonstratives; in particular, as the discussion of scope
above demonstrates, she is right to claim that, on referential uses, complex
demonstratives contribute nothing but their referents to propositional content.
However, she has nothing to say on non-referential uses which, as I hope I have
convinced you above, are genuine uses of complex demonstratives. The
quantificationalist, on the other hand, has a lot that is right to say about non-referential
uses (I shall expand on just how much of the quantificationalist's story is right later in
this chapter), but, again, given the scopal data above, has serious difficulties when
trying to account for referential uses.
6.3 Hybrid accounts
if referential uses are truth-conditionally singular, non-referential uses are truth-
conditionally general, and complex demonstratives are not ambiguous, what kind of
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story is there left to tell? Maybe the way forward is an account on which complex
demonstratives are hybrids of referring terms and quantifiers. Versions of this sort of
account have been advocated by Richard (1993) and Neale (1999)6. For Richard,
complex demonstratives are what he calls articulated tenns: they introduce not only
their referent to propositional content, but also some quasi-Fregean way of thinking of
that referent, as expressed by the nominal Quite what the truth conditions of a
complex demonstrative utterance will be on this story is slightly obscure: Ricbard
suggests that an utterance of 'that F is G' will be truth-conditionally equivalent k an
appropriately related utterance of 'that is F and that is G', in which case his story is
not really hybrid in the sense we are interested in, and will fall at the same hurdles as,
for instance, Dever's account (plus some others). The syntactic structures he assigns
to articulated terms, however, suggest that maybe his intention is to claim that
complex demonstrative utterances give rise to two parallel sets of truth conditions,
one singular and one general.
Whether this is Richard's view or not, it is clearly the view of Neale (1999).
For Neale, the lexical semantics of a complex demonstrative consist in a series of
instructions: initially, the hearer of 'that F is G' is instructed to build the descriptive
proposition in (24):
24) [the x: s is indicating x & Fx] Gx7
He is then instructed to find whichever object is the x such that s is indicating x and x
is F in the context, and build a second, singular proposition containing that object:
25)Gct8
The thrust of Neale's story is thus that complex demonstratives are not referential or
quantificational, they are referential and quantiflcationaL In tandem with this two-
proposition account, Neale tells a stoly about contextual weighting: in most contexts
'Of course one could, an, 1w iastasce, De does, see Lepore and Ludwig's ount an hybnd, and
eves pahaps King's, sinon they posit both quantificational and wtial aspects to the senanitica of
complex demoastratives. On both these staies, however, the IcfQItiaI aspects em embedded within a
uantificationaJ stnscture. They thus sn to be fimdnentaIfy quantificationalist
Nesle (1999, p.67)
'Neale (1999, p.67)
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it will be the proposition in (25) which will carry what he calls the contextual weight,
but in some 'exceptional circumstances'9 it will be the proposition in (24).
This story will not, however, do the work we need. And, to be fair to Neale, it
is not intended to do so, since, even in those contexts in which it is the descriptive
proposition that carries the contextual weight, Neale is still envisaging that there
should be a perceived object towards which the speaker has some referential
intention; he is, in essence, giving an account on which the kinds of uses of
demonstratives which lie at the heart of the referentialist story can be interpreted
(predominantly) descriptively, rather than one that can account for the purely
descriptive uses raised by King. On King's descriptive uses, there is no object towards
which the speaker has any referential intention; when Scott uses the expression 'that
hominid who discovered how to start fires' he has no individual in mind about whom
he wishes to be understood to be talking, rather he wants to talk about whoever is the
hominid who discovered how to start fires. In this kind of situation, Neale's first
proposition will be false, and his second proposition will simply not get off the
ground: since there is no x such that s is indicating x, it is, a fortiori, not the case that
((there is a unique x such that s is indicating x and x is F) and x is G); and, since
nothing satisfies the descriptive material in the general proposition, there is no object
for the singular proposition to be about.
We must therefore look for another kind of hybrid story, and it is the business
of the rest of this chapter to outline and defend an account of this sort.
6.4 Complex demonstratives and communication
All the accounts we have looked at so far agree, either tacitly or overtly, on
one underlying principle: that, whatever the meaning of complex demonstratives may
be, it must be analysed along more than one dimension. For character-theorists like
Braun (1994) and Borg (2000), a satisfactory account must recognise the different
contributions complex demonsiratives make to character and content; for
quantiflcationalists like King (2001), complex demonstratives are semantically
mandated to introduce into propositional content not just the property expressed by
their nominal but also a further property determined by context; and for hybridists
9 Nealc (1999, p.68)
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like Richard (1993) and Neale (1999), complex demonsirative contribute both the
property expressed by their nominal and their referent to propositional content, albeit,
on Neale's account at least, to the content of different propositions. All of these
different two-tier stories on complex demonstratives are expressions of the same
underlying intuition: that understanding a complex demonstrative involves both the
linguistically-given nominal and some extra non-linguistically-given (i.e. contextually
determined) element; when we understand 'that F', we understand firstly that what is
being talked about is an F, and secondly that it is a particular F being talked about,
and, in order to establish which F, we need to make use of somethiig other than the
nominaL I have intentionally attempted to leave this intuition very vague: it can, as
witnessed by the variety of accounts discussed above, be developed in widely
differing ways. But it nonetheless expresses what is possibly the only common ground
between all the accounts currently available. Given this, I suggest we should take it
seriously.
I propose, then, that we start from the following working hypothesis: 'that F'
is a tool that speakers use to talk about particular Fs. The tool works by indicating two
things: (i) that the hearer is intending to talk about a particular F; and (ii) that being an
F, in the context of utterance, is not the only way in which the speaker is thinking of
her intended F. On the face of it, this kind of view seems to have much in common
with the quantificational account of King (2001). Indeed, although the account I shall
advocate diverges from King's in at least one findamental respect, there is a fair
amount of common ground. Given this, I would like, before progressing to a more
articulated formulation of my own account, to highlight a point, in addition to those
already discussed above, at which King's story seems to get things wrong. An
examination of this shortcoming will, I hope, point us in the direction of a more
complete analysis.
For King, it is typical of uses of complex demonstndives backed by
descriptive intentions that the property which saturates the second argument position,
the argument position reserved for first-order properties determined by speaker
intention, is redundant. He asks us to imagine Danielle who knows, on purely general
grounds, that there is currently one and only one person swimming across Lake
Tahoe. Intending to talk about whoever it is that is currently swimming across Lake
Tahoe, Danielle utters:
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26)That person swimming across Lake Tahoe now must be cold.
On King's analysis, the first argument position is, as ever, saturated by the property
expressed by the nominal, i.e. the property of being a person swimming across Lake
Tahoe now. But, for King, that is also the content of the descriptive intention which
backs up Danielle's use of the complex demonstrative: her intention is to talk about
whoever has the property expressed by the nominal. It is therefore the case that the
second argument position is saturated with just the same property as saturates the first
argument position. The speaker's mtention is thus redundant'°.
On the rough sketch of the communicative role of complex demonstratives
given above, this is at least an undesirable result: what I have suggested is that
complex demonsiratives are communicative tools designed for a particular purpose,
that purpose being to talk about particular members of the nominal class. If the
speaker only has one way of thinking of whatever she wants to talk about, then it
would seem that, on the picture above, a complex demonstrative is the wrong tool for
the job. I accept, however, that if this were the only reason to resist the redundancy in
King's account, it would not be reason enough. But there is some empirical evidence
to suggest we might do well to think again. Consider an example that seems to be
parallel to King's example in (27):
27)That oldest man in the world must be worried about mortality.
Here, as in King's example, the speaker can, self-evidently, believe on purely general
grounds that there is one and only one oldest man in the world, given any story on the
semantics of superlatives". And here, again, as in King's example, the speaker's
intention seems redundant, since, cx hypothesi, she wants to talk about whoever is the
oldest man in the world. And yet (27) seems infelicitous hi a way that (26) isn't Why
might that be? What distinction can we draw between (26) and (27) that might explain
why one is felicitous and the other not?
'°at is no of ecurse, to say that the speakci's intantion muat always be redundant on such usa, just
that this can be and standardly is, the cane.
If you free that the points I make thoi* this exaniple are in mire way special to edativon, awisider
'that winn of the race...'. 'that first day of next year ...' etc.
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Another type of evidence seems to point iii the direction of a plausible answer.
Take the sentence in (28):
28) That dog with three legs is called 'Lucky'.
I want to outline two possible contexts in whicb (28) might be uttered: in the first
context, Janet and John are standing in a room fill of dogs, all but one of which have
the standard canine allocation of legs. Janet turns to John and utters (28). In the
second context Janet and John are again in a room fill of dogs, but now all of the
dogs are three-legged. Pointing at a particular do,g across the room Janet utters (28).
There seems to be an intuitive difference betweem the work done by the nominal 'dog
with three legs' hi these two contexts: in the first context, Janet is using the nominal
not only to pick out which kind of thing she's talking about (she's talking about a
dog), but also which individual within that kind she's talking about (the one with
three legs). In the second context, by contrast, she is simply using the nominal to
indicate which kind of thing she's talking about (she's talking about a dog with three
legs), and John must turn to other, non-linguistic fctors to establish which particular
individual within this kind Janet is talking about (Janet's demonstration is going to
give him a big clue).
What might the distinction between Janet id John's two contexts tell us about
complex demonstratives? Let me suggest an answer. saturating King's second
parameter doesn't always have to be a purely non-linguistic matter; sometimes the
speaker can give the hearer information via her utterance that allows him either fully
or partially to saturate this parameter'2. So, returning to (28), in the first context, the
property expressed by 'dog', not 'dog with three legs', will saturate the first parameter
(the parameter we've so far been thinking of as the nominal parameter), and the
property of having three legs will go some way towards saturating the second
parameter. In a context such as this, however, where speaker and hearer are in an
immediate perceptual relation with the object the speaker is intending to talk about,
perceptual/causal properties of the referent will no doubt also enter into the saturation
My talk of saturating paramets is not intended to indicate that I am oramnitted to any of the details
of King's stoy, I am sinçly he using this Imninology kccasc o(esentation. I shall me dem
how these anidusions fit within my own acenurt lata in the thapta'.
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of the second parameter. Compare an utterance of (28) in the first context to an
utterance of(9), repeated as (29):
29)That professor who brought in the biggest grant in each division will be
honored.
for which linguistically given material ('who brought in the biggest grant in each
division') will entirely saturate the second argument position.
In the second context above, the nominal of(28), as we've already seen, only
goes to identify the type of thing that Janet is intending to talk about; it is left to
contextual indicators to determine which individual of that type Janet wants to talk
about. Translating this into King's terms, the property expressed by 'dog with three
legs' saturates just the first parameter, with the second parameter left entirely to
context, albeit a context manipulated by Janet's demonstration.
How does this story help us with the data we started out with, the infelicity of
(27) in comparison to (26)? If we reanalyse (26) along the lines just sketched, it would
seem natural to say that the kind of thing Danielle is intending to talk about is a
person. And which person? Well, the one swimming across Lake Tahoe now. In other
words, the first parameter is saturated by the property of being a person, while the
second is saturated by the property of being swimming across Lake Tahoe now. Both
parameters are thus saturated. But what of (27)? In (27) there are no two properties
that are separable in this way: the property of being the oldest man in the world is not
the property of being both the oldest man and in the world. It is this, I suggest, that
makes (27) infelicitous. Why? Because, contrary to King's accoun1 the parameter
which corresponds, on his story, to speaker intention, cannot be redundant complex
demonstratives are tools for picking things out via two or more distinct mutes, and
uses of complex demonstratives for which, as in (27), there is only one way of
thinking of the speaker's intended referent, are thereby rendered infelicitous.
There are two extra pieces of evidence to suggest that this sort of story is along the
right lines. Firstly, consider (30):
30)That person who is the oldest man in the world must be worried about
mortality.
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To my ear, (30) is less infelicitous than (27). On the accounts we have looked at so far
in this chapter, all of which treat the nominal as a whole unit, there is no obvious
explanation of this difference. On the kind of story I am sketching, bowever, this
contrast is to be expected: in (30), unlike in (27), there are two separable properties
(the property of being a person and the property of being the oldest man in the world)
which can be prised apart to saturate both of King's first two parameters
Secondly, imagine that on Tuesday Janet is reading the newspaper and sees an
article about the oldest man in the world which she discusses with John. On
Wednesday, having mulled things over in the last twenty-four hours, John utters (27)
to Janet. Again this seems less infelicitous than does (27) uttered in a context without
such a background. Why? Because in this context there is another 'route in' to the
person John is intending to talk about: he's the person they were talking about
yesterday. The second parameter thus doesn't go unfilled. There still does seem to me
to be a certain oddness to an utterance of (27) even in this context, albeit less than
before, and this too can be explained in the terms laid out above: complex
demonstratives are designed in such a way that the hearer interpreting a complex
demonstrative first goes to a class to which the thing talked about belongs, and then
goes beyond that to discover which member of the class is being talked about. But of
course for any utterance of (27), the nominal property will determine a unique
individual, thus leaving the second parameter, although now filled, not doing any
semantic work over and above the work already done by the nominal. Again this
seems to go against the grain of complex demonstratives, although not as seriously as
where there is no property to saturate the second parameter at all. Given this kind of
data, it would seem helpful to introduce terminology to distinguish that part of the
nominal which goes to saturate King's first parameter, the part of the nominal which
makes a complex demonstrative a complex demonstrative, and that optional part of
the nominal which can go towards saturating King's second parameter. I propose to
call the former a nominal sortal and the latter a nominal individuator.
Let me then briefly summarise the kind of picture that the evidence above
seems to point towards complex demonstratives are communicative tools of a
particular kind, they are tools for talking about individuals; given their meanhig they
indicate that the individual hi question is being thought of in at least two ways, firstly
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as a member of a particular class and then via some other route or routes that
distinguish(es) them from all other members of that class. This is, of course, no more
than the vaguest formulation of the outline of an analysis of complex demonstratives.
It is the purpose of the next section of the chapter to finn up the proposed analysis.
6.5 A semantics for complex demonstratives
The analysis I want to propose for the semantics of complex demonstratives is not
itself complex, nor should it be surprising, given the analyses of other singular
expressions which I have put forward in the last three chapters. The central claim I
want to make is, of course, that complex demonstratives are marked by their encoded
meaning as individual concept communicators. In what respect, however, does the
encoded meaning of complex demonstratives diflr from that of other singular
expressions? Perhaps the clearest way to answer this question is by comparing the
account of complex demonstratives which I favour with that of definite descriptions
presented in the last chapter. In that chapter! argued that a definite description 'the F'
encodes, over and above its status as an individual concept communicator, the
property of being a unique F in some pragmatically-determined context. The nominal
property encoded by a definite description thus radically constrains a hearer's search
for an appropriate individual concept: since the property is uniquely instantiated (in
the appropriate context) there will be only a very limited set of individual concepts
available for consideration by the hearer. The meaning encoded by a complex
demonstrative, by contrast, leaves the field wide open: a speaker who uses a complex
demonstrative 'that F', where F is taken to be a nominal sortal, indicates that the
proposition which constitutes the content of her informative intention contains an
individual concept associated with the information x Lr F; beyond that, the
determination of which is the appropriate individual concept is left entirely up to
pragmatic inference. In the last chapter I pointed out that there is a contrast between
the sentences in (31) and (32):
31)The table is very beautiful
32) That table is very beautiful
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Whereas (31), uttered in a context in which there are many tables, seems at least
infelicitous, (32), uttered in the same context, does not. This falls out naturally from
the above analysis: the property expressed by the nominal of a definite description
must be uniquely instantiated in the appropriate context, thus using 'the table' in a
context in which there are many tables leads to infelicity. The property expressed by
the nominal of a complex demonstrative, by contrast, does not have to be uniquely
denoting, thus an utterance of(32) in the same context is entirely lëlicitous, although
the bearer of (32) may require further inlbnnation before he is able to reach the
intended interpretation.
It seems, therefore, that the nominal sortal of a complex demonstrative need
not be uniquely denoting. Indeed we can go further given the sort of examples we
saw in the previous section, it seems that the nominal sortal of a complex
demonstrative cannot be uniquely denoting. Thus the meaning encoded be a complex
demonstrative is in some sense the mirror image of that encoded by a definite
description: whereas the nominal of a definite description must be uniquely denoting,
that of a complex demonstrative must not be uniquely denoting. Putting this in the
language of individual concepts, whereas a definite description 'the F' exploits, by
dint of its linguistic meaning, the property of being a unique F in order to guide a
hearer to the intended interpretation, a complex demonstrative 'that F' exploits the
property of being a non-unique F to guide the hearer to an individual concept.
How does this idea tie in with the talk of parameters and saturation which,
following King we have so far been emploing? The individual concept model offers
a natural interpretation of such talk. Given the semantics outlined above, a speaker
who uses a complex demonstrative 'that F' indicates firstly that the proposition she
wishes to explicate contains an individual concept, and secondly that that individual
concept is associated with the information x Lc F (non-uniquely). Now, given that the
property of being F is not, in the appropriate context, uniquety-k1enti1'ing the hearer
knows one more thing: that as an F is not the only way in which the speaker is
thinking of that which she wishes to talk about; that, in other words, the individual
concept which forms a constituent of the representation which the speaker wishes to
explicate contains more information than merely x is l. Were it not to contain
further information, then it would fail to be an individual concept, since the property
'3 Ofooiuse this extra ln1bmtion may be of dilbud typ, pacqtuai, propositional dc.
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of being an F does not single out an individual Here we find a corollary of King's
parameters: the first parameter represents the property expressed by the nominal
sortal, while the second parameter is simply a reflection of the fuct that the speaker
who uses a complex demonstrative is thereby indicating that she has other ways of
thinking of that which she wishes to talk about than merely as an F. Such an analysis
also offers an explanation of why King's second parameter, contra King himself
cannot be redundant for the second parameter to be redundant would, on this
analysis, be for the speaker to have no way of thinking of that which she wishes to
talk about other than as a satisfier of the nominal sortal. Since the nominal sortal is
non-uniquely-identifying, this would be for the speaker to lack an individual concept
of her intended designatum.
Where, then, does the nominal individuator fit into this picture? Again the
answer is straightforward: beyond the non-uniquely-identi1ing nominal sortal, a
speaker may use any number of different strategies to facilitate her hearer's
interpretational task. She may, for instance, use an ostensive gesture or she may
provide an extra linguistic clue; she may, that is, use a nominal individuator. The
nominal individuator thus serves to bring into the context a further property which the
speaker exploits to further her communicative ends, a further property which she
indicates is associated with the individual concept she wishes to communicate.
In chapter four I discussed at some length whether the properties encoded by
indexicals and simple demonstratives serve a semantic or pragmatic purpose; whether,
in other words, they constrain reference or merely guide a hearer's interpretation. I
concluded, given certain examples, that they serve a merely pragmatic purpose, that
an indexical or simple demonstrative can refer so individuals which do not satisfy
their encoded properties. What of the nominal properties of complex demonstratives?
It seems that just the same arguments as were used in chapter four carry over to the
case of complex demonstratives. in that chapter 1 argued that (33) was an entirely
natural (and literal) vehicle for the proposition that James Barry was really a woman.
33)Youknow,whenhewaslaidoutforhisfizneral kturnedouthewasreailya
woman.
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Consider, then, Bert and Ernie who are standing in a gallery admiring a painting of
Barry dressed in his usual male attire. Knowing Bany's true history, Bert points to the
portrait and says:
34)You know, when that man was laid out for his funeral, it turned out he was
really a woman
Again it seems that (34) expresses the same proposition as (33). Indeed it seems that
the alternative utterance, on which we replace 'man' with 'woman', is at best
anomalous:
35)You know, when that woman was laid out for her funeral, it turned out she
was really a woman
It thus seems that, just as with indexicals and simple demonstratives, the property
expressed by the nominal of a complex demonstrative does not constrain reference,
but merely serves to guide a hearer to the appropriate individual concept.
What, then, are the truth-conditional predictions of my account of complex
demonstratives? They will not come as a surprise: on the account I favour, complex
demonstratives may give rise to either object-dependent or object-independent truth
conditions according to speaker intention. The properties expressed by their nominals
serve to guide bearers to the appropriate individual concept and need make no
appearance in truth-conditional content. This is not, of course, to say that these
properties cannot appear in truth-conditional content. It may well be, as it wifl be, for
instance, in the envisaged utterances of (7), (8) and (9), that the intended
interpretation of a complex demonstrative is a descriptive concept the external
dimension of which is simply the property expressed by the conjunction of the
nominal sortal and nominal individuator.
6.6 Defending the analysis
The analysis I am advocating is consistent with the data, particularly the scopal data,
laid out above. However, I would like, in the last part of this chapter, to raise a couple
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of potential objections to the account and to explain why I do not think these
objectiofis pose any genuine threat.
I am thinking, in particular, of objections might be levelled at the predictions
my account makes on referential uses of complex demonstratives 14. There are, first of
all, the kind of entaihnent data exemplified by (3) and (4), repeated here as (36) and
(37):
36)That green car is vely old.
37)Some green car is very old.
On the kind of account I have sketched there is no actual entailment between these
sentences, in that (36) could be used to explicate a proposition which did not entail
(37): say, for instance, I know you are red-green colour blind and for some reason I do
not want to use the word 'red'; I could then utter (36) and thereby explicate a
proposition which will be true 1ff a particular red car is very old, a proposition which
would not entail (37). Nevertheless there are two further points to be made: firstly, in
chapter 2 1 suggested that philosophical intuitions are largely biased towards
particular idealised discourse contexts. In such a context, in which all relevant
contextual facts are mutually manifest to speaker and hearer, it is hard to see how (36)
could express a proposition which did not entail (37). And secondly, such a context is
clearly far from unusual: in the vast majority of contexts, the combination of
contextual and pragmatic factors will conspire to render explicatures on which (36)
entails (37) the optimally relevant interpretations. Thus, although there is, on my
account no actual entailment here, there is every reason why there should appear to be
such an entailment.
Secondly, Lepore and Ludwig ask us to consider various situations in which the
nominals of referentially-used complex demonstratives appear to be playing some role
in truth-conditional content. Consider, for instance, (38) uttered while indicating a
particular individual:
4 Thc prections I intid to discuss we also made by iy otha aconunt on whith
	 tially-used
complex dnuonstratives conUibute nnthing but their refents to uth-cunditional cuntaL
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38)Each woman in this room admires that man whom she sees at the podium'5.
Their claim concerning this example is that, since there is an element within the
complex demonstrative that is anaphoric on an element outside, the content of the
nominal cannot drop out of propositional content This wouki certainly weigh heavily
against accounts, such as mine, on which referentially-used complex demonstratives
contribute nothing but their referents to propositional content I do net believe,
however, that there is any problem with examples such as these. Firstly, it seems to
me that the referential reading that Lepore and Ludwig are after here, where a
particular individual is being picked out as 'that man who she sees at the podium', is
markedly less natural than a descriptive reading and of course there is no problem, on
my account, with anaphoric relations being set up between a quantifier outside a noi-
referentially used complex demonstrative and a pronominal element within. There is,
however, one way that we can get the anaphoric relation with a referential use, but
without having to posit a quantificational semantics. Compare (38) with (39):
39)Each woman in this room admires John whom she sees at the podium.
To my ear (39) is just as (in)felicitous as (38), yet I presume that it would not force us
into a quantificational account of proper names. Rather, we should analyse 'whom she
sees at the podium' as a non-restrictive relative. The same account seems to cany
naturally over to (38); the proposition expressed by (38) looks not like (40), but like
(41):
40)[V(x): Woman-in-this-room (x)][3(y): That (y) & Man (y) & Sees-at-the-
podium (x, y)] (Admires (x, y))
41) [V(x): Woman-in-this-room (x)](Admires (x, ) & Sees-at-the-podiwn (x, ))16
Let me just mention, before closing one final and related type of example that
might seem to threaten my account Again, Lepore and Ludwig ask us to consider.
IS Lepers and Ludwig (2000, p.204).
"These Logical forius &e purely r illustrative pwpoees i'm n intaxng to post' any pwticul
stosy on non-resUictive relatives.
235
42)That shark that took a swimmer off Flager beach last summer attacked him
inside the sandbar.
Again there seems, prima facie, to be an LF interaction between an element within the
complex demonstrative and an element without, once more suggesting that the
properties expressed by the nominal appear at LF. Although there is not the space to
work through the details of such examples, I see no reason to accept this conclusio&7.
Imagine that I'm right, that the interpretation of the complex demonstrative is simply
the particular shark in question. The hearer of(42) is going to face a problem: how
should he interpret 'him'? Of course there might be someone who is highly salient in
the physical context (the speaker may, for instance be pointing at someone), in which
case the swimmer the shark attacked last summer may simply fall out of the picture.
But, in the absence of a physically salient individual, the utterance itself has made a
particular individual contextually salient: the individual who the shark in question
took off Flager beach last summer. It is entirely to be expected that the hearer should
thus interpret 'him' as corresponding to this individual. The key point is that, just
because the property of being a swimmer who this shark took of Flager beach last
summer is contextually salient enough to provide an interpretation for 'him', does not
entail that it appears anywhere else in propositional content.
Of course there is a vay natural daiptive interpretation availthle here, which Lepore and Ludwig
e not interested in but which might well enter into an LF interaction.
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Chapter seven
Conclusion
7.0
Now that the analyses of the semantics and pragmatics of proper names, indexicals,
demonstratives simple and complex and definite descriptions which I favour are in
place, I want make a few very brief concluding remarks: firstly I want to take a step
back and examine some of the overall claims about singular expre&sions which are
inherent in this account; secondly I shall explore where my account fits in to the range
of stories on singular expressions currently on offer, and finally I want to make a few
tentative suggestions about the possible implications of the sort of account 1 favour
for theories of natural language meaning.
7.1 The class of singular expressions
What, then, are the overall claims about the class of singular expressions which
follow from the specific analyses of chapters three to six? Perhaps the central claim is
that the meaning of singular expressions should not be analysed in truth-conditional
terms. How might one analyse the meaning of a singular expression in truth-
conditional terms? There are two distinct possibilities: firstly one might take the
meaning of a singular expression to be identical to that which the expression
contributes to the truth-conditional content of an utterance in which it appears, a
stance shared by, for instance, the Mihian view on proper names and the Russellian
view on definite descriptions. Secondly, however, one might take the meaning of a
singular expression not to be identical to truth-conditional contributxm, but rather to
lay a constraint on the type of contribution, truth-conditionally individuated (at least
in part), which that expression may make; one might, in other words, view the
semantics of a particular singular expression along the lines Kaplan endorses for
indexicals. It has been my aim to deny both of these theses: on the analyses I have put
forward, the meaning, i.e. the encoded semantics, of a singular expression should be
identified with a constraint on truth-conditional contnl,ution, but a constraint which
makes no mention, so to speak, of the truth-conditional type of that contribution. The
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reason I favour this view essentially comes down to the following argument there are,
intuitively, both referential and desciiptive uses of all types of singular expression; we
should, following something like Recanati's Availability Principle, respect intuitions
on truth-conditional content wherever possible; given the pragmatic machineiy made
available by Sperber and Wilson's Relevance Theoiy, it is possible to respect such
intuitions in an analysis of singular expressions, i.e. it is possible to develop an
account on which singular expressions make distinct types of coniribution to the truth
conditions of different utterances ira which they appear. We should, therefore, prefer
such an account.
There is, however, an obvious objection to any such story, one that has, I
believe, led many to the view that no account along these lines can be right'.
According to this objection, what I have proposed for singular expressions is
essentially an ambiguity account. On my analysis, one and the same sentence
containing a singular expression can, in different contexts, have either genuinely
singular of genuinely quantificational truth conditions; what, so the argument might
go, could be more ambiguous t1n that? And we should, of course, reject an
ambiguity account wherever a viable alternative is available.
There is certainly something right in this objection: I am proposing an account
on which singular expressions can give rise to very different kinds of truth conditions,
so, Wall that is being claimed is that, on my account, singular expressions are truth-
conditionally ambiguous, then I'm going to have to put up my hands to that. I believe,
however, that, on my story, singular expressions are not ambiguous in any way that
the meaning-theorist should worry about Let me briefly rehearse the familiar
methodological claims about ambiguity to demonstrate why. According to Grice's
Modified Occam's Razor, 'senses are not to be multiplied beyond necessity' (Grice
(1967, p.47)). Given two competing theories about the interpretation of a linguistic
expression, one of which posits an ambiguity and the other of which posits none, we
should be ready to accept the latter theory. How might a theory without an ambiguity
do the same work as one with an ambiguity? By handing everything beyond the
univocal semantics over to pragmatics. The essence of Modified Occam's Razor,
then, is that an expression should be viewed as ambiguous if one cannot account for
its semantic behaviour via a univocal semantics plus pragmatics But this Is just what
'Among those who de&Iy cpr suth a 'iiew &e Sdiiffa (1981) and Neale (1990).
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my account of singular expressions does: it takes a single semantics for each singular
expression type, a lexically encoded meaning which constrains the mapping from
linguistic to conceptual representation, and leaves the rest to pragmatics. In any
theoretically significant sense, therefore, the account I have proposed is not an
ambiguity account2.
It is thus central to the account I have laid out that the encoded meaning of
singular expressions should not be analysed in truth-conditional terms. How, then,
should it be analysed? What I have suggested is that we should view singular
expressions as encoding constraints on the mapping from language to thought. We
can distinguish two dimensions of these constraints: that dimension shared by all
singular expressions, i.e. the dimension via which we may individuate the class of
singular expressions, and a further dimension, different for each type of singular
expression. On the analysis I have proposed, the former dimension comes down to
this: that singular expressions are tools for communicating individual concepts. Given
the anatomy for individual concepts laid out in chapter two, this equates to the claim
that the interpretation of singular expressions is constrained to concepts which are
taken to denote individuals3. The latter dimension of the encoded meaning of singular
expressions introduces a (more or less specific) property, a property which will serve
to constrain the inferential process via which a hearer may reach the explicature of an
utterance and will thus, indirectly, constrain the explicature itself. Which type of
property this is will differ from one type of singular expression to another.
How best should we think of this kind of encoded constraint? I have, at
various points throughout the thesis, explored the possibility that the notion of
procedural meaning, due originally to Blakemore (1987) and now extensively used
within the relevance-theoretic literature, may offer us an interesting way of
approaching the encoded meaning of singular expressions. In the final analysis, I am
not sure that the use of this label buys us a great deal. On the one hand, it is surely the
case that, on the kind of account I advocate, singular expressions encode a
fundamentally different kind of meaning from, for instance, predicates: while the
former place constraints on the mapping from word to concept, the latter serve, it
would appear, simply to point towards a particular concept. However, it is unclear to
2 Th1s argument is essentially a bmedaiing of sis argwnent presented 1 Recaned (1993) in de1 of
his account of the rvfcuitial-atfribdie distinction in the use of definite desaiptions.3j am han leaving to one side the fictional use of singular expressions.
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me that we would want to identi1' the kind of encoded meaning thus proposed for
singular expressions with the sort of meaning encoded by non-truth-conditional
expressions, upon the analysis of which Blakemore originally based her conceptual-
procedural distinction. Whether there are any interesting parallels between the kind of
meaning encoded by these two types of expression remains an open question, and, in
the absence of any clear answer, one should perhaps be chary of using the procedural
label for the constraints encoded by singular expression&
7.2 What kind of account is this?
In this section I want to address two distinct questions: firstly, to what extent is the
account of the semantics and pragmatics of singular expressions which I have
proposed in this thesis an account of the same thing as mainstream philosophical and
formal stories on referring and denoting? And secondly, to the extent that they are
accounts of the same thing, where does my story fit in with dominant trends in the
literature on reference?
I have so far talked of the analyses laid out in chapters three to six as analyses
of the semantics and pragmatics of singular expressions. I have also argued at some
length that the accounts I have outlined are, in certain key respects, to be preferred to
other theories of the semantics of singular expressions within the philosophical and
formal semantic literatures. Might it not be claimed, however, that my analyses are
simply not the same sort of thing as the theories I have been comparing them with?
While mainstream semantic theories are concerned with delivering truth conditions
for natural language sentences and, via a specification of truth conditions, with
accounting for logical relations between sentences, I have been concerned with the
cognitive processes underlying natural language interpretation, what the inputs to
those processes are and how their outputs are reached. These, so the claim might go,
are simply different enterprises. Equally, those truth-conditional theories which
operate within a Chomskian framework take their task to be modelling native speaker
semantic competence; I, however, in focusing on interpretation, seem to have located
my interest squarely within the area of performance.
Now there is something right about all this: my primary concerns have not
been to pair natural language sentences with their truth conditions, nor to develop an
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account of logical relations between natural language sentences. Rather I have indeed
focused on the interpretation of utterances containing singular expressions. I do not
believe, however, that these considerations support the claim that the account I have
presented is simply a different sort of thing from mainstream truth-conditional
accounts of reference and meaning. While my account is not directly concerned with
pairing sentences with truth conditions and singular expressions with referents, it is
nonetheless concerned with accounting for truth-conditional intuitions just as much as
are truth-conditional accounts; indeed it takes such intuitions rather more seriously
than do many truth-conditional accounts. Thus my account is an attempt to explain the
same sort of data as directly truth-conditional accounts.
Secondly, my overall account does, as I shall discuss in the following section,
have clear things to say about truth conditions and about the sort of logical relations
which have been taken to hold between sentences. The derivation of truth-conditions
will, of course, look very different on the kind of story I have told; in particular, the
mapping from expression to truth-conditional contribution will pass through
cognition. Nevertheless, the account I have proposed should provide the basis for a
pairing of located utterances of sentences and truth conditions.
Finally, although I have focused on the interpretation of utterances, I have
done so in an attempt to get at what is in essence a matter of competence. In chapter 2,
I placed the cognitive dimension of my account within a modular view of the mmd, a
view on which language processing is taken to be a modular process. The encoded
semantics which I have proposed and defended for singular expressions should,
within this framework, be viewed as elements of the knowledge base of native
speakers, i.e. as what is stored about the meanings of these expressions in a language
module. As such, these encoded meanings comprise elements of native speaker
competence, although they will, of course, contribute to on-line utterance
interpretation. Just as for those semanticists who take themselves to be working
within a Chomskian framework, therefore, my interest has been m capturing cts
about the specifically semantic knowledge which underlies native speakers' linguistic
abilities.
It seems to me, therefore, that, although the particular angle of my approach
may differ from that of most within the broadly truth-conditional tradition, I have
nonetheless offered an account which addresses those questions which are at the heart
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of the truth-conditionalist's endeavour, questions concerning the semantic behaviour
of particular natural language expressions. In the answers it gives to these questions,
however, where does my account fit in with others currently on the market? There is
an obvious sense in which it does not fit in with the dominant schools of thought:
since it takes unambiguous expressions to be capable of giving rise to either object-
dependent of object-independent truth-conditions in different contexts, it violates one
of the fundamental tenets of philosophical/formal semantics, that a single expression-
type must always correspond to the same type of propositional constituent. There are,
nevertheless, significant points of contact between my own account and the broadly
Millian and Fregean traditions. Firstly, the account I have proposed takes seriously the
insight fundamental to Fregean epistemology that it is not possible to think of an
individual other than under some mode of presentation. It is possible to view
individual concepts, then, as a cognitive corollary of Fregean senses. But this
equivalence is strictly limited. Firstly, the descriptive content of an individual concept
does not, on the picture I have painted, invariably determine which individual the
concept is a concept of; whereas it is fundamental to the Fregean picture that sense
determines reference. Secondly, for Frege, senses not only serve as modes of
presentation, they also serve as the meanings of linguistic expressions. On my account
this link is severed: while singular expressions do contribute individual concepts to
explicatures, there is no one-to-one pairing between linguistic expressions and
individual concepts; we cannot, in other words, speciiy the meaning of a particular
singular expression in terms of a particular individual concept My account thus
preserves one of the fundamental insights of Frege's epistemology, while rejecting his
equivalence of modes of presentation with linguistic meanings.
As has been mentioned at other points in the thesis, the Fregean insight that it
is not possible to think of an individual other than under a mode of presentation is not
necessarily at odds with the Millian view: it is open to those Milhians who take truth-
conditional content not to be answerabk to cts concerning cognitive significance to
tell some extra story about cognitive modes of presentation. The account I have
proposed, so far as referential uses of singular expressions are concerned, might be
viewed as one possible cashing out of such a story. On my account, referentially-used
singular expressions contribute nothing but their referents to truth conditions, given
the truth-conditional profile of de re individual concepts. We thus end up, for these
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uses, with the same truth-conditional story as the Millian champions for all uses of
supposedly directly-referential expressions. My account fundamentally palts company
with the Millian, of course, in the analysis of non-referential uses of certain types of
singular expression4. It seems to me, therefore, that the account I have defended offers
something of a middle way between Millianism and Fregeanism: while those uses
which the Millian takes to be rigid do indeed come out as rigid on my account,
nevertheless those features of the Fregean account which allow for solutions to the
cognitive puzzles raised by co-reference and emptiness are, in essence, retained.
7.3 Singular expressions, individual concepts and semantic theory
I want finally to say a few words about the implications of the sort of account which I
have proposed for semantic theory generally. In this thesis it has been my aim to
explore what sort of account of singular expressions emerges if one takes the
relevance-theoretic view of natural language meaning and interpretation seriously; i1
that is, one allows for a radical pragmatic coniribution to the level of what is said by
an utterance. The account that has emerged addresses, as discussed above, those
questions which are at the heart of philosophical semantics, but in doing so it offers
some answers that are of a fundamentally different form from those standardly offered
by philosophical semanticists.
Firstly, on the account I have proposed, the lexical meanings of singular
expressions are analysed not in terms of the mapping from language to world, but in
terms of the mapping from language to mind. The chain from language to world thus
involves two links: that from language to mind and that from mind to world. My
account also suggests that those distinctions between mental entities that are of
significance to the encoded meaning of singular expressions may not be those
distinctions which are significant to the truth conditions of mental representations. I
have claimed that, whereas lexical meaning is sensitive to the distinction between
individual and non-individual concepts, the truth-conditions of thought are sensitive
to distinctions within the class of individual concepts, distinctions to which linguistic
meaning is blind.
'Or at least it fijnnatalIy puts coixj 1y with the Millian who takes his theofy to be a theocy of the
meanings of ocrtain natural language expressions, ratha than o(the propositkmal contest of ctain
types of uses ci those expressiom
243
The account I have proposed thus delivers truth conditions for natural
language sentences, although it does so via a two-step process. What of the other
central concern of truth-conditional semantics, accounting for the logical relations
between natural language sentences. On the relevance-theoretic view of semantics,
and on my account of the semantics and pragmatics of singular expressions in
particular, the data on logical relations comes out looking very differeat. Given the
account I have proposed, logical relations, as least so far as they are detemiined by the
meanings of singular expressions, are not the sort of thing that bold between
sentences; rather they hold between the propositions which, on occasions of use,
sentences may be used to explicate. Thus, on my analysis, there is no entaihnent
between (1) and (2) and no contradiction between (3) and (4):
1) John went to market
2) Someone called 'John' went to market
3) She lives in Lake Tahoe
4) No female lives in Lake Tahoe
Why, then, do these logical relations appear to hold? Because, for the vast majority of
contexts of use, the explicature of (I) will entail the explicature of (2) and the
explicature of (3) will contradict the explicature of (4). These, however, are facts
about the propositions which, on occasions of use, these sentences may be used to
express, not about the linguistic meaning of the sentences themselves.
I started this thesis by suggesting that Frege's Uber sinn und bedeutung had
had an effect on twentieth century semantics which paralleled that of Ptolemy's
Almagest on medieval astronomy placing truth at the centre of meaning has led to the
creation of any number of semantic eccentrics, epicycles and equants. II hope that in
this thesis I have at least suggested a strategy for excising these pieces of Ptolemaic
machinery by deposing truth and placing mind instead at the centre of meaning.
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